ManonFuchs

After consulting with my forecasting partner, I am slightly decreasing the probability of a Russian invasion of Moldova. As the risk of Russian hostility increases, so too does Europe's support of Moldova--this aligns with Sandu's comments, which seemingly aim to sound alarm bells for the European community to rally support for her country. In turn, greater securitization of Moldova is likely to deter Russian aggression. For the risk of Russian invasion to increase, I would want to see news regarding lower levels of European support for Moldova. As I indicated in a prior forecast, however, the EU has increased its lethal aid to Moldova. [Atlantic Council]

I retain my prior analysis on the other three countries: we agree risk of invasion for Kazakhstan is very low, the Georgian Dream government which is favorable for the Kremlin remains in power, and there is no need to invade Armenia while Russia can exert its influence in other ways (through Azerbaijan and Turkiye, for example). 

After consulting with my forecasting partner, I am adjusting my forecast to increase the probability that a ceasefire lasts 30 days. First, I found that Russia favors a 30-day ceasefire, assuming certain issues are addressed (previously raised, likely demilitarization of Ukraine and the possibility of a new government being forced through). [IAREX] Second, I was made aware of a Bloomberg article which indicated that the U.S. is amenable to recognizing Crimea as Russian for the purpose of a deal. This could indicate less U.S. support to Ukraine and pressure on Zelenskyy to accept Russia's terms. [Bloomberg]

Russia ramped up efforts to destabilize Moldova this past week, launching a new wave of disinformation. The Russian network Matryoshka carried out its first targeted attack on Moldova’s information and social media space. It spread fake videos that falsely appear to originate from the French government and are intended to undermine the legitimacy of President Sandu’s administration. [DW] 

President Sandu has warned that this interference mirrors Russia’s past behavior ahead of Moldovan elections. She stated that the Kremlin seeks to install a more compliant government in Chisinau, adding that “if the Kremlin manages to control the government, it will use the Republic of Moldova against Ukraine.” She also highlighted the strategic risk posed by Moldova’s 1,200-kilometer border with Ukraine, suggesting that Russia might eventually try to drag Moldova into the conflict. [Odessa Journal]

In light of these developments, there is a slightly elevated risk of Russian escalation or military pressure on Moldova in the near term.

Meanwhile, Armenia and Georgia voted in favor of the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on April 19. This move, however, is not particularly significant. Georgia continues to walk a domestic tightrope, as its population overwhelmingly opposes both Russia’s occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the war in Ukraine. Similarly, Armenia has previously condemned the war. A reversal would have been politically costly at home, and the Kremlin likely understands this calculus. [EA Daily] 

Russia’s ties with Kazakhstan remain strong. This week, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister met with Russian officials to discuss bilateral relations and praised the substantial increase in trade volume between the two countries. [Qazinform] 

On Saturday, Putin called a temporary ceasefire to honor the Easter holiday. "We assume that the Ukrainian side will follow our example," he added. The announcement of this ceasefire, and the analysis of how both sides allegedly violated it, are the primary factors informing my forecast this week.

First, it is important to note that holiday ceasefires, while relatively uncommon, are not without precedent. British and German troops famously agreed to a Christmas truce in 1914.  [CWGC] Similarly, Putin previously called for a 36-hour ceasefire in 2023 during Orthodox Christmas celebrations. At the time, Ukrainian officials and soldiers dismissed the offer, citing Russia’s track record of breaking its promises and emphasizing that the burden lies with the aggressor to halt its assault. [CNN] 

Second, Ukraine’s skepticism in 2023, along with the numerous ceasefire violations this weekend, only strengthens the projection that Russia is unlikely to uphold a ceasefire agreement. So why propose one for Easter?

