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Armenia is currently according to my colleague trying to reengage with Russia to help them with defeating Azerbaijan. Making it even more low of a likelihood that Armenia would be invaded.

I changed my forecast. I updated it to indicate that there is now a 10% chance instead of a 5% chance that Russia would break the ceasefire.  I changed this percentage due to new information that I obtained from my colleagues about the topic, particularly that Russia had broken an informal ceasefire over Easter recently. However due to this ceasefire being an informal one I will keep the rest of my prediction the same for I feel like if a formal ceasefire occurred it would still be more likely that Russia breaks the ceasefire in 61-90 days.  

Base rate: How often has Russia escalated from political or hybrid interference to full-scale invasion in the past 30 years? In 2008, Russia launched an open military invasion of Georgia. Prior to the Georgian invasion Russian had been expanding its influence through political co-optation, economic dependency, and information warfare. Amid the USSR’s implosion in the early 1990s, Russian-speaking separatists in Transnistria feared growing Moldovan nationalism and the possibility of Moldova, which had just declared independence, reunifying with Romania. Russian troops and Cossack fighters helped Transnistrian paramilitary groups fight Moldovan forces in the Transnistria War (1990-92), this day the conflict remains frozen and Russia has yet to do a full scale invasion of the country. Kazakhstan had remained close to Russia politically til recently and has heavy Russian state influence however it has never been invaded. Armenia is the only post-Soviet country where Russia’s influence has grown steadily since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Russian border guards were stationed on Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey. In 1995, a large Russian military base was opened in Armenia’s second city of Gyumri. And in 2020, a Russian peacekeeping mission was deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh after the Second Karabakh War. However now Russian troops are leaving the area The Baltic states have experienced various hybrid warfare attacks, attributed predominantly to Russia but also to China. Hybrid threats to the Baltic states include disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, sabotage, and weaponized migration. However Russia has not done an invasion of the Baltic states Montenegro experienced an Alleged Russian coup plot, no invasion. Hybrid presence via Wagner, but not invasions have occurred in the Central African Republic. Belarus has experienced heavy interference, political domination, but no invasion. The Lukashenka regime, is experiencing an intensifying economic crisis, and near-total dependence on an expansionist Russia however Russia had yet to launch an invasion When it comes to Ukraine, the country has experienced Political interference, separatist support in Donbas, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and now a full scale invasion.  

Out of all the countries mentioned that have experienced Russian interference and cyberattacks only 2 have experienced full scale invasions. Russia has escalated from hybrid/political interference to full-scale invasion in only about 2 out of 8 known cases over the past 30 years. So the base rate for the likelihood of another invasion is 25% 

Inside view: Which of the four countries—Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, or Armenia—is currently the most politically unstable, and how might that instability increase the risk of Russian interference? 

According to an article that came out recently both Georgia and Moldova are experiencing political instability in experiencing “democratic erosion”. dozens of Moldovans reportedly received training in destabilisation techniques at camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia ahead of the elections, with the training conducted by Bulgarians and Serbs connected to Russian intelligence services. Recently in Georgia the president pushed a legislative package that would increase penalties for protest-related offences - in some cases to many years in prison. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgia-plans-tougher-penalties-protesters-amid-political-crisis-2025-02-04/

They passed a legislation to restrict foreign influence two days ago and many are citing the act titled Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the Broadcasting Law, as undemocratic due to it prohibiting foreign funding of the media, the removal of gender-related provisions, and the elimination of the requirement to include civil society organizations CSO. The new president of Kazakhstan enacted political reforms under the banner of a “New Kazakhstan“, promising to fight systemic corruption and the “old clan” oligarchy, which had controlled the most important sectors of the economy for yearsThe lastest level of political instability in Armenia is -0.83 points, a decline from -0.74 points in 2022. In addition to this Armenia is currently at war with Azerbaijan. 

