The probability distribution I made reflects a belief that while the impetus for a deal exists now, but the necessary military and political conditions will likely take several months to align, peaking at the latter end of 2025.
A decisive shift in US political will underpins this forecast. The Trump White House has clearly signaled its intent to conclude the conflict, driven by campaign promises, a desire to avoid long-term entanglements, and crucially, an aversion to approving further large-scale aid packages for Ukraine. This stance is not merely rhetorical; the pressure exerted on Kyiv to countenance negotiations, despite its maximalist aims, demonstrates Washington's resolve and urgency to end the war. As existing US aid diminishes without replenishment, Ukraine's capacity to sustain high-intensity warfare will degrade significantly, creating a powerful, time-sensitive incentive to seek terms before its negotiating position weakens further. This US pressure is arguably the most significant factor pushing towards a resolution this year.
Simultaneously, Russia is actively shaping the pre-negotiation landscape. The recent intensification of military operations, particularly the efforts to expel Ukrainian forces from areas like Kursk, strongly suggests Moscow is seeking to maximize its territorial gains and strategic leverage before engaging in substantive talks. Achieving a notable victory, perhaps symbolically timed around Victory Day (May 9), would strengthen Putin's domestic standing and his negotiating hand internationally. Russia perceives a window of opportunity created by the shift in US policy and the current disunity within Europe regarding long-term support for Ukraine. Moscow is therefore incentivized to consolidate gains and push for a settlement while these favorable conditions persist, rather than risk a scenario where European resolve hardens or US policy shifts again.
However, several factors introduce delays, making an immediate agreement unlikely (Q2 2025: 10%). Russia needs time to achieve its desired battlefield positioning – the outcome in Kursk and potentially other areas is not yet secured. Furthermore, the complex political dynamics within Ukraine and Europe act as potential brakes. President Zelenskyy's position, potentially weakened by military realities and war fatigue, is a critical variable. While both Washington and Moscow might prefer a Ukrainian leadership more amenable to concessions, any transition process could be destabilizing and time-consuming, especially if met with strong internal resistance or significant European pushback aimed at preventing a deal perceived as unfavorable to Kyiv. Europe's fragmented approach currently gives the US leverage, but key European nations could still coalesce to obstruct or delay a settlement they deem premature or unjust.
Therefore, the probability increases significantly in the second half of the year. Q3 2025 (July-September: 30%) represents a period where Russian military objectives might be closer to reality, the impact of dwindling US aid on Ukraine's capabilities becomes undeniable, and initial diplomatic maneuvering or political adjustments in Kyiv could be underway. The peak likelihood falls in Q4 2025 (October-December: 35%). This timeframe could allow for the culmination of these trends: solidified Russian battlefield positions, maximum US pressure coinciding with near-depleted resources for Ukraine, and potentially a more pragmatic political reality in Kyiv. This period aligns with the US desire to potentially avoid contentious debates over new Ukraine aid in the next budget cycle.
The remaining 25% chance of no agreement before 2026 reflects the substantial risks and potential spoilers. Protracted fighting if Russia fails to achieve quick gains, unexpectedly resilient Ukrainian defense coupled with bolstered European (non-US) support, a chaotic or delayed political transition in Ukraine, or a fundamental inability for Moscow and Kyiv to agree on core issues (territory, neutrality, security guarantees) could all push any effective agreement into the future.
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Why might you be wrong?
Underestimation of Ukrainian/European Resolve: Ukraine, backed by core European allies, might resist US pressure more effectively or find alternative support, prolonging the conflict despite dwindling US aid.
Overestimation of Russian Military Success/Speed: Russia's offensive aims (like taking Kursk quickly) might stall or fail, delaying their willingness to negotiate from a perceived position of strength.
Misjudgment of US Political Execution: The Trump administration might face domestic hurdles, distractions, or diplomatic failures in imposing its desired outcome.
Zelenskyy's Political Resilience: President Zelenskyy might successfully navigate the internal and external pressures, maintaining his position and resistance to unfavorable terms.
Complexity of Final Status Issues: Agreeing to talk is different from agreeing on borders, reparations, security guarantees, etc., which could prove intractable hurdles.
Unforeseen "Black Swan" Events: Major battlefield reversals, unrelated geopolitical crises, or internal instability in Russia or the US could dramatically alter the trajectory.
Why do you think you're right?
The probability distribution I made reflects a belief that while the impetus for a deal exists now, but the necessary military and political conditions will likely take several months to align, peaking at the latter end of 2025.
A decisive shift in US political will underpins this forecast. The Trump White House has clearly signaled its intent to conclude the conflict, driven by campaign promises, a desire to avoid long-term entanglements, and crucially, an aversion to approving further large-scale aid packages for Ukraine. This stance is not merely rhetorical; the pressure exerted on Kyiv to countenance negotiations, despite its maximalist aims, demonstrates Washington's resolve and urgency to end the war. As existing US aid diminishes without replenishment, Ukraine's capacity to sustain high-intensity warfare will degrade significantly, creating a powerful, time-sensitive incentive to seek terms before its negotiating position weakens further. This US pressure is arguably the most significant factor pushing towards a resolution this year.
Simultaneously, Russia is actively shaping the pre-negotiation landscape. The recent intensification of military operations, particularly the efforts to expel Ukrainian forces from areas like Kursk, strongly suggests Moscow is seeking to maximize its territorial gains and strategic leverage before engaging in substantive talks. Achieving a notable victory, perhaps symbolically timed around Victory Day (May 9), would strengthen Putin's domestic standing and his negotiating hand internationally. Russia perceives a window of opportunity created by the shift in US policy and the current disunity within Europe regarding long-term support for Ukraine. Moscow is therefore incentivized to consolidate gains and push for a settlement while these favorable conditions persist, rather than risk a scenario where European resolve hardens or US policy shifts again.
However, several factors introduce delays, making an immediate agreement unlikely (Q2 2025: 10%). Russia needs time to achieve its desired battlefield positioning – the outcome in Kursk and potentially other areas is not yet secured. Furthermore, the complex political dynamics within Ukraine and Europe act as potential brakes. President Zelenskyy's position, potentially weakened by military realities and war fatigue, is a critical variable. While both Washington and Moscow might prefer a Ukrainian leadership more amenable to concessions, any transition process could be destabilizing and time-consuming, especially if met with strong internal resistance or significant European pushback aimed at preventing a deal perceived as unfavorable to Kyiv. Europe's fragmented approach currently gives the US leverage, but key European nations could still coalesce to obstruct or delay a settlement they deem premature or unjust.
Therefore, the probability increases significantly in the second half of the year. Q3 2025 (July-September: 30%) represents a period where Russian military objectives might be closer to reality, the impact of dwindling US aid on Ukraine's capabilities becomes undeniable, and initial diplomatic maneuvering or political adjustments in Kyiv could be underway. The peak likelihood falls in Q4 2025 (October-December: 35%). This timeframe could allow for the culmination of these trends: solidified Russian battlefield positions, maximum US pressure coinciding with near-depleted resources for Ukraine, and potentially a more pragmatic political reality in Kyiv. This period aligns with the US desire to potentially avoid contentious debates over new Ukraine aid in the next budget cycle.
The remaining 25% chance of no agreement before 2026 reflects the substantial risks and potential spoilers. Protracted fighting if Russia fails to achieve quick gains, unexpectedly resilient Ukrainian defense coupled with bolstered European (non-US) support, a chaotic or delayed political transition in Ukraine, or a fundamental inability for Moscow and Kyiv to agree on core issues (territory, neutrality, security guarantees) could all push any effective agreement into the future.
Why might you be wrong?