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Delcy Rodríguez could still be President of Venezuela on 30 April 2026 if the current political arrangement remains in place. As vice president and a central figure within the governing coalition, she represents institutional continuity for the regime. Under a contested interpretation of the Venezuelan constitution, the executive branch and aligned institutions could justify her staying in office without immediate elections, framing the situation as a temporary or managed transition. In a context where regime stability, elite cohesion, and control over the security apparatus remain priorities, extending her tenure would be a low-risk option for the ruling bloc.

However, it is far from certain that Delcy Rodríguez will be President by that date. Her legitimacy is disputed both domestically and internationally, and sustained pressure for elections or a negotiated transition could force a change before April 2026. Constitutional arguments requiring new elections in cases of presidential vacancy remain politically powerful, particularly if opposition mobilization increases or if internal fractures emerge within the ruling coalition. International recognition would also remain limited, constraining her ability to govern effectively in the medium term.

Importantly, there is no solid evidence to infer a political agreement with Donald Trump, or with the United States more broadly, designed to keep Delcy Rodríguez in power. U.S. policy toward Venezuela has historically prioritized electoral processes, negotiated transitions, and sanctions leverage rather than endorsing continuity figures from the Maduro inner circle. While pragmatic contacts or tactical toleration cannot be ruled out in diplomacy, inferring a deal specifically aimed at sustaining her presidency would be speculative and unsupported by publicly available information.

In short, Delcy Rodríguez might remain in office on 30 April 2026 under a controlled continuity scenario, but her position would likely remain provisional, contested, and politically fragile rather than consolidated or internationally legitimized.

A cautious but reasoned assessment would be yes, it is plausible, though far from certain, that the United Nations could deploy peacekeeping forces to a conflict zone in a new country or territory by 31 July 2026.

One of the most frequently cited possibilities is Gaza or a broader Palestinian territory, particularly in the context of a post-ceasefire arrangement following the Israel–Hamas war. Several diplomatic discussions have already floated the idea of an international presencié potentially under a UN mandate to support civilian protection, facilitate humanitarian access, and help stabilize governance during a transitional phase. A UN mission could be framed as a temporary stabilization or observer force rather than a traditional robust peacekeeping operation.

Another plausible scenario is Haiti, where the security crisis continues to deteriorate. While the current international response has relied on a non-UN multinational security support mission, a transition to a formal UN peacekeeping operation remains a realistic option if violence escalates further and existing arrangements fail to restore basic security. This would technically count as a “new” UN deployment if it involves a different mandate, force structure, and operational framework.