Confidence interval: 80%

My new prediction is quite similar to before the only difference is that I believe Georgia and Kazakhstan’s ability to get invaded will be much lower. This is because of the fact that each country has a 25% chance of getting invaded and Kazakhstan has a more stable government than previously known. Also Georgia’s rate of getting invaded will be lowered due to each country having a 25% chance of invasion with this into account I think it’s less than 15% that they will get invaded unlike before 

Base rate: What is the likelihood of third-party involvement in enforcing a 2025 Russia-Ukraine peace agreement, and does such involvement typically increase the durability of peace agreements?

Regarding U.S. involvement in a potential peace agreement, Donald Trump has recently proposed conditioning American support for Ukraine on reaching a peace deal—reportedly involving sanctions on Russia and demands for access to critical minerals. If the conflict gets too out of hand the UN could send peace keepers to settle the conflict like it did during the Yugoslavian conflict between Bosnia and Serbia. However according to a recent article despite the EU pressuring the UN to deploy peace keepers, the under secretary general for peace keeping Jean Pierre Lacroix still sees the possibility of deploying peace keepers as very hypothetical right now when it comes to the conflict. Recently the EU announced that it will continue to send sanctions against Russia well into the summer as well as tariffs against Russian fertilizers. The EU has signaled openness to a peace agreement, contingent on the conditions and whether it adequately prioritizes Ukraine’s interests. Based off the information I have collected the most likely scenario would be a peace deal with the United States signing as the third party with perhaps EU support. With this in mind,  do peace deals involving the U.S with EU support increase a peace agreement's durability? In the past the U.S was a facilitator of the Camp David Accords signed by President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem. The accords began in September 1978 and established a framework for a historic peace treaty concluded between Israel and Egypt in March 1979. These accords are considered generally successful at establishing a long lasting peace between the two areas.  Now when it comes to agreements that the EU has facilitated there is a much lower sucess rate as this can be seen with Minsk I and II. With Minski I being broken in about 5 months and Minsk II in a few days. If a ceasefire agreement were to occur to end the Ukraine-Russo war third parties would need to make sure to not repeat mistakes from the past. During Minsk I and II third parties made the mistake of creating a peace deal that forget to include robust mechanisms for enhancing compliance and ignored the stakes at hand which were that both countries had quite divergent interests and difficulty interpreting the text. This made enforcement of the peace deal quite difficult. 

Inside view: To what extent will Russia use ceasefire negotiations as a tool to divide Western support for Ukraine?

Putin has already tried to manipulate the original peace deal that Trump placed on the table to end the war. He stated that he would need a new peace deal that restricts Ukrainian military mobilization, training, and Western aid supplies. He also stated that this new peace deal would need emphasize Russia’s recent territorial gains in Kursk Oblast. This showcases ways in which Putin is using the peace deal as a way for him to win the war unfairly against Ukraine and perhaps divide western support. However in response to Putin, recently Trump commented that he is very angry at Putin’s remarks about the peace deal.

Confidence Interval: 80%

I predict that with this new information in mind combined with my prior research that if the treaty is formed with american support and keeping in mind Russia's history when it comes to breaking peace treaties it is most evident that the peace treaty will probably last 61-90 days. This changed from my most recent updated forecast in that prior I had not considered the idea of what role third party players might play in this peace agreement. If I consider the role of the United States facilitating the peace agreement and how long Russia usually takes to break such agreements historically I can conclude that it is most probable that Russia will break the agreement in approximately 61-90 days. However there is still a chance that the agreement could be broken sooner however I highly doubt it would be broken in less than 30 days due to U.S involvement. I also highly doubt that it would take more than 91 days or more for the agreement to be broken even with U.S support because the situation is quite volatile and even support from the U.S is not guaranteed due to Trump being upset with Putin for not agreeing to his original peace deal. However the United States is quite invested in this matter especially due to Trump himself even stating that he would pledge to end the war in Ukraine during his election platform.  

I revised my forecast to this question after speaking with my classmate Faris. He pointed out to me that in the past most of the times Germany did not receive more than 90 Russian propaganda pieces. However I still kept between 80 to 89 as most probable due to prior research showcasing that Russia ramped up its missinformation campaigns in Germany for this election. However I also think it is important to keep in mind prior cases. 

