mc2811

My partner and I had similar perspectives this week on the United States' role as an interlocutor in the peace negotiations. Due to the alleged increasing lack of interest in working with Russia and Ukraine to come to a solution, a ceasefire is unlikely to occur in the near term, as both sides appear entrenched in their positions, and external diplomatic momentum remains limited.

Moreover, the recent violations of the Easter ceasefire further underscore the deep mistrust and volatility between the parties, reinforcing the perception that any negotiated pause in hostilities is likely to be short-lived or unsustainable without a significant shift in external pressure or internal political will.

Also, as mentioned by a colleague, Russia's concept of a ceasefire may differ from the United States' concept, potentially viewing it as a tactical pause to regroup and reinforce rather than a genuine step toward lasting peace—further complicating negotiations and undermining trust between the parties.

The discussion that I had with my partner informed me that there is an upcoming election in Moldova in October. This influenced me to update my confidence level for Moldova by 5%. Given the potential for electoral interference or shifts in public sentiment, this political milestone may increase Moldova’s exposure to Russian hybrid tactics during a critical period, thus allowing an invasion to be framed as a response to internal instability or a pivot away from Western alignment.

Over the past few weeks, my analysis has explored how geographic proximity and historical claims have influenced Russia's strategic calculus in targeting Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia, with particular emphasis on Moldova and Georgia, where pro-Western shifts and territorial vulnerabilities heighten the risk of Russian coercion and hybrid aggression.  

Base Rate: 

This week, I increased my confidence levels for Georgia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan based on their recent defense spending patterns. As Michael J. Mazarr, RAND policy analyst, explains, military expenditures can serve as credible deterrence by denial—signaling capability and intent to raise the costs of aggression and shape the perceptions of potential adversaries​ (1). 

Inside View:

Out of the four countries, Georgia and Moldova have the smallest defense budgets, with Kazakhstan decreasing its defense spending from the previous year (2). While Moldova has deepened EU defense partnerships to modernize its forces, it has the smallest defense budget of other countries, with only $110 million allotted for its defense (3). However, because it has bolstered its partnership with the EU, I have lowered my confidence level for Moldova by 5%.

According to IISS, Georgia’s pro-Russian tilt and legislative restrictions have strained Western ties, resulting in suspended EU military aid (4).  As a result of this, and having the second smallest defense budget, I believe it is more prone to a Russian invasion, thereby increasing my confidence level by 4%.

As for Kazakhstan, its decision to reduce defense spending despite growing regional uncertainty may reflect a strategic gamble, balancing between maintaining economic stability and signaling neutrality amid Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

In previous forecasts, my assumptions and judgments focused primarily on historical precedents, the role of seasonal conditions, and recent reinvigorated attacks in shaping the duration of a potential ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. In this forecast, however, I will shift focus to examine more closely the United States’ role as an interlocutor in the conflict and its potential influence on peace negotiations.

Base Rate:

The United States has a long history of involvement in Ukrainian affairs, particularly since Ukraine’s denuclearization in 1994. That year, Ukraine joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, dismantled thousands of missiles and delivery systems, and transferred hundreds of nuclear warheads to Russia. In return, the U.S., along with Russia and the UK, offered security assurances under the Budapest Memorandum—a commitment NATO continues to uphold amid ongoing Russian aggression. This historical commitment reinforces U.S. credibility as a key mediator and shapes its leverage in current ceasefire negotiations with Russia.

Inside View:

Despite initial efforts to broker a 30-day ceasefire, Russia has rejected U.S. calls and escalated attacks, including a deadly missile strike on Sumy. While President Trump has maintained sanctions and explored diplomacy, his administration’s wavering military support and conciliatory gestures toward Moscow, such as excluding Russia from reciprocal tariffs, have undermined U.S. leverage (1). As European allies fill the vacuum, Ukraine remains skeptical of U.S. neutrality, complicating Washington’s ability to facilitate a lasting agreement. These mixed signals, coupled with continued Russian aggression and territorial demands, suggest that any potential ceasefire would likely collapse within 30 days due to a lack of trust and enforcement mechanisms.

I have revised my base rate to 8% for Russian disinformation cases between 70 and 79 in Germany, which is supported by consistent evidence from government reports indicating a surge in Kremlin-backed influence operations. German authorities, including the BfV, have confirmed that Russia is intensifying efforts to exploit societal divisions and discredit pro-Western political figures through coordinated disinformation campaigns. These operations are expected to persist beyond the 2025 federal election, targeting coalition talks and public discourse to erode trust in democratic institutions and weaken support for Ukraine and NATO.

According to my partner, the German government may not be capable of implementing more regulations.  Per Interface, ​Germany and the EU have implemented various regulatory measures to combat digital disinformation, but these efforts remain fragmented and largely ineffective due to legal ambiguities, limited enforcement mechanisms, and the complex nature of online misinformation

Partner Input 2: Confidence unchanged

While discussing this forecast with my partner, I recognized that my thinking may have been influenced by the availability heuristic. For example, Kazakhstan and Armenia—the two countries I assessed with the lowest confidence levels—receive significantly less coverage in Western media compared to Georgia and Moldova. This disparity in media attention may have shaped my perceptions and affected the confidence I assigned; however, my confidence remains unchanged.

Per my partner, 700 Georgian civil servants were dismissed for supporting dialogue on EU membership. This reflects a broader trend of the Georgian government shifting in a pro-Russian, authoritarian direction, undermining democratic institutions and distancing itself from Western integration efforts. 

