We have 14 months left in the forecasted time window. I like @lzhang suggestion here about looking at how long it took between negotiation and opening of the base. For our purpose, a base under construction still counts, so while this is only a single case and other negotiations of similar matters may be different, we have initial news media reporting about this from 9 May 2015. We have the next news media report from 21 January 2016 that the negotiations were concluded. That is 257 days or 8 months and 1 week. And the construction is reported to have started in March 2016, but the first official confrmation I found is from April and is mentioned here: "On April 8, 2016 China’s Ministry of Defense reported that construction of China’s first oversea military base had begun." So that gives us 335 days or 11 months between first reporting of negotiations and the reporting of the construction. Ok, negotiations can take a shorter time or media can learn about them in later time than in case of Djibouti (I would expect US Intelligence providing them with such a report, like in case of Equatorial Guinea), but still, this is useful information, as it allows us to reduce the time window of when the information should appear for this likely to take place in remaining time. If we reduce number of remaining days till 1 January 2027 (427) by 335 days it gives us only 92 days or 3 months, even if multiply this by 2 assuming that things could happen faster this is only 6 months and not 14 months.
Time invariant calculations of Laplace's rule of continuity and Jeffreys prior assuming the remaining 184 days
Case A — since first success - construction start of base in Djibouti, assuming March 2016, (variable window, S=1,T=3,531
Laplace: p≈4.95%
Jeffreys: p≈2.51%
Case B — since first reporting of another attempt (fixed window, S=0,T=1,426)
Laplace: p≈11.43%
Jeffreys: p≈5.89%
Also, this article makes interesting point: "China has shifted its strategy in the Indian Ocean region, favouring loyal intermediaries over direct military bases. (...) China’s approach in the region has evolved. Its first overseas military base, established in Djibouti in 2017 on the Red Sea’s edge, marked a turning point but also triggered strong diplomatic pushback from regional and global powers. Since then, overt bases have proven costly in terms of perception and strategic trust. As a result, Beijing appears to favour arrangements that deliver similar benefits— access to ports, surveillance routes, logistic support— without formal PLA installations or permanent overseas personnel openly acknowledged in foreign territories.
By empowering Pakistan as a maritime proxy, China leverages its existing defense ties, ship deliveries (e.g. Hangor-class submarines), and naval cooperation to project influence. Meanwhile, under agreements with Somalia and Turkey, external actors can carry out security operations, training, and oversight in strategic areas— key sea lanes, coastal areas, and zones vulnerable to piracy or external pressures— all while maintaining plausible deniability for Beijing. This creates a web of influence that can advance China’s security and economic goals without provoking formal alliances or accusations of encirclement."
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Why might you be wrong?
Same as before:
"They can maybe send military to some country they have their security cooperation and counter-terrorism with and get some base for the troops (even temporary), and maybe this could trigger resolution as "yes"). This could be a base in a place other than the Atlantic coast of Africa (my understanding is that it would be triggering less opposition and reaction from the US, even if they would still try to prevent it)."
Thanks @LogicCurve ! You mean like renting or buying existing military base from the host country or adapt an existing a port? I assume that this is possible (and part of what I mentioned in pre-mortem comment about getting the base), but if this would be a new navy base or more permanent military base, I expect they would want to design it from scratch to fit their military needs and have exclusive access (I may be wrong, I don't have much military expertise). If they would use part of an existing civilian port to host their vessels, I am not sure if it would trigger resolution of our question. My weak impression is that China wants to avoid getting their military (especially ground forces) engaged and stuck in some local conflict overseas, so why locate the troops somewhere in the first place. But this is not a belief with some strong support with evidence.