• Putin’s performance in the war has been widely criticized; over a million Russians are estimated to have perished, and the country remains under heavy sanctions. Extending this “gracious” offer helps project an image domestically that Russia is acting in good faith while shifting blame to Ukraine for prolonging the conflict.
• Holidays have long served as strategic opportunities in warfare. Even in the absence of a formal ceasefire, forces may assume that hostilities will pause for celebration. This assumption can raise morale, but also increase vulnerability. For example, during the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese forces exploited South Vietnam’s expectation of calm during Tet by launching a surprise attack. [Office of the Historian]

• Meanwhile, Russia has rejected broader ceasefire proposals and continues to demand leadership change in Ukraine, and refuses any territorial concessions. [24 Kanal] At the same time, Secretary Rubio and former President Trump have stated they would withdraw U.S. mediation efforts if no progress is made. In this context, the Easter ceasefire serves as a symbolic gesture; one that allows Russia to appear conciliatory without altering its core demands. [Meduza] 

Ultimately, this development does not substantially change my forecast. It reinforces the pattern that Russia uses symbolic ceasefires for political gain, slightly increasing the probability that, even if implemented, any ceasefire would not last beyond 30 days.

There is not much I am changing here -- upon further discussion with my forecasting partner I believe that the vague parameters for German-language disinformation cases originating in pro-Kremlin media makes forecasting this question quite difficult. On a single day in January, over 3,000 German-language and pro-Kremlin bots were discovered on X [Politico]. Therefore, I would be confident that there are much more than 90 cases, but as this question deals with EUvsDisinfo I am stuck on their prior patterns. 

The only significant update to my forecast is that I’ve reduced the probability of a Moldova invasion from 9% to 5%. I initially increased the forecast to reflect my assessment that recent developments in the news cycle raised the likelihood of an invasion compared to the previous week. However, after further deliberation with my forecasting partner, I realized that my original projection was flawed.

For the same reasons I outlined in my previous forecast, I still believe that the EU’s provision of lethal assistance to Moldova reflects growing concerns about the country’s security risks. As such, it is still reasonable to place Moldova at a higher risk level compared to other countries. In addition, since posting this previous forecast, President Sandu said on Monday that she aims to complete EU accession talks by the end of 2027. Such a development could raise the possibility of invasion. [CNN] 

I updated this forecast to reflect the low likelihood that a ceasefire would last exactly 30 days. Upon further reflection, I realize my confidence in pinpointing an exact day, rather than providing a broad range, is quite low. Instead, I remain more convinced, based on the analysis in my previous forecast, that the ceasefire will last less than 30 days.

To briefly summarize, Russia has rejected bilateral ceasefire proposals thus far and continues to impose additional demands. As the U.S. imposes tougher conditions on its support for Ukraine and pressure mounts on the EU to fill this gap, I would argue that Ukraine remains more likely to agree to a ceasefire (as Zelenskyy has already suggested), while still refusing Russia's unreasonable demands.

In this context, I believe that as Ukraine’s fighting power diminishes and U.S. support wanes, Russia may feel emboldened to make further unreasonable demands, assuming Ukraine is too weakened to resist. Based on this, I think it’s likely that Russia could eventually strike a ceasefire deal, present it as a major achievement, and then violate it in pursuit of greater territorial or geopolitical gains in Ukraine. This would align with Russia’s historical pattern of using ceasefires strategically to project goodwill to its domestic audience while accusing the other party (as seen with Georgia and Ukraine) of violating the agreement. Putin has consistently accused others of doing what Russia itself is doing, suggesting that the more aggressively he makes a claim, the more likely it is that Russia is, in fact, perpetrating that act. [CNN] 

Moldova:

I don't believe recent developments warrant a substantial shift in the forecast for Moldova, though they do offer some signals worth noting. On one hand, increased EU military assistance could reflect growing concern in Brussels about the potential for Russian aggression or even invasion. On the other, the U.S. imposition of high import duties on Moldova may inadvertently signal to the Kremlin that Washington is not prioritizing Moldova's defense.

The EU just approved its largest-ever military assistance package to Moldova, valued at 20 million euros. This builds on last year’s provision of 9 million euros in lethal aid, already a significant policy shift, and underscores a growing commitment to bolstering Moldova’s military readiness. [RFE/RL]

In contrast, the United States imposed 31% import duties on Moldovan goods, the highest rate among post-Soviet countries (excluding Russia and Belarus). This move, which was applauded by the pro-Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta, was framed as a return to Trump-era policies that do not privilege any one country. While the trade measure is not directly tied to security issues, its optics could be interpreted by Russia as a sign of Moldova’s relative isolation, particularly if paired with broader skepticism about U.S. engagement in the region. [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] 

Taken together, the increased EU assistance and the seemingly indifferent U.S. stance may have mixed effects: reinforcing Moldova’s importance to Europe while also potentially emboldening the Kremlin, depending on how these signals are read.

