Barco

While the 30-year base rate for cross-border territorial skirmishes (resulting in fatalities) in South Asia is exceedingly high (South Asian aggregate ~43 percent; Indo-Pakistan ~86 percent), it is far lower for the Sino-Indian Ladakh region, averaging ~2.1 percent in any given year (from 1990-2024), based on data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project, ICOW  territorial claims data, ACCLED data, and other reporting. I started with the global base rate on territorial disputes (~3 percent), broke these down by region to focus on South Asia more generally, and further still to arrive at a Sino-Indian base rate of approximately 0.21 average over 35+ years (1990-2024 = ~ 0.03; 2010-2024 = ~ 0.07). These rates, of course, can vary significantly due to geopolitical conditions, accidents, or other externalities.

This estimate could shift markedly due to changing conditions on the ground, such as accidents, shifting alliances, or military escalation (inside view). Several factors could shift this assessment, such as the escalating conflict between India and Pakistan, driving a large military buildup along its already securitized border, broad opportunities for miscalculation, or interstate military support increasing hostilities (e.g., Chinese weapons sent to Pakistan). With China's strong backing of Pakistan and the U.S. historical support for India, there is an opportunity for political miscalculation and escalation. These dynamics pushed my estimate from the long-term average rate of ~ 2 percent to ~ 4 percent (although it wouldn't take much to shift these markedly). 

China and India have reached agreements to de-escalate border tensions, leaning towards cooperation. Additionally, the country has begun to promote tourism in the disputed region to diversify its economy. It is in China's interest to support Pakistan as a mediator of the conflict and let the U.S. and its allies work to restrain India. Any cross-border conflict between the two states could rapidly spiral out of control. 

However, the new Administration's protectionist policies, coupled with Beijing's global, expansionist ambitions, are a bit of a wild card; on the one hand, the U.S. is engaging with India on keeping the peace but not offering the level of support it may have in the past, perhaps opening up a chance for China to fill an even greater role in brokering peace. 

Thus, my near-term expectation is for China to focus its expansionist efforts elsewhere (e.g., in the South China Sea) while India and Pakistan are engaged in conflict or negotiations. While the chance of a bolt-from-the-blue escalation or accident is worryingly high, the most likely path for this region is to try to maintain stability.

While President Trump's approval rating stabilized following the backtrack on Tariffs, it is unlikely to rise above 45 percent by August 1, 2025. While there has historically been a narrow range for his approval rating, averaging 41 percent over the first and second terms, there are several domestic and foreign policy stories that could shift his approval rating downward.

First is the continued discussion of a recession and policies widely considered detrimental to the economy, such as tariffs, export controls on technology, and cutting off funding for basic science research. While clear indicators of a recession have not materialized, serious experts are warning that current policies could lead to a downturn.

Second are potential signals of disaffection among the base over various policies (e.g., theories of replacing recently fired federal employees with AI systems, creating a centralized database of U.S. Persons, etc.). Third are several foreign policy crises that the president promised to resolve in his first year in office that appear to be only worsening, with an uptick in political violence and broken cease-fire agreements (in Gaza and the Russian-Ukraine conflict).

While I give the potential for an approval rating above 45 percent a 20 percent chance, an increase in signals of a recession or a significant foreign policy blunder could decrease this number (5 or 10 percent).

According to the National Interagency Fire Center, the number of acres burned in the U.S. was already over 1.1 million (close to the ten-year average of 1.2 million), making it highly probable to surpass 1,283,147 acres. Additionally, the U.S. is currently facing drought conditions in regions that have historically been prone to wildfires (e.g., the Pacific Northwest), which will exacerbate conditions. With the summer fire season in the U.S. just beginning and Canada already reporting near-record wildfire activity, it's highly probable that wildfire activity will exceed 1,283,147 acres. 

While the situation remains unpredictable, regional reaction to the U.S. Administration's tariff policies seems more likely to decrease the likelihood of conflict. Russia's recent bid to revive a "Strategic triangle" with China and India as a counterbalance to the West points in the direction of increased cooperation over escalation.