Revised forecasts:
Both sides are still willing to fight, and a short-term ceasefire may only accumulate strength for the next stage of the conflict unless the two sides really find a breakthrough solution.
-0.01979
Relative Brier Score
18
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
No forecasts in the past 3 months
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Comments | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
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New Badge
Star Commenter - Apr 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
73%
(+4%)
Less than 30 days
22%
(0%)
30 days
5%
(0%)
31-60 days
0%
(-4%)
61-90 days
0%
(0%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Unless Ukraine is unable to fight, or third-party intervention plays a decisive role.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
6%
(-18%)
Moldova
4%
(-9%)
Armenia
4%
(-14%)
Georgia
4%
(-5%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
1.Russia has invested too much in the Ukrainian battle field and may not be able to open up a new battlefield in the short term;
2.Continuing to open up new battlefield requires accelerating the national budget, but Russia’s domestic economy is in recession and may not be able to afford it.
Compared with war, Russia is more likely to use “non-traditional”methods to invade other country,
such as cyber attacks, energy supply cuts, etc.https://view.inews.qq.com/k/20250417A09TZS00?web_channel=wap&openApp=false
Files
Why might you be wrong?
1.Russia has received support from third-party forces;
2.The escalation of the conflict in the Russian-Ukrainian war has led Russia to take the risk of opening up a new front.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
69%
(+16%)
Less than 30 days
22%
(-8%)
30 days
5%
(-8%)
31-60 days
4%
(0%)
61-90 days
0%
(0%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
1.Short-term status: The 30-hours ceasefire agreement on Easter has failed, which means that is difficult to build trust in short-term ceasefire agreements.
2.The duration of the partial agreement may be extended, but a comprehensive ceasefire agreement requires the resolution of territorial disputes between the two sides.
3.External influence: The Trump administration is mediating between the two sides, and continued pressure may lead to a phased ceasefire.
Therefore, I think the 2025 ceasefire agreement may be partial and short term.
https://finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2025-04-22/doc-inetyiih8244544.shtml
https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=3136027281947561821
Files
Why might you be wrong?
1.Russia violated the ceasefire agreement;
2.The Ukraine army was unable to continue the war;
3. The US coordination was ineffective.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
24%
(+8%)
Moldova
13%
(+1%)
Armenia
18%
(0%)
Georgia
9%
(0%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Revised forecasts for Forecast 1:
1.Moldova is at higher risk.
2.Armenia is at lower risk.
3.Georgia is at risk of local invasion.
4.Kazakhstan is at lower risk.
Given Russia’s current military commitment to Ukraine and its declining regional influence, so I reduced the chances of invasion of those four countries.
https://caus.com/all-articles/news/102444/
https://view.inews.qq.com/k/20220716A05HIF00?web_channel=wap&openApp=false
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The overall probability is subject to changes in the war in Ukraine and pressure from international sanctions.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(0%)
Less than or equal to 59
10%
(0%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
47%
(-13%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
43%
(+13%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
0%
(0%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
Revised forecasts for Forecast 1:
I will consist the number I predict, but I will revise some of the reasons.
1.The German government has issued new regulations to prohibit access to Russian media channels;
2. The support rate of German populist parties has increased, and these parties are usually pro-Russian.
https://news.sky.com/story/german-election-from-ai-influencers-to-russian-disinformation-the-far-right-is-getting-a-leg-up-online-13313167
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The technology of the regulatory platform strengthen their ban on Pro-Russian false content, the amount of disinformation in German may be lower than.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
53%
(-17%)
Less than 30 days
30%
(+30%)
30 days
13%
(-13%)
31-60 days
4%
(0%)
61-90 days
0%
(0%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
Revised forecasting for forecast 1
The territorial differences between Russia and Ukraine are irreconcilable;
2. Based on an analysis of Russia’s historical war behavior, it is very easy for Russia to violate the ceasefire agreement;
3. If the war situation is likely to improve, the risk of the agreement breaking down increases.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The ceasefire period forecasting is based on short-term battlefield situation and diplomatic breakthrough, but the territorial solution and security guarantee mechanism of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have not been resolved. The ceasefire agreement is easily broken by sudden military action and political changes.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
16%
(-32%)
Moldova
12%
(-11%)
Armenia
18%
(-22%)
Georgia
9%
(-6%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Revised forecasts:
1.Because Russia spend too much money and energy on the war in Ukraine, so we assume that Russia has no spare power to attack other countries.
2. If there still has opportunity to invade this four countries that would based on history reason and geopolitical reason.
https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/2025/russia-and-eurasia/
https://www.rferl.org/a/pashinian-armenia-putin-russia-border-guards/33151284.html
Files
Why might you be wrong?
1.Reliance on historical experience
2.Sudden changes in political factors
3.Geopolitical chain reactions
Possibly using Non-traditional means such as cyber attacks or energy coercion instead of traditional war.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(0%)
Less than or equal to 59
10%
(+10%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
60%
(+60%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
30%
(+30%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
0%
(-100%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
Revised forecasts:
1.With the German elections behind us, there will be less disinformation.
2.In recent activities, Germany has discovered more than 100 AI-Generated pro-Russian content websites, which have created a lot of disinformations.
3.Based on historical data as a reference:
103 cases in 2023, 107 cases in 2022, and 53 cases in 2021.
Overall I predict that the number of disinformation cases will reach 79.
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/pro-kremlin-outlets-drool-over-german-elections/
https://consilium-europa.libguides.com/Kremlin-Disinformation/Research-papers
Files
Why might you be wrong?
1. Some disinformation is spread through encrypted means or niche platforms, making it difficult to capture public data.
2. Forecasts rely too heavily on historical data from the past three years and ignore the non-linear growth that can come from generational transitions in Technology.
Files
Why do you think you're right?
Revised forecasts:
If Russia achieves a decisive victory in Ukraine, the threat to Moldova may escalate before 2027, but the threat of war against the other countries remains low.
Why might you be wrong?
Russia has received support from third-party forces.
The likelihood of war depends on the outcome of the Ukrainian battlefield.