There is so much to unpack in this forecast, I’ll try my best to take a stab at it.
First and foremost, the use of a pandemic-capable pathogen as a biological weapon by state or non-state actors is, to me, the least likely scenario of all. To be effective, a weapon needs to produce predictable effects and provide a tactical advantage, which are not characteristics typical of pandemic-capable viruses. The risk for uncontrollable self-harm is simply too high, even in the case of pathogens aimed at animals or plants. Whichever field advantage one wants to gain, there are much better and cheaper options than developing and deploying bioengineered weapons. Even a terrorist non-state organization wouldn’t benefit much from generating that kind of global damage. There are plenty of historical cases of terrorist attacks that managed to resonate globally despite being relatively low-cost and much easier to realize. Think of 9/11.
If I were to think about which actor is most likely to try and develop such a bioengineered weapon, I’d guess a “lone wolf” terrorist. Incidentally, this type of individual is also less likely to have access to the necessary knowledge, equipment, and materials, and therefore he would almost inevitably fail.
I would expect most of the danger to stem from an accidental release from an existing research laboratory. This could either be a research institution or some state-backed military experimental project. Most of the currently ongoing research activity likely regards existing pathogens, so the most likely scenario could be one in which a mutated version of a previously known virus is accidentally released. Something as trivial as influenza with a single mutated gene could infect a researcher, and the virus could quickly spread uncontrollably, which would technically count toward a “Yes” resolution.
I also believe the crowd might be overlooking the potential resolution from an epiphytotic event. The resolution criterion reads “A new plant disease outbreak is announced” which is vague enough to account for a wide set of possible scenarios. Plant bioengineering is less strictly regulated, and there is a higher degree of experimentation than with animals and humans. Cultivars are bioengineered to increase their yields and make them more resistant to disease. This might create conditions for the rapid spreading of certain diseases or the emergence of “superweeds” resistant to herbicides. In that case, human bioengineering activity would be only an indirect cause for the spread of these diseases or weeds, but would certainly provide a positive answer to the question “Will human bioengineering activities cause a biological event of high consequence”. Would that count for a “Yes” resolution? Unclear.
For my initial forecast, I’m starting with a stricter interpretation of the resolution criteria aligned with that of the crowd, but I’ll ask for a clarification of the Epiphytotic event resolution criteria and evaluate whether to raise my probability estimate.
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Why might you be wrong?
It is always somewhat complex to correctly calibrate a forecast on longer timeframes
My knowledge of the subject is limited. There is no historical base rate, and there are just so many paths to a "Yes" resolution that it would be a monumental task to unpack every single option. Multiple biological entities could cause events affecting humans, animals, or plants. Multiple actors could be responsible (states, non-states, terrorists, lone wolves, amateurs). And there are multiple ways the event could unfold (accidental, deliberate...). In all of this, it's not easy to properly assess how easy/complex it would be for each actor to create a dangerous biological entity
There is no historical base rate for this type of event, and it's not easy to even estimate the extent to which bioengineering is happening in the world and at which rate.
Why do you think you're right?
There is so much to unpack in this forecast, I’ll try my best to take a stab at it.
First and foremost, the use of a pandemic-capable pathogen as a biological weapon by state or non-state actors is, to me, the least likely scenario of all. To be effective, a weapon needs to produce predictable effects and provide a tactical advantage, which are not characteristics typical of pandemic-capable viruses. The risk for uncontrollable self-harm is simply too high, even in the case of pathogens aimed at animals or plants. Whichever field advantage one wants to gain, there are much better and cheaper options than developing and deploying bioengineered weapons. Even a terrorist non-state organization wouldn’t benefit much from generating that kind of global damage. There are plenty of historical cases of terrorist attacks that managed to resonate globally despite being relatively low-cost and much easier to realize. Think of 9/11.
If I were to think about which actor is most likely to try and develop such a bioengineered weapon, I’d guess a “lone wolf” terrorist. Incidentally, this type of individual is also less likely to have access to the necessary knowledge, equipment, and materials, and therefore he would almost inevitably fail.
I would expect most of the danger to stem from an accidental release from an existing research laboratory. This could either be a research institution or some state-backed military experimental project. Most of the currently ongoing research activity likely regards existing pathogens, so the most likely scenario could be one in which a mutated version of a previously known virus is accidentally released. Something as trivial as influenza with a single mutated gene could infect a researcher, and the virus could quickly spread uncontrollably, which would technically count toward a “Yes” resolution.
I also believe the crowd might be overlooking the potential resolution from an epiphytotic event. The resolution criterion reads “A new plant disease outbreak is announced” which is vague enough to account for a wide set of possible scenarios. Plant bioengineering is less strictly regulated, and there is a higher degree of experimentation than with animals and humans. Cultivars are bioengineered to increase their yields and make them more resistant to disease. This might create conditions for the rapid spreading of certain diseases or the emergence of “superweeds” resistant to herbicides. In that case, human bioengineering activity would be only an indirect cause for the spread of these diseases or weeds, but would certainly provide a positive answer to the question “Will human bioengineering activities cause a biological event of high consequence”. Would that count for a “Yes” resolution? Unclear.
For my initial forecast, I’m starting with a stricter interpretation of the resolution criteria aligned with that of the crowd, but I’ll ask for a clarification of the Epiphytotic event resolution criteria and evaluate whether to raise my probability estimate.
Why might you be wrong?