the lack of comprehensiveness of the easter day truce means that it was not relevant to our forecast and so I restored my previous predictions with the breakdown of the easter truce increasing the likelihood of a ceasefire lasting less than 30 days but not by too much
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Star Commenter - Apr 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
33%
(-67%)
Less than 30 days
3%
(+3%)
30 days
26%
(+26%)
31-60 days
2%
(+2%)
61-90 days
36%
(+36%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
the easter truce may not determine the results of a comprehensive ceasefire, as a comprehensive ceasefire is negotiated to last while the easter truce was temporary in nature and so the motivation behind the two may be significantly different enough to not impact one another
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
11%
(+1%)
Moldova
2%
(0%)
Armenia
20%
(0%)
Georgia
5%
(0%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
With the increased disinformation campaigns against President Matryoshka (The Insider) with a targeted disinformation campaign that includes multiple video formats from think tank adjacent videos to "interviews". These actions have the potential to increase unrest within Moldova and prime it for a potential invasion, however, this could also be a method to support pro-Russian candidates to be elected into positions of power. The ambiguity of the motivation reduces the strength of my correction. The previously stated limitations are also cause to limit the strength of the correction.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
As this is a small incremental increase and there is no ambiguity into the direction that this datapoint might move the stated prediction into, I may be wrong in the weight I should allocate to this data point but not on the direction of change.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
100%
(+71%)
Less than 30 days
0%
(-5%)
30 days
0%
(-26%)
31-60 days
0%
(-2%)
61-90 days
0%
(-38%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
A ceasefire has occurred during Easter Sunday () and has already been terminated by Russia on Monday. (BBC)
My previous cases had assumed that any ceasefire that would take place would strive to be lasting, or a phased approach, it neglected the possibility for an extremely short-term (1-3 day) ceasefire to honor religious holidays, this is ironic as I had factored into my base case the Eid celebration ceasefires during the Afghanistan civil war that had lasted less than 30 days yet I didn't give it more weightage.
I am satisfied that my predictions estimated 90+ days as the most likely (~38%) and less than 30 days as the second most likely (~29%).
Meaning that the below 30 days was within the "improbable" bucket, one bucket below even odds, as the Easter Ceasefire relied on multiple variables including the intensity of the war leading up to the holiday, this improbable rating was justified.
It is also great to see that my revision of the forecast from 4% likelihood of a ceasefire occurring for less than 30 days to 29% (25% increase) as a result of factoring in previous conflicts through an outside view was justified and successful.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
This 1-day "truce" may not be considered a ceasefire, President Zelensky has called it a PR stunt, while both sides accuse each other of violating the ceasefire more than a thousand times mere hours after agreeing to it. Furthermore, this situation cannot be considered comprehensive as it does not deal with any of the demands of either party and was meant to be extremely short-term by its very nature, therefore it may not be considered an eligible ceasefire.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
10%
(0%)
Moldova
2%
(0%)
Armenia
20%
(0%)
Georgia
5%
(0%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
After discussing with my partner we aknowledged the importance of prior conditions for the likelihood of future war waging capabilities, my results do take this into account and so have not been altered
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Have not found an outside view
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
4%
(0%)
Less than or equal to 59
40%
(0%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
44%
(0%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
10%
(0%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
2%
(0%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
There has not been any additional news that altered my forecast this week
Files
Why might you be wrong?
not sure
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
29%
(+18%)
Less than 30 days
5%
(-22%)
30 days
26%
(+19%)
31-60 days
2%
(-10%)
61-90 days
38%
(-5%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
- discussion with partner highlighted how a ceasefire's fairness or one-sidedness may impact the duration
- My partner and I recognized how a vast majority of ceasefires during the 21st century were around the extremes, either they were broken within 30 days or lasted a significant amount of time
- with the ceasefires that were broken in between, they tended to have a phased approach, similar to the recent Israel and Palestine ceasefire which ended after phase 1. therefore, I increased the likelihood of a ceasefire lasting between 30 and 60 days to reflect the impact a phased ceasefire may have on the length
Files
Why might you be wrong?
- While i continue to fine tune my inside view I am unable to identify an outside view to use as a base case, this leaves my forecast blind to over arching trends that may not be captured in the history of Russian behavior but may have been captured in global behavioral trends
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
4%
(0%)
Less than or equal to 59
40%
(-2%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
44%
(0%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
10%
(0%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
2%
(+2%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
- increased the probability of more than or equal to 90, as a situation may arise that i have not foreseen
- While the concept of counter-propaganda is not a new one, identifying and tracking it is. this results in our data points for the trend being limited, constricting our ability to establish an outside view
- German Elections Source: https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/09/europe/germany-coalition-deal-intl/index.html
- EU-Disinfo database: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/to-challenge-russias-ongoing-disinformation-campaigns-eight-years-of-euvsdisinfo/
Files
Why might you be wrong?
- while this predication will not capture disinformation outright, the question is focused on the EUvDisinfo source and so we are limited by the framing of the question
- My drivers do not include the resource limitations that may prevent additional dis information expenditure, this may impact the results as Russia's economy remains resilient/ is more constrained, leading to a decreasing amount of disinformation over time, however, it can not be added into the discussion as it is likely to be based on speculation.
Files
Why do you think you're right?
https://eurasianet.org/armenia-rushes-to-reengage-russia-aiming-to-outflank-azerbaijan
This source reaffirms Armenia's motivation to strengthen ties with Russia not in order to prevent an invasion but to improve military coordination, it would not be doing this if it saw Russia as a threat
Why might you be wrong?
This could actually reduce the probability of Armenia being invaded