204156

I decided to leave my forecast the same after my conversation with my classmates as we agreed that the failed Easter truce increased the probability for less than 30 days. We also agreed that if the ceasefire lasts over 29 days, it is then most likely to be a longterm ceasefire and last over 91 days, as indicated historically by the Minsk II agreement, so I decided to keep this as well. 

After my conversation with Mange and Jo, I decided to maintain my forecast. Our forecasts were similar, however several sources (https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/2043251/6-countries-feared-invaded-by-russia) I had not seen before were presented to me which affirmed my opinion, particularly regarding Moldova. I did not previously know that Russia accused NATO of using Moldova as a weapons hub for Ukraine, and this could be used as a justification for invasion. I previously felt hesitancy raising my forecast to 9% so instead of raising my forecast after learning this, I instead feel more justified in my prediction of 9%. 

This forecast, I made a drastic change and decreased 31-60 days, 61-90 days, and 91 or more days by 13 percent altogether to then push less than 30 days from 53 to 66 percent. This was done after seeing that Trump and Rubio hinted at abandoning the peace negotiations, as well as after a 30 hour Easter truce announced by Russia was reportedly violated nearly 3,000 times, according to Zelensky. A report from Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported a total of 1,882 cases of Russian shelling, 812 of which involved heavy weaponry.  Ukraine indicated a willingness to pause strikes for 30 days but Russia rejected this proposal. 

Sources

1.https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wdllj8lwxo

2. https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/20/europe/ukraine-easter-ceasefire-violations-intl/index.html

3. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/18/us/politics/trump-rubio-putin-ukraine.html

4. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-russian-army-trying-create-impression-easter-ceasefire-2025-04-20/

I increased Georgia from 4 to 5 percent and Moldova from 8 to 9 percent, leaving Armenia and Kazakhstan at 3 and 1 percent respectively. 

I chose to increase my forecast for Georgia after reviewing some of my peers' forecasts, which led me to examine the current protests in Tbilisi more closely. Protestors have been marching and blocking essential streets every day since November. (https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250328-we-will-fight-until-we-win-can-georgia-escape-russia-influence-protests-tbilisi) Almost 90% of Georgia's citizens support European integration, and I believe protests will not cease until this goal is achieved or until they are brutally suppressed. As demonstrations become more disruptive, it may increase Russia's incentive for direct action, perhaps launched from the Georgian territory they control. 

I also learned that the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia account for nearly 20% of internationally recognized Georgian territory. I previously did not realize the areas were so large or that that Russia effectively controlled such a significant percentage of Georgia's land. To me, this may facilitate an invasion and is why I increased my forecast. Further, over this past week, Georgia rejected Russia's proposal to restore diplomatic ties, citing their occupied land. This rejection may push Moscow away from similar efforts in the future. (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50856)

I chose to increase my forecast for Moldova as the three diplomats just left the country two days ago, and further because there has been news that Russia intends to place loyalists in Moldova's parliament in the upcoming elections, and then use the country against Ukraine. (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/19/7508268/)

I maintained my forecasts for Kazakhstan as the Russian Premier Mishustin met Kazakh counterpart Bektenov in Moscow and emphasized the "brotherly and allied" relations between the two nations, as well as the growing cooperation across trade, energy, and infrastructure. (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/-we-are-truly-bound-by-brotherhood-russia-kazakhstan-praise-booming-ties/3544632) 

Similarly, although the news came in March, I read that Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said, "Armenia is a friendly country for us. It is a sovereign state, but we have a lot in common --- bilaterally, historically, and culturally." I also did not realize that there had been an agreement on the text of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan on March 13. So it appears that even as Armenia is pursuing integration with the EU, they are still tightly bound with Russia.  (https://oc-media.org/after-years-of-deterioration-armenias-relations-with-russia-appear-to-be-warming/) Further, three days ago, Russia's deputy foreign minister and Armenia's Parliament deputy speaker discussed the potential normalization of relations between Armenia and Türkiye. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsrJdTIESK0)

My partner and I agreed on our order of countries, and both increased our percentage for Moldova when we learned about the expulsion of diplomats (me from 5-8% last week and her from 8-11% this week).  We had a long discussion about Georgia, as it is tied to Russia economically, which would dissuade an invasion, however, there have also been anti-Kremlin movements in Tbilisi which could increase Moscow's incentive to retain influence. 

