I'm decreasing April-June to 2%. We are nearly two thirds of the way through the time period. Putin's actions have been clear that he is not serious about peace in the short term. Even getting a high level delegation to show up to talks has not happened from Russia's side. More prisoner exchanges are likely, but not much else.
Trump is finally publicly expressing frustration with Putin, but so far has not increased pressure through increased sanctions or new a new round of aid to Ukraine. On the other hand, the US, UK, France, and Germany changed the rules so that Ukraine has no restrictions concerning how deep they are allowed to strike military and infrastructure targets inside Russia with weapons provided by the four listed countries.
The coalition of the willing in Europe is clear that they will stand with Ukraine regardless of the actions of the US. The nature of war has changed to be dominated by drones on the frontlines, for surveillance, and for deep strikes. This helps even the odds between Ukraine and Russia. Russia still has more mass/number of available troops, so will want to push through the summer and fall months when territorial gains are most likely. Russia will also want to see if they can break the will of the US. The won't be able to break the will of Ukraine, Poland, the Baltics and Nordic states, or France and UK. With the change in leadership in Germany and the recent visit of Zelenskyy, it appears they are committed to increasing support and removing restrictions on Ukraine's use of force.
I have the second highest weight on October to December because if there are no major Russian gains through the summer and fall, they may want to agree to a ceasefire if US support for Ukraine is robust and European support has continued to accelerate. There is also a small chance of leadership change in Russia which would change the calculations.
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Why might you be wrong?
There are increasing rumors of instability in Russia. I continue to think the chances of this occurring before the end of the year are low, but they are not impossible. The march towards Moscow by Prigozhin and Wagner is in the distant past now, but it showed that the population was not strongly behind Putin. If the summer goes very poorly for Putin, a change of leadership is not out of the question. I generally am not optimistic about the efficacy of sanctions, but if the allies manage to seriously reduce the ability of the shadow fleet, economic pressure may also play a roll.
Why do you think you're right?
I'm decreasing April-June to 2%. We are nearly two thirds of the way through the time period. Putin's actions have been clear that he is not serious about peace in the short term. Even getting a high level delegation to show up to talks has not happened from Russia's side. More prisoner exchanges are likely, but not much else.
Trump is finally publicly expressing frustration with Putin, but so far has not increased pressure through increased sanctions or new a new round of aid to Ukraine. On the other hand, the US, UK, France, and Germany changed the rules so that Ukraine has no restrictions concerning how deep they are allowed to strike military and infrastructure targets inside Russia with weapons provided by the four listed countries.
The coalition of the willing in Europe is clear that they will stand with Ukraine regardless of the actions of the US. The nature of war has changed to be dominated by drones on the frontlines, for surveillance, and for deep strikes. This helps even the odds between Ukraine and Russia. Russia still has more mass/number of available troops, so will want to push through the summer and fall months when territorial gains are most likely. Russia will also want to see if they can break the will of the US. The won't be able to break the will of Ukraine, Poland, the Baltics and Nordic states, or France and UK. With the change in leadership in Germany and the recent visit of Zelenskyy, it appears they are committed to increasing support and removing restrictions on Ukraine's use of force.
I have the second highest weight on October to December because if there are no major Russian gains through the summer and fall, they may want to agree to a ceasefire if US support for Ukraine is robust and European support has continued to accelerate. There is also a small chance of leadership change in Russia which would change the calculations.
Why might you be wrong?
There are increasing rumors of instability in Russia. I continue to think the chances of this occurring before the end of the year are low, but they are not impossible. The march towards Moscow by Prigozhin and Wagner is in the distant past now, but it showed that the population was not strongly behind Putin. If the summer goes very poorly for Putin, a change of leadership is not out of the question. I generally am not optimistic about the efficacy of sanctions, but if the allies manage to seriously reduce the ability of the shadow fleet, economic pressure may also play a roll.