The probabilities remains largely the same for this question. In addition rationales and arguments previously discussed, Russia's continued focus on Ukraine is likely keeping further invasion in next two years remotely likely but not impossible. Georgia remains the most likely target due to its strategic location for Russia, both serving as a deterrent for NATO expansion eastward and an excellent seaport coupled with previous invasion in 2008 never reaching an official peace agreement.
0.036982
Relative Brier Score
17
Forecasts
2
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
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New Badge
Star Commenter - Apr 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
7%
(0%)
Moldova
3%
(0%)
Armenia
9%
(-2%)
Georgia
3%
(-1%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Peace agreement could signal for weakness in the case of Russia getting its conditions met. (Ukraine denied membership and international recognition of Crimea as its territory) In this case, probability of invasion for these states, especially Georgia would be much higher than single digits.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
7%
(-1%)
Moldova
3%
(0%)
Armenia
11%
(-1%)
Georgia
4%
(-1%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
The variables that determine the probability of invasion of these states have not significantly changed since last week. However, the U.S. has grown more impatient with the ceasefire mediation process. This could both prompt the ceasefire reaching conclusion, or stale the ceasefire indefinitely. In the case of staling ceasefire agreement, the probability of invasion of these state are likely to decrease with the assumption that the EU and allies continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily, which would further deteriorate Russian forces. In the event of agreement reached in the foreseeable future, the probability remains the same as last week.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1296573/russia-ukraine-military-comparison/
Files
Why might you be wrong?
If a ceasefire agreement is reached and Crimea is recognized as Russian territory and Ukraine indefinitely denied NATO membership, this could be viewed as weakness, or even appeasement tactics similar to how league of nation treated Hitler's incremental encroachment of Europe post WWI. In that case, invasion of these state would increase. However, considering the time constraint of this forecast, the probability would only increase very modestly.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
39%
(+2%)
Less than 30 days
16%
(+4%)
30 days
10%
(-3%)
31-60 days
14%
(-1%)
61-90 days
21%
(-2%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
Despite Trump's administration's push for a ceasefire, Moscow rejected a U.S. proposal for a 30-day truce and continues its offensive. On April 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a one-day Easter ceasefire, which President Volodymyr Zelensky said was violated roughly 3,000 times in one day. This clearly indicate Russia can easily violate their own promise to ceasefire. Less than 30 days probability is now increased to 39% and 16% for exactly 30 days. More than 90 days' is still probably but not likely.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/20/world/europe/ukraine-russia-easter-truce.html
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Russia is clearly does not want Ukraine joining NATO and wants international recognition of Crimea as its rightful territory. Russia has long claimed that Ukraine joining NATO is unacceptable, viewing it as a direct threat to its national security and an encroachment into its sphere of influence. U.S. abandoning its role as the mediator in the ceasefire negotiation can add pressure to Ukraine; in exchange of increasingly desirable ceasefire deal for Ukraine and Russia, Russia get Crimea and denial of NATO membership for Ukraine. If somehow these conditions are satisfactorily reached between Russia and Ukraine. A longer than 90 days ceasefire is certainly much more likely than indicated at only 21%.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
37%
(+7%)
Less than 30 days
12%
(+5%)
30 days
13%
(0%)
31-60 days
15%
(-5%)
61-90 days
23%
(-7%)
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
Russia’s historical non-compliance with agreements and ongoing military engagements suggest that a ceasefire might be short-lived. According to a Wikipedia entry updated on April 14, 2025, Russia has broken 190 agreements with Ukraine and the international community
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
If both side reach agreement to a 30 days of ceasefire and no further resolution is reached during the 30 days. Continuation of invasion is likely immediately after agreed upon time. Therefore driving the likelihood of exactly 30 days of ceasefire, however this requires a specific sets of events to happen and not happen which limits its probability to only at 12%.