Hi @michal_dubrawski , if you peruse some of my comments you will understand what I am saying. There's too much info there to re-type. But, the short version is: China has paid multi-millions to expand some ports, and one in particular Kribi in Cameroon is of interest. I believe there are something like 78 ports across Africa that China is involved with. The More Info section and Resolution Criteria states that expansion of an existing port would qualify as creation of a military base. However, I asked for a Clarification - and the other issue is, China would have to declare it as a military base. So, just parking some naval vessels there will not suffice as a "military dual use" port.
Thanks, yes, I remember that you wrote about these 78 ports (good research). I try to read all the comments, especially those from our team but not only, but some parts of the argument I may have forgotten—I apologize. Great that you have asked for this clarification. My belief is that China is unlikely to call such a port they use a military base if they could avoid it - do you agree?
It's easy to miss rationales of others, especially if it's been a few days since logging back in. Yes, I agree that it is probably unlikely China will call it a military base (at least at this time), unless something major changes. It is interesting to note that the main military bases of other nations - U.S., China, etc. are all on the eastern side of Africa near the gulf of Aden. Apparently they can co-exist with military bases near one another. I should have asked for the Clarification sooner, as that would have changed my forecast earlier.
Why do you think you're right?
We have 14 months left in the forecasted time window. I like @lzhang suggestion here about looking at how long it took between negotiation and opening of the base. For our purpose, a base under construction still counts, so while this is only a single case and other negotiations of similar matters may be different, we have initial news media reporting about this from 9 May 2015. We have the next news media report from 21 January 2016 that the negotiations were concluded. That is 257 days or 8 months and 1 week. And the construction is reported to have started in March 2016, but the first official confrmation I found is from April and is mentioned here: "On April 8, 2016 China’s Ministry of Defense reported that construction of China’s first oversea military base had begun." So that gives us 335 days or 11 months between first reporting of negotiations and the reporting of the construction. Ok, negotiations can take a shorter time or media can learn about them in later time than in case of Djibouti (I would expect US Intelligence providing them with such a report, like in case of Equatorial Guinea), but still, this is useful information, as it allows us to reduce the time window of when the information should appear for this likely to take place in remaining time. If we reduce number of remaining days till 1 January 2027 (427) by 335 days it gives us only 92 days or 3 months, even if multiply this by 2 assuming that things could happen faster this is only 6 months and not 14 months.
Time invariant calculations of Laplace's rule of continuity and Jeffreys prior assuming the remaining 184 days
Case A — since first success - construction start of base in Djibouti, assuming March 2016, (variable window, S=1,T=3,531
Laplace: p≈4.95%
Jeffreys: p≈2.51%
Case B — since first reporting of another attempt (fixed window, S=0,T=1,426)
Laplace: p≈11.43%
Jeffreys: p≈5.89%
Also, this article makes interesting point:
"China has shifted its strategy in the Indian Ocean region, favouring loyal intermediaries over direct military bases. (...) China’s approach in the region has evolved. Its first overseas military base, established in Djibouti in 2017 on the Red Sea’s edge, marked a turning point but also triggered strong diplomatic pushback from regional and global powers. Since then, overt bases have proven costly in terms of perception and strategic trust. As a result, Beijing appears to favour arrangements that deliver similar benefits— access to ports, surveillance routes, logistic support— without formal PLA installations or permanent overseas personnel openly acknowledged in foreign territories.
By empowering Pakistan as a maritime proxy, China leverages its existing defense ties, ship deliveries (e.g. Hangor-class submarines), and naval cooperation to project influence. Meanwhile, under agreements with Somalia and Turkey, external actors can carry out security operations, training, and oversight in strategic areas— key sea lanes, coastal areas, and zones vulnerable to piracy or external pressures— all while maintaining plausible deniability for Beijing. This creates a web of influence that can advance China’s security and economic goals without provoking formal alliances or accusations of encirclement."
Why might you be wrong?
Same as before:
My weak impression is that China wants to avoid getting their military (especially ground forces) engaged and stuck in some local conflict overseas, so why locate the troops somewhere in the first place. But this is not a belief with some strong support with evidence.