greciaprieto

After talking to Madison, other than maybe finding a different term that replaces my use of 'ceasefire' throughout my prior forecast, I think I'm right in characterizing public, official statements relating to a 'ceasefire' as deliberately employed as a tactical tool in a conflict. 

Based on conversations with my partner, we noticed that our initial forecasted percentages are remain somewhat consistent for both. However, we do consider different things. For example, in the case of potential Russian invasion of Georgia, my forecasting partner has given greater weight to the ongoing protests as a destabilizing factor. In my forecast, I emphasize Russia's willingness (or intent) to capitalize (or not) on the potential destabilization caused by the protests based on their projected strength in currently active Russian fronts like in Ukraine.

My forecast has shifted from general assumptions of Russian opportunism to a sharper focus on the internal contradictions within target states that Russia can narratively and strategically exploit. I now see Russia capitalizing on identity crises, not just territorial disputes. In Georgia (36%), the domestic erosion of Western alignment drives concern. The ruling party’s push for the “foreign agents” law has deepened political rupture, and Russia has already begun reframing Georgia’s protest movement as Western destabilization efforts (https://www.ponarseurasia.org/georgias-identity-crisis-and-public-protests/). On Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian invasion, recent escalations in Transnistria recent reporting shows Russian troop activity near Transnistria and revived messaging that paints Moldova as a NATO pawn (https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-transnistria-ukraine/). Combined with Moldova’s deepening EU ties, the ingredients are in place for a limited incursion framed as “stabilization” — especially if the war in Ukraine slows. The Easter ceasefire reminded me that Russia doesn’t need escalation to signal intent; it uses pauses just as well. Finally, Kazakhstan (15%) and Armenia (6%) remain less likely, but for clearer reasons than before. In Kazakhstan, Russian rhetoric is still aggressive, but the state is balancing ties with both Russia and the West more effectively than I gave credit for (https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/playing-both-sides-central-asia-between-russia-and-west). Armenia’s foreign policy is drifting from Russia, but I can see the Kremlin’s focus on pressure through isolation and energy dependency rather than force (https://trendsresearch.org/insight/armenias-nascent-multi-vector-foreign-policy/). In my opinion, neither presents a short-term opportunity worth the cost.

The Easter ceasefire didn’t just break — it was exploited. Framed as a 48-hour pause in long-range strikes, hostilities resumed within 14 hours in several zones. Russia used the window to rotate artillery, reposition drones, and test Ukrainian defenses (https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/04/20/the-broken-easter-ceasefire-russias-rejection-of-restraint-in-ukraine/). Moscow then accused Ukraine of over 1,000 violations, not to report infractions, but to shape the post-truce narrative and justify renewed escalation (https://brusselsmorning.com/russia-accuses-ukraine-of-over-1000-ceasefire-violations/71709/). This coincides with an internal messaging shift. For example, Kiriyenko — the regime’s narrative architect -- is now pushing a “Time of Heroes” narrative (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/04/19/a-blueprint-for-building-putinism): one that casts sacrifice as glory and makes sustained violence a moral necessity (https://russiapost.info/politics/time_of_heroes). Ceasefires don’t align with that logic.

On the other hand, Ukraine also moved strategically. Kyiv dismissed the truce as a ploy but used its ambiguity to conduct limited operations in Bakhmut and Avdiivka, citing the absence of a formal agreement. It flipped the ceasefire’s religious framing by highlighting Russian strikes on churches and aid routes, using that narrative to reinforce its moral posture and diplomatic credibility (https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025).

I raised my <30-day estimate slightly — from 49% to 53% — not because ceasefires are meaningless, but because this one reinforced a pattern: they’re declared with moral language but enacted with tactical intent. My forecast has evolved from relying on the Minsk base rate to focusing on how actors behave during ceasefires — and how that behavior reveals strategic ambiguity, not restraint.