The low probabilities for 31-60 and 61-90 days reflect the challenge of sustaining a truce beyond initial agreements, given Russia’s insistence on addressing root causes, as stated by Putin in an Al Jazeera report.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/14/what-are-putins-conditions-for-a-ceasefire-in-ukraine
The probability of a more than one but less than 3 mouth of ceasefire is likely done without semi-successful diplomacy from U.S. and Ukraine, in addition to international pressure. In this situation, Russia agrees to ceasefire and continues over 1 mouth but ultimately not reaching peace keeping stage of the process. This is likely prompted by unexpected actions in U.S. diplomatic resolution following the initial ceasefire. Low to moderate probability is assigned to the medium peace range accounting for uncertainties in U.S. diplomatic actions following initial agreement, peacekeeping for more than 30 days but eventual re-engagement before 90 days.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/02/ukraine-war-briefing-us-pressure-builds-on-russia-over-refusal-to-accept-ceasefire
The Russia military may have deteriorated more than projected and they might be eager to make sign a peace agreement with the Ukraine and others in the international community, In this case, assuming they are gotten sufficient conditions, they are like to keep peace for over 90 days. Past 90 days, re-engagement is still possible similar to medium term re-engagement, the aggregate probability of medium term re-engagement and long time actual peacekeeping increases the probability of 91 day or more.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The 37% probability for a ceasefire lasting less than 30 days might be too high if international oversight strengthens a ceasefire. For example, the involvement of a “coalition of the willing,” as mentioned in the Guardian article, could provide monitoring mechanisms that extend a ceasefire’s duration.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/02/ukraine-war-briefing-us-pressure-builds-on-russia-over-refusal-to-accept-ceasefire
The 23% probability for a ceasefire lasting 91 days or more might undervalue the potential for a sustained ceasefire if significant concessions are made. For instance, a Reuters article from March 13, 2025, notes Russia’s demands, including Ukraine abandoning NATO ambitions, which, if partially met, could lead to a longer ceasefire.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
8%
(-2%)
Moldova
3%
(+1%)
Armenia
12%
(-2%)
Georgia
5%
(-1%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Russia's continued attacks on Ukraine territory amid ceasefire talks with U.S. and Ukraine signals high level of commitment to come out victorious in this war. These are the dynamics for each of these countries with Russia.
Moldova: Recent developments indicate Moldova is pursuing closer ties with the EU, with presidential elections in October 2024 and parliamentary elections in 2025. President Maia Sandu, a pro-EU leader, has accused Russia of attempting to destabilize her government.
Armenia: Armenia has frozen its CSTO membership and is exploring EU membership. This can signal to Russia as Armenia's attempt to further cut ties with Russia. Despite unfriendly international political movement, Armenia's not physically connected to Russia, which decreases probability of invasion.
Georgia: A Wilson Center article from March 2025 indicates 69% of Georgians view Russia as an enemy, suggesting high tension. Given this, and the potential for escalation over breakaway regions, the probability increases to 15%, acknowledging historical conflicts and current Western alignment.
Kazakhstan:
Kazakhstan's multi-vector policy, balancing Russia, China, and the West. Russia's 2022 intervention to quiet unrest, as mentioned in a Columbia Journal article, which suggests their willingness to use force, but an invasion seems unlikely given mutual economic benefits. Thus, the probability remains at relatively low.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/03/moldova-new-battleground-russias-war
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/georgia-russia-quasi-partnership-based-elite-interests
Files
Why might you be wrong?
A sudden resolution or escalation in Ukraine could free up or further strain Russia’s resources and drastically altering its capacity or incentive to invade elsewhere. For instance, a peace deal in Ukraine might redirect Russia’s attention to Moldova or Georgia, pushing probabilities higher than forecasted.
These forecasts are based off of historical base rates from Russia's aggression towards neighboring nations. However, historical base rates can mislead if new variables emerge.
Drawing from "Superforecasting" and "Thinking, Fast and Slow", biases like overconfidence or anchoring might skew the forecast. I might be anchoring too heavily on Russia’s current Ukraine focus, underestimating its strategic adaptability, or overconfidently assuming stable relations with Kazakhstan and Armenia with blindspots that would alter the probability of invasions.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
26%
(+19%)
Less than or equal to 59
25%
(+17%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
19%
(+4%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
17%
(-11%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
13%
(-29%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
2022 and 2025 are both federal election years for Germany. Using the Resolution criteria tool, it is clear that German has only had 42 pro-Kremlin media cases since October 1st 2024 to today, which is lower than 2021 to 2022 (62 cases) for the same time period, 82 cases for 2021 to 2022 in total. It is reasonable to assume most pro-kremlin media cases would be around and or before the elections. The federal election was in February. This suggests an overall decline of pro Kremlin media efforts.
