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Star Commenter - Jan 2026
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
Adjusting third bucket downward after looking at community forecast.
Why do you think you're right?
I think community is a little low on the <2 option, which has occurred in ~half of the last couple decades. I also think that an event which would give 8 inches of slow or higher would likely already be on our radar, if it's going to occur in the first ~60% of the month. Since it isn't, we can probably adjust that bucket downward rapidly.
Why might you be wrong?
The snow this weekend could come on strong and late!
Perhaps I'm even too low on the 0-2" bucket, as well. That could be 60% or so, plausibly, if we make certain assumptions about the next two weeks only having trace snowfall.
Why do you think you're right?
I'm slightly below the community forecast on this question. I think that the March 8th coalition would have to pick up about a dozen seats to qualify, and these types of tense, realigning, multi-ethnic coalition elections (see the Knesset) tend to make large swings like that quite challenging.
Moreover, concerningly the question criteria appears to exclude the Free Patriotic Movement. If so, that would make a YES resolution almost impossible, so it would be nice if moderators could clarify.
Why might you be wrong?
If FPM is actually not included, my forecast drops to like 5-10%?
Moderators should clarify. FPM is firmly a member of the March 8th alliance.
Why do you think you're right?
I'm slightly below community forecast (74%) at 67%. The Houthis are once again threatening an attack, as a result of US tensions with Iran. I think this question is fairly correlated with the odds of a US attack on Iran (~60%), and should remain above this, as it's likely that this would be a chief means of retaliation if the US strikes Iran, and also likely that the threshold for Houthi attacks in the Red Sea is probably lower than a full-on strike on Iran (and could happen from the Houthis' own volition as well).
Why might you be wrong?
The Houthis could be committed to a ceasefire violation at this point due to internal political pressure. The Houthis threats could be already in the process of being realized. There's also a chance I'm too high and the Houthis are internally resolved to maintain the ceasefire due to favorable domestic conditions as a result of a lack of recent conflict.
Why do you think you're right?
This strikes me as quite unlikely, given the short time horizon. As other commenters have noted, Russia and China rarely sanction oil entities in this manner. At 3%, slightly higher than community, mostly due to near-term uncertainty in US and EU trade policy. It's possible there are some "hockey assist" style sanctions for entities that don't comply with some international arrangement, but I think I'll time decay down to 2 and 1% fairly rapidly if no news around Middle East or oil/gas tensions rises to the forefront.
Why might you be wrong?
Could be too low, the criteria aren't rigorously fleshed out, so perhaps some sort of reciprocal tariffs would qualify? Unclear.
Why do you think you're right?
Once again, I think the crowd forecast is slightly too cautious. China and perhaps more likely, the US, have many government officials that are capable of making random haphazard statements that can then be backed up and retconned into policy. I'll time decay on this question linearly.
Why might you be wrong?
Why do you think you're right?
Fairly low on this question. It can often take several months between the desire for such a deployment and its actuation, given the slow speed of UN deployments. That being said, the community is far too low at 2%, in my opinion. I'll be slightly more conservative for the next 2-3 months before dropping my forecast rapidly.
Why might you be wrong?
A ceasefire in Sudan could potentially lead to a fairly rapid UN deployment, perhaps. There could be some efforts to achieve this already in the pipeline that are non-public.
Why do you think you're right?
In the last election, five years ago, Nguesso won with 88% of the vote. His opponent literally died the night of the election (from COVID, no foul play AFAICT).
The only thing that will stop Nguesso this time is a similar act of god. But that might happen! He's 82. There could conceivably be a military coup. Idk. But odds are low and there's only two months. I'm at 95% of a Nguesso victory, with the 5% mostly representing unknown unknowns in a country not known for rigorous press coverage.
Why might you be wrong?
Perhaps Nguesso is already dead and being propped up, Weekend at Bernie's-style?
Perhaps the opposition has been mounting a secret campaign for the last few years and Nguesso's popularity has actually cratered?
I'm not sure, but a Nguesso loss would be shocking to both international observers and domestic parties, surely. It's not even clear to me that the election is fair enough for him to lose, even if he *were* to die the night of the election.
Sorry, just checked - the opposition parties behind this united initiative "2AD2026" are not in the parliament - I don't have information if they are not there because of lack of popularity of maybe them boycotting the previous elections, but I try to find this information. But some other opposition parties may have formed another united platform: https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250531-congo-brazzaville-l-opposition-forme-une-nouvelle-alliance-en-vue-de-la-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-de-2026 - but unless they start to work together it means that they are not that united, and there are also parliamentary opposition (arties which were not delegalized or banned from running in last parliamentary elections).