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There is a new update on the Easter ceasefire, according to a group discussion of forecasters, where the claimed peace agreement is reportedly broken in a very short amount of time (NYT, Reuters). This piece of information contributes to a higher possibility of shorter, less than 30-day, peace agreement durations. As in, if a truce cannot be maintained for a religious holiday, with the current status quo of negotiation, it is very unlikely that a long-term ceasefire would happen. 

I did not really change my forecasts. Specifically, for the possibility of Moldova, the news stating "if Ukraine falls, Russia will invade Moldova" (TVP), reaffirms the highest percentage of invasion. Additionally, for Armenia and Georgia, the discussion around these two countries' "frozen" status vis-a-vis their EU/NATO status, as well as reliance on Russia, also consolidates the current 3/4 percentage. For Kazakhstan, with the friendly development on the energy front, there is much less reason for Russia to invade. Additionally, keep in mind Kazakhstan's relationship with China; seeing the war fatigue of Russia, it is much less likely for Russia to invade Kazakhstan.

Moldova

Moldovan President Maia Sandu warned that the Kremlin is actively working to influence Moldova’s upcoming elections, aiming to install a pro-Russian government to use Moldova against Ukraine (Pravda). So, based on current developments, there is a growing concern from the EU’s side regarding Moldova’s political stability, particularly with its current pro-Russian senate composition. Because there is much at stake for the Kremlin, as Moldova is a border state, this increases the likelihood of a Russian invasion. Additionally, Moldova is receiving enhanced military support from the EU, including modern air defense systems (Army Recognition). The rising ability, in addition to the base rate (Moldova intends to join the EU and NATO), can increase the chance of invasion.

Armenia

Armenia has supported UN resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression, potentially signaling a geopolitical shift (EADaily). This actually seems like an escalation, which to Russia can be seen as a political challenge, increasing the possibility and reason to invade. However, Russia is also acting as a mediator in Armenia-Turkey normalization talks, which tempers the risk of invasion (Eurasia Review). In other words, although there is an increase in tension, due to Armenia’s unresolved issues in the Caucasus region, Russia is also acting as a facilitator, and the likelihood of its invasion reduces again.

Georgia

Georgia, like Armenia, voted in favor of the UN resolution against Russia, reflecting current public and governmental sentiment (EADaily). This aligns with the overall current public sentiment Georgia has towards Russia, but does not change much of how Russia may perceive Georgia. Because Georgia is still much dependent on Russia for its economy, it is important to keep that in mind, which translates to a relatively low possibility of invasion. Continued domestic political tensions and a cooling relationship with the EU signal to Russia that Georgia is not moving decisively Westward (Jam News). This also adds to some sense of security to Russia, because Georgia is not closer to the EU, Russia will see Georgia less of a threat, therefore would not invade.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan seeks to reduce reliance on Russian energy routes through diversification, including a pipeline across the Caspian Sea (The Diplomat). It is true that for Kazakhstan to reduce its risk of being “controlled” by Russia and to achieve its energy independence, it is critical to proceed with the current pipeline project with Russia with caution. However, because the current deal with Russia would still benefit Kazakhstan itself, there is no immediate need for an invasion. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan and Russia continue to maintain strong energy and nuclear cooperation, suggesting a relatively stable bilateral relationship (Trend).

Based on recent updates, the current administration has attempted to mediate by sending special envoy Steven Witkoff to engage with Russia, and by proposing a 30-day partial ceasefire focused on halting attacks on energy infrastructure. However, this initiative has been undermined by conflicting statements between Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S. over the ceasefire’s terms, timeline, and implementation (AP News; Washington Post). Although Ukraine has expressed support for the U.S.-brokered effort, Russia's insistence on broad conditions has stalled progress. Meanwhile, both sides have continued to accuse each other of violations, further eroding trust (BBC). If a 30-day ceasefire was supposed to happen, however, due to the hostility, the situation is more complex than simply signing an agreement. The strain on Russia’s energy sector may increase tensions rather than foster peace.

Additionally, statements from the U.S. special envoy suggesting a partition-like solution, though later retracted, provoked strong instability towards the current peace efforts, making the peace process harder to predict (BBC). Despite European calls for the U.S. to apply more pressure on Moscow, the lack of coordination and continued Russian attacks demonstrate the fragile state of negotiations (The Guardian).

Overall, while the U.S. has attempted to push both sides toward peace, its actions have exposed deep-rooted divisions and made a long-lasting peace agreement increasingly unlikely. Given these dynamics, the probability that a ceasefire will hold beyond 30 days remains low. 

Revision: I did not change my current forecast after my discussion with my forecast partner; we shared similar reasons behind the overall prediction for each nation. Specifically, Armenia's decision not to continue with its membership in the CSTO has been the major contribution to my decision to increase the likelihood of invasion for a little bit. My forecast partner also brought up a good point regarding the recent election in October for Moldova, which is associated with its potential EU membership. This leads to a similar conclusion as my current forecast, where the probability of Russia invading Moldova is higher than that of the other nations. 

Revision:  For this particular forecast, I did not change much because I do think my current forecast captures the current dynamics (as far as this week).  However, my forecast partner had brought up skepticism towards the accuracy of the database, thereby posing my baseline into question. Additionally, my forecast partner also mentioned upcoming EU elections (EU Elect Calendar), which are good drivers and signals that would influence the overall probability distribution, adding more confidence to the current prediction. For example, German-speaking countries like Switzerland will have multiple elections starting in September 2025, and Russia itself will also have an election in September 2025, which contributes to the higher case observed category. 