Using 2021 and 2022 as a baseline, that means 2024-2025 is likely to have
82/62=1.323
42*1.323=55.566 cases as a base rate.
Germany's renewed commitment to support Ukraine as of this week is likely to drive up the cases minimum to moderately. Similarly, Russia's continued military aggression is likely going to be mirrored by its propaganda campaigns. This is reflected by the 25% probability for less than 59 and 60-69 cases.
Sources:
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-announces-fresh-military-aid-to-ukraine/live-72212628
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I could be wrong if the previous election year cannot reliably serve as a base rate for this election year for any reasons. Even if it can be used as a base rate, from now to September 30th is still almost half of a year away. The moderately lengthy time frame produces uncertainties relating to ceasefire agreement, Russian internal politics, non-state actors, U.S. politics, German politics and other geopolitical influences etc. All of these factors could contribute to increased or decreased pro-kremlin efforts in German language.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
10%
(+2%)
Moldova
2%
(-1%)
Armenia
14%
(-1%)
Georgia
6%
(+1%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Armenia's efforts to repair ties with Russia, potentially affecting invasion likelihood. Froze CSTO membership but now seeks to repair ties, increasing re-exports to Russia.
- Seeking Western ties (EU border mission, arms from France), but economic ties with Russia complicate relations.
(Source: https://eurasianet.org/armenia-rushes-to-reengage-russia-aiming-to-outflank-azerbaijan)
Georgia (15%): I might be right if the current balance holds, with Russia maintaining occupation without further invasion, particularly if the Georgian government continues to align with Russia and domestic protests subside.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Moldova (8%): I might underestimate the risk if Russia uses Transnistria as a pretext for intervention, especially if Moldova’s EU accession process advances or if pro-Russian forces gain power in upcoming elections, given historical patterns of Russian destabilization.
Kazakhstan (5%): I could be wrong if Russia’s imperial ambitions lead it to pressure Kazakhstan more aggressively, especially if Kazakhstan continues to diversify its alliances and reduce its dependence on Russia, given comments on nationhood and long border even if it's strategic location is not of paramount importance to Russia.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
7%
(-2%)
Less than or equal to 59
8%
(-6%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
15%
(-6%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
28%
(0%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
42%
(+14%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
The forecast might be correct if the number of cases remains similar to past election years, around 80-89, aligning with relatively high probabilities for 70-79 and 80-89 cases but higher emphasis on 80-90.
Historical data, such as 82 cases in 2021-2022 (also an election year), supports this, suggesting that election-related disinformation could fit within the expected range if patterns hold, given the failure of Russian Ukraine war for Moscow, the number is likely higher than it was in 2021-2022.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The forecast might be incorrect if Russia's intensified campaigns lead to over 90 cases, making your 42% probability for this range too low.
The Reuters article from January 20, 2025, discusses a campaign with hundreds of posts on X, part of the Doppelgänger operation, suggesting high activity. The February 21, 2025, Reuters article mentions Storm-1516's fake videos, indicating sophisticated operations.
(Sources: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-disinformation-targets-german-election-campaign-says-think-tank-2025-01-20/
Files
Why do you think you're right?
Attempted but failed truce during Easter increases probability for less than 30 days to 45%. The cause could be the leadership failing to command its troops , or intentionally breaking the truce for other unforeseen reasons on both sides. Regardless of the cause of the failed truce, it shows the increasingly unlikely event of complete ceasefire lasting for long if any comprehensive agreement is reached in 2025.
Why might you be wrong?
A more deliberate, organized ceasefire could give sufficient time for command structure on both sides to ensure ceasefire is kept once agreement is reached, unlike the attempted truce during Easter being a spur of the moment event. If no other major influences are exerted and both sides are legitimately looking to stop killing, 91 days or more is more likely than 19%.