BC019

After speaking with my partner, I’m more skeptical that the trade statistics I pulled to adjust my forecast last week may not be as relevant because the Georgian party had elections since then which favored Russia. I also had not considered Russia’s recent disinformation campaign against Moldova this weekend. This makes me think that tensions were heightened over the weekend, which is why I’m increasing that percentage slightly. Otherwise, we had very similar arguments and our conversation reinforced my original forecast. 

After speaking with my partner, I want to revise some of my percentages. First, Russia has explicitly indicated that it wants a 30-day ceasefire which increases my confidence in its likelihood. Additionally, we discussed how it is less likely that a ceasefire lasts exactly 30 days because it is an extremely narrow window of time. While recent developments (as indicated in my previous forecast) reinforce my confidence that a ceasefire might last at least 30 days, there is a greater margin of flexibility with 30-60 days which is why I’m adjusting those percentages.

The latest, potentially inflammatory interaction between Moldova and Russia (Moldova's expulsion of three Russian diplomats several weeks ago) has not elicited a noteworthy response from Russia since then. Moreover, ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia increasingly favor Russia in its terms. The possibility of a ceasefire, in addition to relatively minimal tension with Moldova in the last couple of weeks, continues to support a minimal risk for invasion. Nevertheless Point.md, a Moldovan website, reported on the president of Moldova's recent statement that the Moldovan government has a moral responsibility to protect Ukraine against Russia for two reasons: to protect the welfare of Ukrainians and to protect itself against a war with Russia. This may or may not incite Russia to become more aggressive against Moldova; however, president Sandu’s statement echoes a broader move towards greater securitization in the absence of reliable U.S support. Because of this, Russia may determine that an invasion against Moldova is too costly.

Following up on last week's insight about Georgia decreasing Russian imports by 5% in 2023 compared to 2022, I investigated which countries Georgia increased trade with that same year. Decreased Russian imports coincided with a 98% increase of Japanese imports, a 92% increase of US imports and a 42% increase of German imports. This may or may not be indicative of a move to align itself more closely with the West, which Russia may perceive as a threat. Because of this, I very slightly increased the probability of Russia invading Georgia. I still believe the probability of invading Georgia is extremely low however and the younger generations pushback against the Georgian government indicates that the Georgian government continues to heavily weigh the merits of a relationship with Russia.

 I maintain my position on Armenia and Kazakhstan as the least vulnerable to invasion on this list for the same reasons noted in my previous forecast; however, I want to note that earlier this month, Armenia and Russia celebrated the 33rd anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with each other. To commemorate this, the foreign ministers of Russia and Armenia exchanged positive messages highlighting their “centuries-old friendship” and the importance of maintaining a strong partnership.

Sources

https://www.geostat.ge/media/59731/External-Merchandise-Trade-of-Georgia-in-2023.pdf

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250328-we-will-fight-until-we-win-can-georgia-escape-russia-influence-protests-tbilisi

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/what-europeans-think-of-trumps-approach-to-ukraine-and-what-they-might-do-next/

https://point.md/ru/novosti/politika/sandu-v-kremle-khotiat-zamenit-rukovodstvo-moldovy-na-loial-nykh-liudei/

https://massispost.com/2025/04/armenian-and-russian-foreign-ministers-exchange-messages-on-33rd-anniversary-of-diplomatic-relations/

Recent developments suggest to me that the outcome of conflict between Ukraine and Russia increasingly favors Russia. In my last forecast I discussed US envoy Witkoff meeting Putin and urging Russia to make progress in the context of more favorable terms (e.g. giving Russia ownership of certain Ukrainian regions). Recent developments appear to build on this. Three days ago, Bloomberg reported that the United States is possibly open to recognizing Crimea as Russian in a ceasefire deal. Moreover, an exasperated US appears to be threatening to walk away from peace talks. These developments open two possibilities in the event of a ceasefire:

1) Ukraine feels pressure to sign a deal in light of The United States’ unreliable support, Russia exploits this and possibly makes greater demands that Ukraine is forced to concede to, and because the terms are favorable to Russia the ceasefire lasts longer than 30 days.

