JessicaZhixinHan

During the discussion of our group, we went through a paragraph called "Armenia rushes to reengage Russia, aiming to outflank Azerbaijan", which motivated us to lower the probability of 1% for Armenia. In addition, we all agree that the overall probability of Russia launching a full-scale invasion of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, or Kazakhstan before April 1, 2027, remains low.

Reference:

Armenia rushes to reengage Russia, aiming to outflank Azerbaijan https://eurasianet.org/armenia-rushes-to-reengage-russia-aiming-to-outflank-azerbaijan

I adjusted the precentage of "Less than 30 days" higher than "30 days" after the discussion. My teammate and I both believe that it is most likely to be either short or long, which means either less than 30 days (out of diplomatic considerations, and could be only symbolic) or 91 days or more (after careful considerations based on the status quo and benefits on both sides; the U.S. support and intervention is also considered in it). 

The previous Easter ceasefire in the Russian-Ukrainian war lasted only about 30 hours, indicating that both sides lacked the willingness to continue the ceasefire.

-We can infer that there are huge differences in the starting points of the ceasefire negotiations. Putin claimed to be "open" to a bilateral ceasefire, but did not give up the original political goals.

- In addition, Russia is the country that has mainly broken the ceasefire agreement in the past, with at least 25 failed experiences since 2014. Therefore, we can infer that a long-term ceasefire is almost impossible to achieve in a short period of time.

-The US position has also become increasingly tough. Secretary of State Rubio set time pressure for the negotiations, saying that "coordination will be abandoned if no agreement is reached within a few days." All of these may lead to a symbolic ceasefire.

References:

Attempts to reach ceasefire in Ukraine littered with years of failure

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wdllj8lwxo

Putin suggests he's open to Ukraine ceasefire talks with Zelenskyy https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-putin-ceasefire-talks-zelenskyy-trump-peace-deal-rcna202303

At this point, I still think that the overall probability of Russia launching a full-scale invasion of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, or Kazakhstan before April 1, 2027 is low. There are several reasons for this:

1. Although the American public is divided on supporting Ukraine, the West still tends to support Ukraine. Recently, 46% of Americans believe that the United States has not "helped enough" Ukraine. At the same time, 47% of Americans are very worried about Russia's invasion of other countries in the future.

2. For Moldova, although the OSCE has recently tried to promote diplomatic interaction, Russia's information warfare has exacerbated domestic instability in Moldova. So there is reason to think that Russia may still try to intervene in the future.

3. There are still some pro-Russian forces in Armenia, and its geographical location is not conducive to direct military intervention.

4. Kazakhstan has close relations with China, and the cost of invasion is high and the risk is huge.

References:

Support for Greater U.S. Role in Ukraine Climbs to 46% High https://news.gallup.com/poll/658193/support-greater-role-ukraine-climbs-high.aspx

How Americans view the Russia-Ukraine war https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/04/17/how-americans-view-the-russia-ukraine-war/

After consultation thoughts:

I adjusted my forecast by lowering the probability of Russia invading Moldova, as my teammate pointed out the recent diplomatic efforts led by the OSCE encouraging both Moldovan and Transdniestrian authorities to build on the cooperation that emerged during the recent energy crisis. When there is positive diplomatic momentum, it implies the willingness from both sides to engage constructively, which could significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict in the near term.

After-Consultation Thoughts:

After discussing with my teammate, I adjusted my forecast by lowering the probability of the “Less than or equal to 59” option. As my teammate pointed out, there are already 42 disinformation cases recorded, and we still have six more months until October. Assuming the rate remains stable, the total is likely to exceed 59. At the same time, I increased the probabilities for the “Between 60 and 69, inclusive” and “Between 70 and 79, inclusive” categories, since only one new disinformation case has been added to the database over the past week, suggesting the pace is steady but not accelerating.

After consultation thoughts:

I really appreciate my teammate’s insight. We discussed the possible outcomes of a ceasefire and agreed that it would likely be either a symbolic or diplomatic gesture, or a longer-term agreement driven by economic and strategic constraints. After all, there seems to be little rationale for a short-lived ceasefire that falls somewhere in the middle. Based on this reasoning, I adjusted my forecast by lowering the probabilities assigned to the mid-range duration categories.

Based on Trump's recent tough trade policies toward China and the European Union in the past week, we can speculate that these moves may lead to instability in the security order on a global scale. At the same time, the United States' strategic attention in Eastern Europe may also decline. If the United States' strategic and resource investment in Central Asia or the South Caucasus weakens, it will give Russia more opportunities to operate in the surrounding "gray zone".

More importantly, based on the prediction that Trump may reduce military support for Ukraine, coupled with the fact that Russia has invaded Georgia three times and has stationed troops there, Georgia is still one of the most likely targets of invasion.

References:

Wharton Business School - The Economic Effects of President Trump’s Tariffs https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2025/4/10/economic-effects-of-president-trumps-tariffs

China Raises Tariffs on the U.S. Again. Currencies Are a New Concern https://www.barrons.com/articles/china-trump-125-tariffs-tesla-a18dd47b

1. Friedrich Merz was recently elected as the Chancellor of Germany, and the CDU/CSU subsequently reached an agreement to form a coalition with the SPD. However, according to a recent Ipsos poll on April 9, 2025, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has overtaken the CDU/CSU bloc in public support for the first time. Given AfD’s alignment with anti-migration and pro-Russian narratives, this political shift increases the likelihood that Kremlin-affiliated media will amplify disinformation in German-speaking contexts.

2.Recently, President Trump's envoy recently proposed the idea that "Trump envoy suggests dividing up Ukraine like post-war Berlin." Such remarks have been actively quoted by Russian media, not only in Russian-speaking circles, but are also likely to circulate in German-language form on right-wing social media platforms in Austria, Switzerland, and Germany, exaggerating the narrative of "the West abandoning Ukraine." The new German government has recently turned to a tough immigration policy, which has also provided more material for pro-Kremlin media to create hate speech and spread false information.

References:

• Ukraine-Russia war latest: Trump envoy suggests dividing up Ukraine like post-war Berlin as four injured by drones https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-latest-news-trump-putin-b2732065.html
• Germany's Merz unveils coalition deal to spur growth, tackle migration https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-coalition-deal-expected-around-midday-sources-say-2025-04-09/