Armenia:

I’ve lowered the probability of a Russian invasion of Armenia from 4% to 2%, with perhaps somewhat unconventional reasoning. After months of progress toward a historic peace deal with Azerbaijan, tensions between Yerevan and Baku are once again rising. Notably, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s foreign ministers are now engaging via the 3+3 format [Eurasia Review], which includes Russia. This pivot back toward multilateral talks, following Yerevan’s efforts to reduce Kremlin involvement, is striking and it points to Russia’s reassertion of influence over the peace process. [Eurasia review] 

I would argue that Russia benefits from stalling the peace deal. An aggressive Azerbaijan weakens Armenia’s ability to pursue deeper ties with the EU and NATO, as Yerevan is forced to focus on defending itself against a hostile neighbor. In this scenario, a direct Russian invasion becomes unnecessary, as Azerbaijan effectively plays the role of regional enforcer. This logic is consistent with recent history, such as the 2020 Karabakh War, during which Russia stood aside, effectively giving Azerbaijan a green light to attack.

Georgia: 

I don't believe there has been any significant shift in the status of protests in Georgia to justify a change in the forecast. On April 9, demonstrators marked the anniversary of the 1989 massacre, when Soviet forces killed 21 protesters in Tbilisi. However, these symbolic protests have been ongoing for months and have not produced any change in leadership. [Civil.ge] 

Kazakhstan:

Finally, there has been no major news concerning Russia and Kazakhstan. Perhaps worth noting, rare earth metal reserves, estimated at up to 20 million tonnes, were discovered in Kazakhstan on Thursday. If anything, this development may present Russia with another avenue to exert influence without resorting to invasion. This could take the form of acquiring development contracts, or conditioning the completion of energy infrastructure (such as coal-fired plants) on favorable profit-sharing arrangements for mineral extraction. [Euronews]

Based on an analysis of recent German news vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine, I project a slightly higher probability that German-language disinformation cases originating in pro-Kremlin media will fall in the 80–89 range—up to 57%, compared to 55% last week.

Firstly, the EUvsDisinfo database recorded one new case of disinformation this week, bringing the total number of German-language disinformation cases from pro-Kremlin media to 42. Assuming each subsequent week yields at least one additional case, I can say with a high degree of certainty that there will be at least 60 such cases by September 2025.

Recent News

A quick analysis of recent developments surrounding Germany’s increasing support for Ukraine’s military capabilities, as well as German reporting on Russia, strengthens the case for a higher projected number of disinformation cases.

•  This past Friday, the German Defense Minister pledged "new deliveries of weapons systems" following a meeting with defense ministers at NATO headquarters. [DW]
• The Bundeswehr Inspector General argued that Germany should be fully rearmed by 2029 to defend against a potential Russian attack on a NATO member. Separately, the German Federal Intelligence Service assessed that Russia views itself in systemic conflict with the West and could prepare for war with NATO.  [Ukrainska Pravda] 
• Also on Friday, the German defense minister stated that peace between Russia and Ukraine appears unlikely and reiterated Germany’s strong and continued support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia. [TVP World] 
• Allegations of Russian involvement in a string of violent attacks in Germany are also circulating in the media this week. ZDF and other outlets have reported that Russia may have played a role in three fatal incidents ahead of the elections. Notably, an analyst found that search queries in Russia for a “terrorist attack in Mannheim” spiked before the event took place. [Frankfurter Rundschau] 

Taken together, these developments suggest a few key points. First, Germany is stepping up its support for Ukraine and growing more concerned about its own national security. Russia has historically responded aggressively to European countries that increase their security posture against it and may retaliate with heightened disinformation campaigns. While the allegations of Russian involvement in recent terrorist attacks in Germany remain unconfirmed, their circulation signals a broader awareness of the risk of Russian interference and disinformation within the country.