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After a discussion with my peer and some further research, I have increased the probability of a ceasefire lasting less than 30 days due to recent events. Over the weekend, there was a temporary "Easter ceasefire" between Russia and Ukraine, but it was broken by both sides. My peer and I also discussed how words can be interpreted differently by either side, which can have an impact on what it means to have a ceasefire or a truce. Because both sides accused each other of breaking the temporary ceasefire, it increases the probability that if a written bilateral ceasefire were created, neither side would abide by it and continue attacking each other. It can also lead to a frozen conflict, which is what I talked about in my previous forecast, and after talking with my peer, I am reaffirming this belief that a frozen conflict can happen if an agreement is reached. 

The discussion that I had with my peer brought a new perspective that I hadn't considered before. Military spending can be a driver in this scenario because recently, Kazakhstan has decreased its military spending, and Moldova has increased its EU partnerships while having a small defense budget. If a country has foreseen a small probability of an invasion happening, it is important to take into consideration its military power. Due to this, I have decreased my probability of Kazakhstan being invaded by 2% and Moldova by 1%. 

As stated in my previous forecast, the base rate for my forecast is 20% due to the historical background that Russia has with all 4 countries. The outside view has changed slightly and has influenced a small increase in the probability of a Russian invasion in Moldova and Georgia. According to the New York Times, Moscow has stationed military forces in friendly countries and fanned the flames of destabilizing political movements across the continent (NYT). In addition, the United States has been distancing itself from European allies, which has only made countries vulnerable since they don't have the reassurance of US military power. The inside view for these countries has stayed the same since my previous forecast. However, the current President of Moldova has recently announced that the upcoming parliamentary elections have increased tensions with Russia. "The Kremlin is betting on replacing the country's leadership with people it can control. And it's not just about Moldova, because Russia's interest is now in Ukraine. If the Kremlin gains control of the government, it will use Moldova against Ukraine" (Ukrainska Pravda). Since Russia already has troops in Transnistria, it wouldn't take much to take control of Moldova and use their resources against Ukraine. In addition, the United Nations created a resolution that accuses Russia of aggression in Ukraine, in which Georgia and Armenia both were in support (EA Daily). This can have consequences against the two countries that come from Russia, so the probability of Russian invasion increases slightly for the two countries. 

The reason behind my updated forecast is due to the events that have occurred this past weekend. The outside view is still the same as my previous forecast, in which I stated that there have been previous failed ceasefire attempts between Russia and Ukraine. However, the inside view supports the rationale that even if Russia and Ukraine somehow reach a ceasefire deal, the probability of a ceasefire lasting less than 30 days has increased. The United States recently expressed that it might be "moving on" from trying to negotiate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine (AP). Without a strong third party to help Russia and Ukraine come to a ceasefire agreement, neither country's probability of respecting any ceasefire increases. In addition to Secretary Rubio's statement, the Kremlin signaled that it was in no hurry for a ceasefire, a consistent message from Moscow throughout Mr. Trump’s attempts to end the war (NYT).  For these reasons, I have slightly increased my forecast by 5% because now that the US is threatening to back out of forcing a negotiated deal that would satisfy both parties, any deal that comes out after that will not have sufficient political power to remain intact. 

After speaking with my partner, there are a few points that were raised that have pushed me to change my forecast slightly. In my previous forecast, I stated that Armenia's probability of invasion is lowered due to being a member of the CSTO. However, my partner brought to my attention that the CSTO has slowly become less powerful, especially since 2022. As contentious Russian military decisions erode confidence in the CSTO, growing interest from other international actors highlights the potential for a new security order to emerge within Central Asia (Young Australians). One of the reasons I brought this up is because participation in multilateral institutions has helped bring peace and stability to other parts of the world. If confidence in these institutions is dwindling, then it increases the probability of countries such as Armenia for a Russian invasion. In addition, another point that was brought up by my partner is that China has had a presence in Kazakhstan. It has intensified its soft-power efforts, developing language courses, education, and people-to-people connections aimed at reaching more deeply into Kazakhstani society (Carnegie Endowment).  Due to this relationship, the probability of Russia invading Kazakhstan lowers because of their close relationship with China. 