I revised my forecast of this question after consulting with my classmate Faris who pointed out to me that it is most likely highly improbable that Russia will do another invasion in the next two years due to using a lot of there military resources in this recent war with Ukraine. Faris also pointed out to me a scale in which to base my prediction off of on RAND under crowd forecast that shows the user the scale of probability of each percentage. After looking at that scale and taking into account Russia’s lack of resources after its war against Ukraine I adjusted my percent probabilities. However I still kept Moldova as being the most probable for invasion due to prior research I had conducted, placed Georgia as second,  Kazakhstan as third, and Armenia as the lease likely country for invasion. I have Georgia now higher in terms of invasion likelihood compared to Kazakhstan due to rethinking the implications of prior research and Faris pointing out to me the geographical location of Georgia and how this would influence its likelihood of invasion. This is because Russia might view Georgia as more of a threat due to there new law on restricting foreign press. They might see this as a sign of Georgia wanting to become more isolationist and view it as ether a threat or an opportunity to attack. It is also important to note that this law has most of the west up in arms due to it restricting NGOs influences in government. Much of the west is calling the new law undemocratic which would make it less likely that Georgia would receive western support if an invasion occurs. I placed Kazakhstan as third due to it having a strange political situation in that some of its policies are pro Russia while others are very anti Russia. I kept Armenia as the least likely to get invaded due to Russia pulling out its troops from the country and remaining to contain very little interest in the region. 

How many Russian interventions have occurred in countries experiencing internal instability or contested elections? Russia has a pattern of intervening in countries experiencing political instability or contested elections. In Georgia, Russia intervened during a period of political turmoil. In Azerbaijan, it is reported to have supported a coup that ousted President Abulfaz Elchibey, with rebels allegedly using Russian military equipment. In the Central African Republic, Russia, primarily through the Wagner Group, backed President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, reportedly interfering in the 2020 election amid ongoing unrest. In Mali, Russian-trained military officers were involved in the 2020 coup that removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. And in Montenegro, prosecutors alleged that Russian intelligence agents attempted to orchestrate a 2016 coup aimed at stopping the country’s accession to NATO.  Also it is important to note that although Russia has not done a full scale invasion of Maldova it has interfered in other ways during a time in which it has experience internal instability by choking off natural-gas supplies last year and by having a grip on Moldova’s eastern Transnistria region, where it stations troops and backs separatist rebels. 

Updated Inside view: Has Moldova strengthened its security ties with NATO or the EU in the last year? Russian missiles and drones enter Moldova’s airspace regularly. The most recent incident being on 13 February 2025, when two Russian drones crashed on Moldovan territory. The event once again highlighted the risks posed to neighbouring countries amid Russian aggression in the region. And on on 24-25 March 2025, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly organised its first joint Committee visit to Moldova since 2015. Is Russia's military presence in Armenia being scaled down, reinforced, or unchanged?Russia's military presence in Armenia is being reduced, with many of the vehicles that once provided security now being replaced by those of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA). A recent news report highlighted growing Armenian sentiment of abandonment by Russia, noting that the Russian military base in Gyumri remains one of the last visible symbols of Moscow's fading influence in the region. How likely is it that the Georgian Dream party will pass legislation restricting foreign influence in 2025? They passed a legislation to restrict foreign influence two days ago and many are citing the act titled Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the Broadcasting Law, as undemocratic due to it prohibiting foreign funding of the media, the removal of gender-related provisions, and the elimination of the requirement to include civil society organizations (CSOs) in the decision-making process. Has Kazakhstan publicly supported or criticized Russia’s actions in Ukraine recently? In a pointed statement made in Putin’s presence, President Tokayev affirmed that Kazakhstan does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the self-proclaimed republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. Meanwhile, Kazakh individuals and businesses have capitalized on the war in Ukraine by importing sanctioned European goods and reselling them to Russian buyers at inflated prices. 

