Chris-Cao

Naomi and I had very similar numbers, so I plan to keep my numbers as they are. It was interesting to see how Naomi decreased the likelihood of invasion into Armenia compared to me, who increased the likelihood of invasion based on the events we recorded for this week. Still, our numbers got closer together! Again I witnessed the phenomenon of numbers meaning different things: my 5%= her 10%.

After discussions with Naomi, it further led me to add percentage to the <30 days category, taken from the 61-90 category. Naomi showed the record of how Russia has violated ceasefire agreements throughout history. Additionally, we discussed how the Easter ceasefire failure demonstrated the lack of trust and confidence between both parties, leading me to believe a breakdown of a ceasefire would be likely.

Inside View: Recently, hostile rhetoric towards Armenia from Russia is worrying. Propagandists of Russia Today have outwardly blamed Armenia for not supporting Russia's annexation of Crimea, stating that Armenia would not exist if it was not more supportive of Russia. This follows a major deterioration of relations regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia's cautiousness regarding Ukraine. I am thereby increasing Armenia's likelihood of being invaded by 1%.

https://oc-media.org/kremlin-propagandist-simyonan-says-armenia-wont-exist-without-friendly-ties-with-russia/ 

My changes have come from recent developments--the Inside View. As of this week, Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio plan to attend summits in Europe to discuss a peace agreement in Ukraine with European allies in France. This boosts the likelihood of a ceasefire occuring. When it comes to how long that ceasefire would last, many Western experts still disagree over whether NATO's peacekeeping soldiers should be placed as a buffer between both nations. The unfeasability and disagreement would directly impede deeper resolutions should an incremental ceasefire and conclusion of the conflict transpire. As a result, I am increasing the likelood it lasts under 60 days. 

https://thehill.com/opinion/5251045-ukraine-russia-conflict-peacekeeping/

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0r5vlwj4dqo

The study Manon had that showed 84% of 105 ceasefires ended in renewed offensive action within just 13 days of their implementation biases me further to it being less than 30 days. I'm adding 7% to <30, taken from 31-60 and 61-90.

Manon had a great calculation where 1 new source each week would bring us to roughly ~60 cases by September 2025. As a result, I decreased the<59 by 3% and added the difference to 60-69.

After review with Manon, our numbers were relatively the same, so I will keep my numbers as they are. Something that we noticed was how we valued numbers differently. Manon thought 9% meant very little while I thought 5% meant very little. Though the crowdforecast roughly evens it out, its interesting to see how different numbers can be on a person-to-person basis!

Summary: Outside view: Being all former nations in the USSR, I asked how many former USSR states Russia has invaded–3/15, a 20% chance at invasion. The invasions into the three nations were all justified by the defense of Russian speaking populations, which increases the likelihood of invasions into ¾ nations mentioned by around 5%. The nations invaded did not possess NATO or EU membership, increasing likelihood of invasion as these three have also no former membership. Russia also had not invaded multiple countries at once, reducing the likelihoods of all nations. So, likelihood of invasion of Moldova sits around 35%, while the others sit around 25%. For the inside view, I examined each nation’s number of russian troops, western support levels, memberships in Russian blocs, territory held by Russia, relations with Russian allies, and economic ties. 

Outside View: As a result of reviewing Paul Huth’s study on territorial disputes, I have revised my baserate to 30% for Moldova and 20% because Huth found in his analysis from 1950-1990 that around 20% of territorial claims result in militarized disputes, while the majority do not. This is an interesting dynamic that decreases my original baserates, as invasions over territorial claims/former territories are not as common. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26273184?seq=29 

Inside view: As a result of the detained pro-Russian leader of Moldova's Gagauz ethnic minority being put on house arrest, I believe that this will further fuel the Russian desire to support its pro-Russian partners in Moldova and have revised my forecast to increase the likelihood of invasion by 1%. This action actually dates back to two weeks ago when Leader Eugenia Gutul was detained on suspicious charges of electoral fraud. She is not recognized by the current President of Moldova despite winning an election. She was backed by a fraudulent billionaire. In fact, Moldova even expelled three Russian Diplomats who assisted Eugenia Gutul in escaping deeper charges. This all exacerbates tensions and increases the likelihood of conflict. 

https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/MOLDOVA-POLITICS-GUTUL-cf22a1cf-2833-429a-9cc9-47ca6f41c6bf  

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/31/moldova-expels-three-russian-diplomats-russia-vows-to-retaliate