My colleague noted that there are four potential reasons for invasion: 1) to create a buffer zone against the EU 2) for increased Russian geopolitical control 3) to ensure the security of diplomatic allies and 4) for or against ethnic communities. 

When putting these four reasons against the countries presented in this question, I maintain my forecasts. 

My colleague and I posed the question, "Why German language?" to frame our forecasts. We decided that gaining a Russian influence in Germany could serve Moscow's interests by marginally weakening NATO, influencing Germany's energy policies, and destabilizing their politics as they lean increasingly to the far right and away from Western Europe. My partner also noted that META social medias now have looser restrictions, which could lead to an influx of disinformation. However, we questioned whether or not they would be counted by this database. While I was tempted to move my "Between 70 and 79" and "Between 80 and 89" to be more similar numbers, I ultimately decided to leave my forecast as is because I believe that there has been a trajectory by the database to count fewer cases in the second 6 months of the "year" as they count it. 

After my conversation with my colleague, I maintained my revised forecast.

Together, we discussed the impacts of weather on ceasefires. She noted that Russia requires less energy in the summer, meaning it takes fewer resources to push their war in Ukraine. This may compel them to increase their offensive, as exhibited by the attack on Sumy, to secure a truce on their terms by autumn (when ceasefires last on average for 150 days, according to my classmate's calculations). 

If a ceasefire is agreed upon before autumn, I expect it to last less than 30 days. As a linked article notes, violence increases in the summer.  This is based on a small case study of Baltimore, but could indicate something greater about human nature. However, if the ceasefire is made in autumn, it may last over 91 days, as per the Russian average. 

We also discussed that Chinese citizens are fighting with Moscow (on an individual basis, not sent by the Chinese state) as well as military officers who were sent by Beijing. This, in conjunction with renewed military aid to Ukraine and more significant attacks on Ukrainian cities, indicates that a ceasefire is not near, and is not guaranteed to be long-lasting. 

1.https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/research

2. https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2022/08/violence-increases-in-hot-weather-cease-fire-days-could-help/

3. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-nationals-fighting-russia-ukraine-are-mercenaries-us-officials-2025-04-11/&ved=2ahUKEwj6gKnordqMAxULFVkFHUcoI0EQvOMEKAB6BAgOEAE&usg=AOvVaw3BjHLc9dqke8TI15Y3yCkP

I mostly maintained all of my percentages as no news or conversations I encountered over the past week (this is cast prior to my conversation with my classmate) led me to reframe my forecasts or significantly change my mind.

There has been no news out of Moldova since expulsion of Russian diplomats, and no escalation in dialogue or action, which is a good sign thus far. Moldova does have parliamentary elections in 2025, which may also sway the chances of invasion. These elections represent the "final battle on Moldova's road to EU membership in a country where pro-Russian political opposition remains strong."

I did learn that Armenia refused to pay its contributions to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization on April 1, which means it will suspend its participation in the military alliance in August 2024. This led me to increase my forecast by just 1%, and I also raised Georgia by 1% as I still believe it has a higher chance than Armenia to face invasion. 

Kazakhstan is still  a member of the CSTO and there has been no significant news in the past week. In October 2025, they will hold elections and I believe this will more accurately determine the threat of invasion, depending on if a pro-Western or pro-Russia government is installed. However for now, chances remain absolutely minimal. 

1. https://kyivindependent.com/armenia-refuses-to-finance-contributions-russian-led-csto-security/

2. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/12/31/from-germany-to-romania-the-elections-that-will-define-europe-in-2025

I slightly increased the percentage for "less than or equal to 59%" and lowered "between 80 and 89" for several reasons. 

EUvsDisinfo Database has only reported 1 case in the past 13 days (making a total 42), showing a slow in the trajectory I originally anticipated and making 70-79 more likely. Further, there are not many significant elections in western Europe in 2025 beyond local elections in Italy, various parliamentary elections, and Polish/Romanian presidential elections. This may be reason for Russia to save its resources for a more impactful year. 

However, as Putin began his large-scale drive into Ukraine, he accompanied it with a wave of concurrent disinformation to prevent Western leaders from "taking the harshest steps against Moscow." He may employ a similar tactic as ceasefires are negotiated with the US and Russia carries out a final push for land, resources, and a dominant narrative as the war (supposedly) comes to an end. 

1. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/12/31/from-germany-to-romania-the-elections-that-will-define-europe-in-2025

2. https://www.csis.org/analysis/down-not-out-russian-economy-under-western-sanctions

3. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0r5vlwj4dqo