2) Ukraine feels pressure to sign a deal that Russia agrees to give its favorable terms, and Russia falls in line with historical precedence, violating the ceasefire deal within 30 days or shortly thereafter anyway.

 Overall, what seems more likely than in previous weeks is that a ceasefire deal is on the horizon. What is undetermined is the extent to which it will be sustainable.

Sources

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-18/us-open-to-recognizing-crimea-as-russian-in-ukraine-peace-deal

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/18/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-talks-trump-administration

My partner brought up the economic reliance that Georgia has on Russia. This was an interesting point to me because it forced me to reassess my argument about strategic leverage in my second forecast. I originally argued that the likelihood of Russia invading Georgia was low—in part because Georgia has something to offer Russia via the GD party’s ideological alignment with Moscow. I stand by this assessment; however, when I investigated this point further, I saw that Georgia's trade turnover with Russia decreased by 3% in 2023 compared to 2022. Considering this, I believe that two arguments are valid: First, either Georgia is less vulnerable than I predicted because it relies heavily on Russia; or second, we may be seeing a trend whereby Georgia tries to disintegrate itself economically from Russia, making them more vulnerable than I anticipated if Russia perceives this as a threat. Because of this, I adjusted my forecast slightly and increased Georgia’s vulnerability by 1%.

I do not wish to change my forecast after the conversation I had with my partner. Considering the limited information we have about German language pro-Kremlin media at the moment, it is difficult to predict weather unfolding events will lead to a higher number of cases. For this question, I am relying on current events, the geopolitical context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and German internal politics to make my forecast. Based on these metrics I am drawing conclusions about where Russia might reasonably see a threat with respect to Germany.

One thing my partner and I discussed that I had not previously considered of is that because the ceasefire terms being negotiated increasingly appear more favorable towards Russia, the ceasefire may either 1) not last, thus keeping with precedence; or 2) last for longer than we expect. Because of this, I am maintaining high likelihoods for “less than 30 days” and “30 days,” but I am increasing the likelihood of 90 days or more as well.

I am maintaining that the likelihood of a ceasefire continuing after 30 days is low considering the historical precedence however I am increasing the likelihood of a ceasefire remaining in place for at least “30 days” and between “31 to 60” days slightly. This is because in the last few days US envoy Witkoff met President Putin and urged Russia to make progress on the Ukrainian ceasefire. The terms discussed seemed much more favorable to Russia given Witkoff’s proposition of giving Russia “ownership” of certain Ukrainian regions. These developments coupled with the negotiated timeline of the ceasefire on the table (30 days) makes me believe that the likelihood of a ceasefire remaining in place for at least 30 days is higher than I previously thought.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-nobody-has-yet-answered-russias-questions-around-proposed-ukraine-2025-04-07/

https://kyivindependent.com/trump-may-impose-new-russia-sanctions-if-ceasefire-not-reached-by-end-of-april-media-report/

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-trump-urges-russia-to-get-moving-to-end-war-against-ukraine/

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-divided-europe-russia-zones-responsibility-trump-keith-kellogg-rcna200977

I am slightly updating my forecast to increase the likelihood of “more than or equal to 90” cases of disinformation following last week's discussions with my partner; however, I am maintaining “between 80 and 89 inclusive” to be the most likely outcome. So far, there has only been one more case of disinformation according to the database. The context appears to be getting more delicate, however, given 1) Germany and Britain’s recent message to Russia about Ukraine’s renewed ability to continue fighting the war, and 2) Germany announcement of new military aid to Ukraine yesterday. Something else I had not previously considered was political transitions in Germany. Given Germany’s new chancellor it will be interesting to see if Russia pursues disinformation campaigns to weaken the state of Germany’s internal politics.

Sources

https://www.dw.com/en/germany-announces-fresh-military-aid-to-ukraine/live-72212628

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8dg48g79jvo

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/apr/10/germany-new-government-crisis-us-russia-china