MichelleRuiz

By July 31, 2026, it is highly likely that the United States will maintain and incrementally expand export controls explicitly affecting frontier AI model development, particularly through refined restrictions on advanced computing hardware, training infrastructure, and the transfer of high-capability model weights. While sweeping, entirely new regimes are less certain, policymakers are expected to adjust existing thresholds, licensing requirements, and country-specific rules in response to geopolitical competition, national security concerns, and technological advances. Overall, the regulatory trajectory points toward continued selective tightening—aimed at preserving U.S. strategic advantages in frontier AI—while seeking to balance innovation, allied coordination, and commercial competitiveness.

Although the Trump administration rescinded the 2025 AI Diffusion Rule before it fully took effect—arguing that it was overly complex and bureaucratic—the evidence suggests that the government did not abandon the intention to regulate exports related to advanced AI. In fact, the Department of Commerce announced that it would issue a “replacement rule,” and in October 2025 it established the *American AI Exports Program*, aligned with an executive order aimed at promoting the export of the “American AI Technology Stack.” This indicates that the administration remains interested in creating a formal, legally binding framework to control the international diffusion of critical AI technologies.

Given that the U.S. government views frontier AI as a strategic asset with national security implications—especially regarding China—it is reasonable to expect that the new rule will include explicit controls on advanced model weights, frontier-class training compute, or cloud access intended for frontier-model development. Moreover, rescinding the previous rule did not eliminate the institutional recognition that frontier AI requires a specific regulatory regime; it merely opened the door for a version that is simpler, more focused, and more aligned with the current administration’s vision.

Therefore, with a program already created, an executive order mandating action, and a regulatory gap the administration has committed to fill, it is highly probable that before July 31, 2026 a new rule—published in the Federal Register or as an update to the EAR—will be implemented that meets the required criteria: explicit controls on frontier model weights, frontier-training compute, or cloud access for advanced AI development, with broad applicability and verifiable enforcement.

In 2025, the United States did indeed move forward with new or expanded export controls on advanced AI chips, cloud‐based access to AI compute infrastructure, and AI model weights—but with important caveats and subsequent modifications. In January, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a sweeping “AI Diffusion” rule that sought to impose global licensing requirements on exports of high-end AI chips, limit access to large compute clusters for AI training, and introduce a new category for model weights exports. However, by mid-May the same agency announced the rule would be rescinded due to concerns about innovation and diplomatic fallout. Simultaneously, instead of a broad and enduring global ban, the U.S. shifted toward a more targeted architecture of export controls, focusing on specified entities, validated end-users, and particular country tiers—thereby lowering the probability of wholesale controls on model weights or cloud compute across all countries. For 2025 the implied outcome is: yes, new controls were introduced—but their long‐term enforcement in that full form did not persist, and the dominant trend is toward selective measures rather than universal license regimes. As such, while companies dealing in AI hardware, cloud providers and model developers should expect incremental and specific regulatory steps, they should not anticipate a blanket export licensing regime for all AI model weights or cloud compute access being fully operational in 2025.

Source: https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-rescission-biden-era-artificial-intelligence-diffusion-rule-strengthens?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Department of Commerce Announces Rescission of Biden- ..."

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