I am slightly reducing probabilities for Latvia and Lithuania in this timeframe (17 months or 1.4 year remaining). A lot can change in what is almost 1 year and a half, but I don't think Russia will be able to act that fast based on how their forces are still engaged in Ukraine. I think Ukraine will remain their main focus for quite some time.
I believe that maintaining the impression that there is real and current threat of invasion to the EU and NATO countries in Baltics and NATO Eastern Flank is currently beneficial for Russia. Look at the recent incidents like with those armed individuals in unmarked uniforms near Estonia border and some media reaction with warnings that the little green men have already come to NATO's doorsteps.
If Russia was planning to invade NATO Eastern Flank anytime soon they would not be doing what they are doing now - I mean for example showing Poland the need to invest in drone detection and antidrone protection on their Eastern border. Ok, if one plans the attack and wants the element of surprise to be on their side, they may want to make numerous incursions into target airspace and territorial waters creating the impression that this is something which happens often and which is "normal". Also something like conducting regular military exercises at the target country's border as a cover up for the military buildup for future invasion, as in case of USSR's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia or Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, I think for now this is all about the posture, image, about signaling, putting pressure, making NATO countries' policymakers uncomfortable, trying to influence their societies, showing the world "we can do that", also I guess it is good for internal audience in Russia. The result is that European NATO countries are making preparations to defend themselves from future Russian invasion, and if Russia does not plan to invade any NATO country anytime soon, this is good for them as it reduces how much money that is assigned for military purposes and how many weapons and ammunition can be sent to Ukraine. My point is that if policymakers in EU and European NATO were sure that we are safe from Russia because we are in NATO, then we would be able to sent more of the equipment to Ukraine. Even the US during the Biden administration was calculating how many weapons they could give to Ukraine and how many they needed to keep in reserve in case of other conflicts.
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Why might you be wrong?
Unique time of weakness for NATO, and unique opportunity for Russia? Serious miscalculation? I was wondering if putting Russian military vessels on some Baltic state territorial waters with the intention to blockade and hold this space for at least some time would count toward resolution as "yes".
If Russia was planning to invade NATO Eastern Flank anytime soon they would not be doing what they are doing now - I mean for example showing Poland the need to invest in drone detection and antidrone protection on their Eastern border.
Thanks, Christos! I now think that maybe I wanted to find the signal too hard here and ended up reading too much from this. War is chaos, and states are subject to internal miscoordination and miscommunication. The world is not as rational as we would like it to be. There is a lot of noise. Maybe a potential short-term gain from this plan of attack was assessed to be worth it, or maybe someone responsible for planning has not envisioned the consequences. Assessing the intentions of adversaries is a famously hard task for any intelligence agency, especially if we would like to achieve a strategic warning instead of only a tactical warning. Instead, many have pointed toward assessing capabilities of the adversaries, but that too can be misleading if we mistake capabilities with intentions (replacing the harder question with the simpler one and trying to answer the original). I guess if we could say that they do not have capabilities and will not have them in this timeframe, that would be informative. Even then, there is a risk of misjudgment from the attacking side (I love the books by Robert Jervis).
Why do you think you're right?
I am slightly reducing probabilities for Latvia and Lithuania in this timeframe (17 months or 1.4 year remaining). A lot can change in what is almost 1 year and a half, but I don't think Russia will be able to act that fast based on how their forces are still engaged in Ukraine. I think Ukraine will remain their main focus for quite some time.
I believe that maintaining the impression that there is real and current threat of invasion to the EU and NATO countries in Baltics and NATO Eastern Flank is currently beneficial for Russia. Look at the recent incidents like with those armed individuals in unmarked uniforms near Estonia border and some media reaction with warnings that the little green men have already come to NATO's doorsteps.
If Russia was planning to invade NATO Eastern Flank anytime soon they would not be doing what they are doing now - I mean for example showing Poland the need to invest in drone detection and antidrone protection on their Eastern border. Ok, if one plans the attack and wants the element of surprise to be on their side, they may want to make numerous incursions into target airspace and territorial waters creating the impression that this is something which happens often and which is "normal". Also something like conducting regular military exercises at the target country's border as a cover up for the military buildup for future invasion, as in case of USSR's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia or Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, I think for now this is all about the posture, image, about signaling, putting pressure, making NATO countries' policymakers uncomfortable, trying to influence their societies, showing the world "we can do that", also I guess it is good for internal audience in Russia. The result is that European NATO countries are making preparations to defend themselves from future Russian invasion, and if Russia does not plan to invade any NATO country anytime soon, this is good for them as it reduces how much money that is assigned for military purposes and how many weapons and ammunition can be sent to Ukraine. My point is that if policymakers in EU and European NATO were sure that we are safe from Russia because we are in NATO, then we would be able to sent more of the equipment to Ukraine. Even the US during the Biden administration was calculating how many weapons they could give to Ukraine and how many they needed to keep in reserve in case of other conflicts.
Why might you be wrong?
Unique time of weakness for NATO, and unique opportunity for Russia? Serious miscalculation? I was wondering if putting Russian military vessels on some Baltic state territorial waters with the intention to blockade and hold this space for at least some time would count toward resolution as "yes".
Yeah, I'll drink on that... 👍😉