madskinds

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Today in class we discussed Russian ideas of sovereignty and that they don't consider former USSR nations "sovereign" this increased my belief that Russia might invade, and I think Moldova or Georgia are the most likely nations they would invade. Thus, I increased the likelihood of invasion in those nations. While at the same time I don't necessarily think Russia would engage on multiple fronts and thus I am keeping my percentages low.

Grecia and I discussed Georgian protests and Russian involvement in Moldovan elections which indicates upheaval and potential conflict. I continue to think Armenia is unlikely to face invasion from Russia due to it's strong military and Kazakstahn seemed relatively peaceful and thus less likely to face invasion.

I feel as though much of the conversation had in class affirmed my percentages for this ceasefire.

First we considered, was the Easter ceasefire even a ceasefire under the terms of this question, and we we determined it is not considered a ceasefire. However, the fact that even a 30 hour  holiday "truce"  could not be respected indicates lack of ability to maintain a ceasefire should they sign a real one into affect. 

Additionally, we discussed differing definitions of a ceasefire, peace, and sovereignty among different cultures. Which would affect Russia's willingness to maintain a ceasefire. If they don't consider former USSR nations sovereign then they may not consider a need to respect a peace agreement with them. 

Moldova: What I researched had me revisiting the question and rereading what they consider an invasion and how an attempt to annex Transnistria would be considered an invasion. While this didn't change my answer it reaffirmed the 9% chance of invasion as a reasonable invasion (and I considered rating it 10% likely but decided to leave it a 9% as I didn't want to succumb to recency bias feeling I needed to update this forecast just because of new information that in someways just better explains why research I have done considers Moldova the most likely next country for Russian aggression). Additionally, comments made about Russia's continued work to infiltrate Moldovan parliament in the September elections is worth noting and perhaps will lead me to increase my prediction in the near future.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/19/7508268/

Armenia: I decreased my  belief that Russia would attack Armenia because its strong and supported military seems a less interesting target than that of Moldova which is relatively weaker.  Thus, it is more of a stronger belief that Russia will invade Moldova, but would not enter another front in Armenia if it does so. 

https://www.euronews.com/2025/04/15/iran-and-armenia-simulate-border-threats-in-joint-military-drills

Georgia: The information found today reaffirmed and even  increased my relatively high belief that Russia might invade Georgia by April, 2027. As America leaves Georgia twisting in the wind and right-wing pro-Kremlin groups gain traction in their government Georgia becomes a more attractive option for Russian invasion.

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/04/11/hebm-a11.html

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250328-we-will-fight-until-we-win-can-georgia-escape-russia-influence-protests-tbilisi

https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/15/europe/georgia-protests-authoritarianism-fears-intl-cmd/index.html

Kazakhstan:  Research I found reaffirms my relatively high (compared to other forecasters) belief that Russia would invade Kazakhstan. Due to its large rare earth deposits found and America's decreasing interest in policing the region as an America first policy puts us at odds with countries we supposedly support.

https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Russia-Halts-Large-Chunk-of-Kazakhstans-Oil-Export-Capacity.html

https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-plans-to-send-delegation-to-united-states-for-trade-talks

https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/04/20/soyuz-ms-26-spacecraft-carrying-expedition-72-crew-lands-in-kazakhstan

https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/kazakhstan-efforts-to-restore-last-wild-horse-species-receive-huge-boost-of-150-animals/

I wanted to update my forecast as news came in regarding the Easter ceasefire and its breaking. While both sides have been receiving serious urging from the Trump White House to seek peace there has been no serious desire from either party, and when the energy ceasefire was reached it was very convoluted creating issues in following orders. Similarly in the announcement of the Easter ceasefire there was simply a random announcement making it a very diffcult order to follow. And if this counts as a ceasefire it was broken or atleaseast accused of being broken. However, in the time leading up to the ceasefire there was some Ukraine talk about desiring a longer ceasefire, hence keeping 30 days and 91 days at at least at 10% chance. I think a 31-90 ceasefire is unlikely, however there is some value in a break in fighting for both sides to regroup.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-putin-zelensky-easter-truce-latest-news-b2736321.html

https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/19/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-truce-strategy-intl-latam/index.html

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-drones-3c940cf913f22eb21803841b4d026db8

https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/20/europe/ukraine-easter-ceasefire-violations-intl/index.html

I increased my belief in 31-60 days, 61-90 days, and 91+days by 1% each and decreased the less than 30 days option by the 3%. After my conversation with Mange I realized I may have been undervaluing the value of a ceasefire for Russia in time to re-arm and prepare for re-invasion. This made me increase potential for longer ceasefires, but I was careful to not be swayed too much by recency bias.

I increased my likelihood of between 70-89+ pro-Kremlin publications being done in German language due to my discussion with Mange and her interesting points about the increasing potential for disinformation campaigns as language learning models become used more in this work. I think that the potential for this technology will possibly increase the amount of pro-Kremlin publications in German, however I am hesitant to decrease the likelihood of the 60-69 range as it includes my calculated base-rate and still seems like a very possible outcome especially given all the new information I've gathered (I.e German elections have ended, but potential for increasing conflict with Russia as U.S. disengages and Germany potentially takes up that role).