Confidence interval: 70%

I lowered my percentage for Armenia because it has become apparent that Russia is disinterested in invading Armenia. Russia keeps pulling its troops out of the region and even is allowing EU troops to fill in. The Armenia people feel abandoned by Russia making the invasion way less likely than previously thought out. Moldova however due to recent news has a high probability of being invaded due Russia sending drones and missiles recently to the region. Georgia has only a 20 % chance of invasion due to general disinterest in the region and military failure in the past. However the region is still likely to be invaded due to its recent laws restricting foreign influence in its media. This might provoke Putin to want to look into the region. Kazakhstan has a 30% chance of invasion due to its inconsistency when it comes to its views on Russia. On the one hand people in the region are supporting Russian businesses on the other hand the president stated that he disproves with Russia's actions in invading Ukraine. 

Updated baserate: To what extent will the rise of populist, pro-Russian parties in Germany incentivize an increase in German-language disinformation cases in 2024–2025? The rise of populist, pro-Russian parties in Germany has created new incentives for the Kremlin to increase German-language disinformation. Recently a German think tank CeMAS found that hundreds of posts on platform X (formerly Twitter) have exhibited hallmarks of Russia’s Doppelgänger disinformation campaign, which the german government had previously dismissed. These efforts disproportionately target Germany’s centrist parties, including the Greens, CDU, and SPD, aiming to weaken their candidates ahead of the European elections. This suggests that Moscow sees the growing popularity of populist parties as an opportunity to amplify narratives favorable to its strategic interests, making a spike in German-language disinformation during this cycle highly plausible. 

Updated Inside view: How effective are German counter-disinformation measures (like ZEAM and EU media bans) at limiting the reach and influence of pro-Kremlin narratives in 2024–2025? German counter-disinformation measures, such as ZEAM and the EU's bans on Russian state media, have shown moderate effectiveness in curbing the reach of pro-Kremlin narratives in 2024–2025. While the moderate center-right CDU/CSU alliance, led by chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, won the election with 28.6% of the vote, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) still made significant gains, securing 20.8% and finishing second. This suggests that despite official efforts to limit disinformation, extremist parties sympathetic to pro-Kremlin messaging continue to gain traction. On the left, there was also a slight increase in support for far-left parties, though center-left parties like the Greens and SPD still outperformed them, indicating that the political center holds but is being challenged from both extremes.

Confidence Interval: 80%

Based on the updated base rate and inside view, I still predict that the number of German-language disinformation cases originating from pro-Kremlin media will most likely fall between 80–89 cases. This reflects the continued effectiveness of German counter-disinformation efforts, as evidenced by the election results favoring centrist parties. However, I’ve slightly increased the probability of 90 or more cases due to new findings from a German think tank suggesting that some campaigns on X went undetected. I also reduced the probability of 60–69 cases to zero, as the new evidence points to a higher overall volume of disinformation activity.

Updated base rate: How strong is the political will on both sides to maintain peace compared to historical examples? Both Russia and Ukraine show low political will to maintain peace. Ukraine was more compliant under Minsk I and II, but under Zelensky, compromise has become less likely. Russia, consistent with its past behavior, continues to demonstrate minimal commitment to lasting peace.

 Updated inside view: How do recent battlefield gains shape Putin’s willingness to negotiate sincerely? Putin’s recent battlefield gains appear to reinforce his belief that Russia has the upper hand, decreasing his incentive to negotiate sincerely. His conditional statement that peace depends on the U.S. ending military aid suggests strategic maneuvering—particularly if Trump were to return to power. The confirmed recruitment of at least 163 Chinese nationals into the Russian military further signals long-term planning and preparation for continued war rather than de-escalation.

Confidence interval: 75% 

Revised forecast: I now predict that a 2025 ceasefire would most likely break within 30 days, down from my previous forecast of 31–60 days. While Russia has historically taken longer to violate peace deals, recent signals, including increased foreign military recruitment and conditional peace rhetoric, point toward a more immediate breakdown following any ceasefire.