After speaking with my partner, there was something that I didn't take into consideration in my previous forecast. They pointed out that the EU is not equipped to detect disinformation from Russian campaigns, and it has made it difficult to bring them down. This might be why we also see an increase in German language disinformation cases because some of them might slip past EU cyber defenses. This is a perspective that is new and should be taken into consideration. In addition, she also pointed out that if the war is coming to an end, then the number of disinformation cases can decrease due to Russia reaching their objectives. 

After speaking with my partner, we came to the same conclusion about how NATO and the EU are important drivers in how long a ceasefire would last between Russia and Ukraine. In addition, without U.S. interference and help guide talks between the two countries, it would increase the probability that a ceasefire would last less than 30 days. However, one consideration that I looked into after speaking with my partner is that when looking more closely at past historical trends, there are still tense relations with Russia and other parties. For example, in my previous forecast, I stated that Russia invaded Georgia back in 2008. When I looked a little more closely, there was a formally held ceasefire between the two countries, but even years later there is still heavy military tensions. Moscow... today regularly moves the demarcation line between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia a few meters further into the country (Atlantic Council). Due to this, I have slightly increased my forecast for a ceasefire to last 91 days or more because the question asks if a ceasefire would hold and not whether it would become a frozen stalemate. 

The base rate for Russian invasion needs to consider centuries of Russian history because the country's foreign policy has historically relied heavily on coercion and military projection. "Russia has always been a militarized country—it has done this, in fact, for its own survival" (Tufts Now). In my previous forecasts, my base rates have been around 20%, and then I would work my way up or down depending on the country. In my latest forecast, I decreased the probability of invasion between 8-17% for Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakstan. For this forecast, I will be sticking to my base rate of 20% due to these countries having some historical background with Russia. The outside view of a Russian invasion within any of these countries can be looked at from the perspective of a NATO/EU encroachment. Russia does not want the West right at its doorstep, so it would do what is necessary to keep it from establishing a presence in Russia's neighboring countries. Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, along with several other countries, are caught between Russia and the EU, building ties with the latter even as the former seeks to maintain influence there and deter the West (Carnegie Foundation).  This increases the likelihood of a Russian invasion when looking from an outside view. However, the inside view is a different story. Armenia's probability of invasion would be lower due to being a member of two Russian-led institutions—the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Carnegie Foundation). In my previous forecast, I stated that Kazakhstan has a low likelihood of Russian invasion due to being a neutral player in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, I have increased Kazakhstan's probability of invasion because there has been societal and political instability that has shifted away from Russia's dependence (ECOFR). Recently, there have not been any new developments within any of these four countries and the threat of Russian invasion. However, even though there hasn't been any recent news, it is still important to keep track of any developments that these countries may have with Western countries because that can increase the likelihood of Russia invading these countries. 

The base rate that I am establishing for this forecast is 60 days per year because that is the average amount of disinformation cases that have occurred within the last 5 years (RAND). This base rate is linked to German language disinformation cases coming from pro-Kremlin media across the European Union that have been reported by EUvsDisinfo. In my previous forecast, I stated that Russia increased its pro-Kremlin propaganda that supported a conservative party for government elections due to that party aligning with Russian beliefs. The outside view is that at the end of November 2024, as it became clear that Germany would be facing elections in early 2025 amid the current government’s collapse, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution issued a public warning regarding the potential for foreign influence and manipulation in the upcoming elections (PRIF Blog). In addition, during the COVID-19, pandemic in 2021, the German elections were expected to be highly digitalized, and there was fear of disinformation cases spreading more easily on the internet (Institute of Montaigne). Overall, this has led to an increase in the number of disinformation cases that have originated from pro-Kremlin views. The inside view is that due to the Russia-Ukraine war, there has been an increase in disinformation cases. In 2024, one of the most impactful fake messages, in terms of the number of people it reached and the amount of feedback it generated, Annalena Baerbock, the foreign minister, appeared to be declaring from her own account on X that government support for Ukraine was crumbling (The Guardian). In recent news, according to the TASS, a Russian news agency, the feedback received from Ukrainian troops indicates that most of the weapons Germany has sent to Kiev are not even used (TASS). However, according to DW, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and his British counterpart were discussing how Germany has pledged new deliveries of weapons systems at a meeting of defense ministers at NATO headquarters (DW). On one side of the spectrum, a Russian news outlet stated that German weapons are not being used on the war front, and on the other side, a credible news source is talking about sending more military aid to Ukraine. The two opposite articles support the theory that the number of cases of disinformation has increased and will not decrease within the next year especially as the Russia- Ukraine war is almost coming to an end.