Revision: I reduced the probability for the "91 days or more" scenario because, despite the possibility of a more stable ceasefire, such as the one seen in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, seasonal patterns suggest limited time for long-term agreements to happen. Historically, summer and fall have seen longer-lasting ceasefires, but with winter beginning in December and lasting through February 2026, there is effectively only a one-month window for a lasting agreement to be established if it is to meet the "goes into effect by the end of 2025" timeline suggested by this forecast question. Additionally, the approaching deadline for U.S. military aid to Ukraine (The Guardian), combined with delays in EU support (EURACTIV), may increase the instability of the situation overall. This would increase the likelihood of a short-lived ceasefire, thereby reducing the overall probability of a peace agreement lasting 91 days or more.

For this forecast, I expanded the base rate setting to Russia's historical invasion patterns since WW2, and see if the current situation would align with historical data: 

Confirmed Russian/USSR Invasions

1. Hungary (1956) – Soviet tanks crushed anti-communist uprising (Britannica).

2. Czechoslovakia (1968) – Warsaw Pact invasion to halt liberal reforms (History.com).

3. Afghanistan (1979–1989) – Direct invasion to prop up communist regime (Britannica).

4. Georgia (2008) – Invasion to support South Ossetia/Abkhazia separatists (The Guardian).

5. Ukraine (2014–Present) – Annexation of Crimea, Donbas war, and full-scale 2022 invasion.

Disputed/Indirect Interventions

1. Moldova (Transnistria, 1992) – Russian-backed separatists (Reuters).

2. Syria (2015–Present) – Military support for Assad (Al Jazeera).

Based on past events, there are a couple of shared rationales behind the invasion, including seeking buffer zone protection from NATO or western influence; seeking geopolitical control; seeking better partnership with its allies; and protecting russian minorities in regions of dispute.  So to put the forecast in perspective, below is the case-by-case analysis. 

Moldova

Moldova is experiencing amplified tensions with Russia, as evidenced by the expulsion of Russian diplomats and the arrest of pro-Russian leader Eugenia Gutul (Reuters; Al Jazeera). Moldova's fading faith in Russia, combined with accusations of Moscow aiding a fugitive lawmaker in Transnistria, suggests a deteriorating relationship between these two countries (Reuters). Taking into account Russia’s historical involvement in Transnistria and its strategic interest in maintaining buffer zones, Moldova is vulnerable to possible Russian invasion, especially if anti-Russian policies escalate.

Armenia

Despite Armenia’s earlier pivot toward the West and suspension of CSTO payments (Kyiv Independent), Russia indicates a strategic readjustment in diplomacy (Eurasianet). Specifically, Russia seeks to counterbalance Armenia’s Western alignment by reinforcing cultural and diplomatic ties (Eurasianet). Since Armenia remains a key strategic ally (also located in close proximity to Turkey, another strategically significant state for Russia) against NATO expansion, Russia is unlikely to invade. 

Georgia

Georgia’s current ruling party exhibits a delicate balance with Russia currently. It has publicly resisted full diplomatic restoration with Russia while deepening economic ties with Russia (Wilson Center). Despite its recently developed public hostility toward Russia (69% view it as an enemy), the government complies with Kremlin-friendly policies, such as the "foreign agents" law (Jamestown). Russia exerts economic pressure on Georgia, so it is likely that Russia would prefer influence over invasion. Although the hostility may lead to instability, which may be seen as a threat,  the likelihood of invasion remains low. 

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan currently has strong economic and diplomatic ties with Russia (Times of Central Asia). Russian Foreign Minister’s reaffirmation of partnership and cooperation in energy (OPEC+) and security (CIS) underscores stability (Trend, Times of Central Asia). Therefore, the overall possibility of a Russian invasion remains low, especially considering Russia's energy needs and Kazakhstan's location.

For this forecast, I used the same baseline (41 cases up to April 2025, according to the database). However, the number of German-language disinformation cases will likely remain high or increase, given current trends. For example, the EU has documented over 5,500 pro-Kremlin disinformation cases related to Ukraine since 2015, with a sharp rise after Russia's 2022 invasion (Council of the European Union). Improved EU tracking mechanisms may lead to higher detection rates, but Russia's disinformation efforts are also intensifying at the same time, adding to the rationale of higher observed cases. Additionally, the European Parliament has condemned Russia's weaponization of historical narratives on social media and imposed sanctions on Kremlin-linked media and the enforcement of the Digital Services Act (Evropski parlament). This pushback may provoke further disinformation campaigns from Russia, as Russia may see that as a threat and intend to undermine the EU unity.

In addition, recent reports highlight Russia's ability to evade existing restrictions, contributing to the higher probability of disinformation cases. For example, the Social Design Agency, linked to the Kremlin's Doppelgänger operation, posted thousands of ads on Meta platforms, exploiting Meta's reduced fact-checking, regarding the war in Ukraine, or another conflict, such as the Hamas attack(NYT). Similar tactics were observed ahead of Germany's 2025 elections in January, where Russian bots and fake news sites flooded social media to amplify pro-Russia narratives (TVP World). Meanwhile, the U.S. has scaled back efforts to counter Russia due to the current administration. Such a pullback decreases cross-agency coordination and intelligence sharing with European allies, giving leeway for Russia to spread an intentional campaign more easily (CBC). This creates gaps that pro-Kremlin actors could exploit (both from the gap of US-owned media companies and the EU regulations, but also the overall gap of understanding between Russia's intention and action), increasing the overall volume of disinformation.