Given Georgia’s strategic location, unresolved territorial disputes, and growing public support for the EU, Russia may view increased Western alignment as a threat—potentially prompting military action to reassert influence and prevent further NATO or EU encroachment.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgia-fired-700-civil-servants-supporting-pro-eu-protests-watchdog-says-2025-04-15/

Partner Input 2: Confidence unchanged.

According to this week's updated forecast, my confidence level regarding the duration of a potential ceasefire is informed by Russia’s historical pattern of ceasefire violations. Notably, Russia has repeatedly breached such agreements, including during the 2008 war with Georgia and following the Minsk Agreement in early 2015.

Per my partner, the Kremlin and the U.S. Special Envoy to Russia met last week. President Putin reportedly expressed openness to a permanent peace agreement with Ukraine—though analysts remain skeptical, citing Russia’s prior violations of ceasefire commitments and the lack of concrete concessions. This follows Russia’s deadliest strike in Sumy, Ukraine on Sunday, April 14, which killed 35 people, prompting Ukraine to launch retaliatory attacks later that same day.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/15/us-envoy-witkoff-says-putin-open-to-permanent-peace-with-ukraine

https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-putins-request-for-peace-revealed-to-trump-envoy-at-meeting-12541713

Revision 2:

Last week, I revised the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Kazakhstan to 14%, citing China’s deep economic ties and Russia’s dependence on Beijing as key deterrents, despite Kazakhstan’s strategic resource appeal. Moldova faces the highest risk of invasion before 2027 due to Russia’s influence in Transnistria and recent appeals for Moscow’s protection, though its security depends heavily on Ukraine’s defense of Odesa. Armenia remains the most insulated, while Georgia—already partially occupied by Russia—could face renewed aggression if Moscow succeeds in Ukraine.

Base Rate:

Given historical precedent and geographic proximity, I maintain that Georgia and Moldova face the highest risk of Russian invasion, while Armenia and Kazakhstan remain the least likely targets. 

Russia is using hybrid tactics and pro-Russian parties to expand its influence in Georgia and Moldova, leveraging the “Russkiy Mir” narrative to justify interference and erode Western ties. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), "the Kremlin has used the 'Russkiy Mir' narrative for decades to justify Russian aggression in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and to set conditions to influence independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire.

Inside View:

The Kremlin continues to use the “Russkiy Mir” narrative and pseudo-historical claims to justify influence over former Soviet states like Georgia, where recent fraudulent elections and a pro-Russian ruling party have increased the risk of Russian coercion. With Russian troops occupying 20 percent of Georgian territory and NATO expansion framed as a threat, Georgia remains a strategic target for hybrid aggression, especially amid Western hesitation. Similarly, in Moldova, Russia is backing Kremlin-aligned actors involved in vote-buying and disinformation campaigns to destabilize democratic institutions and discredit pro-European leadership, signaling Moscow’s intent to expand its influence with President Sandu's re-election.

Moreover, Moldova recently expelled three Russian diplomats after accusing the Russian embassy of aiding a pro-Kremlin lawmaker's escape to the breakaway region of Transnistria. This incident underscores Moldova's ongoing efforts to counter Russian interference and maintain its pro-European trajectory. ​

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/31/moldova-expels-three-russian-diplomats-russia-vows-to-retaliate

In the lead-up to Germany’s 2025 federal election, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns intensified, with 70 percent confidence estimating 80–89 cases between October 2024 and September 2025. These efforts aimed to erode trust in democratic institutions, discredit pro-Ukraine candidates, and boost Kremlin-friendly parties like the AFD. Authorities linked the disinformation surge—including 700 fake accounts in the final election week—to the Russian influence campaign Storm-1516.

Base Rate:

Based on the Federal Government of Germany's reports on Russian disinformation, I have revised my base rate to 80% for cases between 80 and 89 because of the documented and growing volume of disinformation traced to pro-Kremlin sources across official media, social media channels, embassy websites, and coordinated campaigns. The government's recognition of disinformation as a persistent and intensifying threat—particularly in the context of the Ukraine war and during sensitive political events—supports a higher likelihood that activity will meet or exceed projected levels​.

Inside View:

On April 2, 2025, Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) reported that Russia continues aggressively expanding its disinformation and influence operations targeting German society and political processes.  According to Global Influence Operations Report, these efforts aim to exploit societal divisions, undermine support for Ukraine, and manipulate political discourse in Germany through coordinated disinformation campaigns focused on energy, inflation, alleged Russophobia, and attacks on political figures.

In 2025, Russia will likely intensify its disinformation efforts in Germany by leveraging a sophisticated mix of tools—including fake news websites, AI-generated content, and coordinated networks of pro-Russian influencers. These operations are designed to exploit existing societal divisions, delegitimize pro-Western political figures, and undermine public trust in democratic institutions, particularly by spreading false narratives about Ukraine, energy security, and inflation. The BfV also anticipates that these campaigns will extend beyond the February federal election, targeting post-election coalition negotiations and policy debates, with the broader goal of weakening Germany’s political cohesion and reducing public support for Ukraine and NATO.

https://www.global-influence-ops.com/german-intelligence-agency-warns-of-russian-disinformation-campaigns-targeting-elections/

https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/hintergruende/DE/spionage-und-proliferationsabwehr/gefaehrdung-russische-spionage-sabotage-desinformation.html