Russia’s likelihood of launching full-scale invasions into Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, or Kazakhstan by April 2027 remains low overall—but, as my forecasting partner has highlighted, the distribution of risk is asymmetrical, with Georgia and Moldova facing the most plausible scenarios of escalation. In Georgia, risks have increased over the past quarter. The March 2025 protests over the "foreign agents" bill, inspired by Russian-style NGO laws, provoked a political crisis. In Moldova, the Transnistrian question persists as a flashpoint. Russian disinfo targeting Moldova’s EU path has intensified, but the logistical limits—no direct land bridge, constrained troop movement through Ukraine—and stronger EU support post-accession talks reduce immediate kinetic risk. Russia is likely to rely on hybrid pressure, not troops, barring a NATO distraction or political rupture in Kyiv. 

Key References:

1.  (4/2/25) https://kyivindependent.com/georgian-parliament-passes-updated-foreign-agents-law/
2. (march 2025) https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EEAS-3nd-ThreatReport-March-2025-05-Digital-HD.pdf
3. (Winter 2025 Issue) https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2025-issue-no-29/back-to-the-future
4. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/armenia-navigates-a-path-away-from-russia?lang=en

My forecasting partner and I discussed that as of mid-April more disinformation cases have popped up than before suggesting that in 2025, the targeted Russian disinformation campaigns will supersede the mean number of yearly disinformation cases. If this trend holds—and if detection remains constant—we could surpass the 80+ case high seen in 2021–2022, a peak election year. Given this pace, the 80–89 range remains the most likely outcome. Another angle discussed when updating my forecast included how post-election political restructuring has created messaging vacuums that are being filled by external narratives. As my forecasting partner noted: “post-election admin shifts have meant more bots, not fewer,” especially due to outsourcing delays in content moderation contracts and AI detection software rollout. Meanwhile, German regulators have yet to publicly announce prosecution under the NetzDG law against coordinated disinfo actors, meaning that legal deterrence remains weak. 

Key References:

1. "Generative AI and the German Far Right: Narratives, Tactics and Digital Strategies" (2/18/25)
2. https://vsquare.org/how-russian-disinformation-campaign-influenced-german-elections-afd-cdu-greens-cyberoperations/ (4/3/25)
3. "The role of civil society organisations in co-regulating online hate speech in the EU: A bounded empowerment" (3/31/25)

Despite initial diplomatic engagement and partial coordination between the U.S. and Turkey, recent developments point to the fragility of the ceasefire. The April 14 ISW report confirms that both Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to escalate military operations, including Russia’s recommitment to mechanized assaults, reintroduction of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) near Toretsk, and daily allegations of ceasefire violations from both sides [https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025]. These actions reflect tactical posturing rather than peace signaling. There is no sign of deconfliction zones, third-party monitoring, or sanctions-based compliance structures. Additionally, the absence of a maritime ceasefire (ex/ B;ack Sea) and the failure of negotiations on strikes against energy infrastructure suggest that the underlying strategic goals of both sides remain incompatible. Behavioral patterns, including the use of civilian vehicles for evading drones, indicate adaptation for continued combat rather than de-escalation.

After conversing with forecasting partner, these points reinforce our base-rate logic: ceasefires in conflicts without enforcement mechanisms (e.g., Minsk 2014/2015) tend to collapse within weeks. MY forecast has thus changed slightly, increasing the percentages of a likely ceasefire not extending beyond 30 days.

Russia is unlikely to launch full-scale invasions in Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, or Kazakhstan before April 2027, but its strategic posture reflects conditional aggression shaped by regime fragility, Western distraction, and the opportunity for plausible deniability. In Moldova, the Transnistrian region remains a long-standing pressure point, and Russian disinformation has spiked since late 2024 targeting pro-Western reforms (https://www.svoboda.org/a/32896478.html). In Georgia, where Russia already occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia, renewed incursion is plausible if Western deterrence erodes, particularly amid domestic unrest (https://ecfr.eu/publication/broken-dream-the-oligarch-russia-and-georgias-drift-from-europe/). Armenia’s westward pivot, including reduced CSTO engagement, introduces tension but also lowers Russia’s strategic leverage (https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/armenia-navigates-a-path-away-from-russia). Kazakhstan, while currently stable, faces periodic rhetorical threats from Russian elites questioning its sovereignty, echoing patterns seen prior to Ukraine’s invasion (https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2025-issue-no-29/back-to-the-future) see also: https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2025-issue-no-29/back-to-the-future. Overall, Georgia presents the highest risk, followed by Moldova, with Armenia and Kazakhstan less likely targets under current conditions.