while Russia has motivations to target all these countries, its capacity is severely constrained by the Ukraine war, making opportunistic moves against the most vulnerable target (Moldova) most likely
1.690636
Relative Brier Score
21
Forecasts
1
Upvotes
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New Badge
Star Commenter - Jul 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
35%
Moldova
8%
Armenia
15%
Georgia
3%
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I could be overconfident on Moldova (could be wrong by 20+ percentage points); underestimating Armenia (could miss 30%+ scenario overweighting Armenia's pivot away from Russia, but Putin might view this as existential threat requiring forcible correction)
Georgia baseline could be completely wrong: existing Russian occupation of South Ossetia/Abkhazia might be launching pad for full invasion rather than status quo satisfier
There is Kazakhstan black swan potential: massive underestimation if Russia decides on "demonstration effect" against largest Central Asian state.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
25%
Estonia
18%
Latvia
28%
Lithuania
Why do you think you're right?
Russia might view Baltic states as an ideal testing ground for NATO's resolve under Trump, calculating that US especially and to less extent NATO Europe won't risk escalation over small allies
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Even a weakened NATO response would still impose massive costs on an already overstretched Russian military, and Putin may be too focused on Ukraine and too risk-averse about triggering any NATO response to attempt such a gamble.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
Less than or equal to 49
30%
Between 50 and 59, inclusive
70%
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
0%
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
0%
More than or equal to 80
Why do you think you're right?
My forecast range would be 58-65%. Most likely: 62% representing a 5-point decline, consistent with adaptation but slower than the previous year's 11-point drop
This reflects the pattern where initial shock gives way to adaptation, but the underlying security concern remains elevated compared to pre-2022 levels.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Threat perception polling is notoriously volatile and subject to major swings based on current events. My forecast assumes relatively "normal" conditions, but the timeframe could include major geopolitical shocks that make any current analysis obsolete. The score could easily be anywhere from 35 (if Russia collapses/peace achieved) to 85+ (if major escalation occurs). The range provided (58-65) reflects only the "most likely" scenario given current trends, but may be far too narrow given the inherent unpredictability of both geopolitics and public opinion.
Files
New Prediction
This forecast expired on Oct 2, 2025 02:56AM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
25%
Yes
Jul 2, 2025 to Jan 2, 2027
75%
No
Jul 2, 2025 to Jan 2, 2027
Why do you think you're right?
While Russia has demonstrated both capability and intent to conduct hybrid operations against NATO infrastructure, the threshold for kinetic-effect cyber attacks remains high due to escalation risks. The 25% probability reflects the elevated threat environment and Russia's increasing boldness, while acknowledging NATO's improved defenses and Russia's preference for maintaining plausible deniability.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I'm trying to predict the behavior of adversaries under extreme stress in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment. Russian decision-making under pressure might be far more or less aggressive than historical precedents suggest. The probability could easily be anywhere from 5% (if Russia remains cautious) to 70%+ (if multiple escalatory factors align).
My assessment assumes rational escalation management, but wars and crisis situations often involve miscalculation, technical failures, and decision-making under extreme pressure that can produce very different outcomes than peacetime analysis would suggest.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
Europe allocates the same amount or less than the U.S.
0%
More than €0 but less than €10 billion
0%
At least €10 billion but less than €20 billion
100%
At least €20 billion but less than €30 billion
0%
€30 billion or more
Why do you think you're right?
Based on current trends and stated European commitments, I forecast:
- European military aid by Dec 31, 2025: ~€85-90 billion
- US military aid by Dec 31, 2025: ~€65-67 billion
Expected European lead: €18-25 billion more than the US
Key Variables:
- Upside for European lead: EU €800 billion defense initiative accelerates, more countries follow Nordic/UK example
- Downside for European lead: Ceasefire agreement leads to reduced European urgency, or US aid resumes
- Economic constraints: Germany has allocated EUR 650 million in 2025, marking a drop of around 70 percent compared to the same period in 2024 - showing not all European countries are increasing
Most likely outcome: Europe will allocate €18-25 billion more in military aid than the US by the end of 2025, representing a significant shift from historical US leadership in this category.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
My forecast assumes linear progression of current trends, but Ukraine aid has been characterized by dramatic, unpredictable shifts. The gap could easily be anywhere from Europe leading by €50+ billion to the US resuming leadership entirely. The remaining timeframe is long enough for multiple major policy reversals.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
Less than 30 days
100%
30 days
0%
31-60 days
0%
61-90 days
0%
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
If a bilateral ceasefire occurs in 2025, it will most likely last 15-45 days, with 30 days being the most probable specific outcome based on current negotiating frameworks and historical patterns of compliance and violation.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The honest answer is that ceasefire duration in active conflicts is notoriously unpredictable, and I may be imposing false precision on an inherently chaotic process. The range could easily be anywhere from "no ceasefire occurs" to "indefinite frozen conflict lasting years."
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
15%
Yes
85%
No
Why do you think you're right?
Given the current evidence, the likelihood of the Coalition of the Willing deploying forces to Ukraine by December 31, 2025 appears low based on several factors:
- No ceasefire agreement exists between Ukraine and Russia
- Significant shortfalls in troop commitments from coalition members
- Plans have been scaled back from major deployments to limited training missions
- Russia has rejected the proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire that Ukraine, under US pressure, agreed to in March 2025
- The coalition's own stated condition requires a comprehensive peace deal before deployment
-
The coalition remains in a planning phase with ongoing meetings, but actual military deployment appears contingent on diplomatic breakthroughs that have not yet materialized.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs or escalatory events could potentially change the timeline
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(-100%)
Yes
100%
(+100%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
Spain has not agreed to spend 5% of GDP on defense and has explicitly rejected this target. While other NATO members have agreed to the target, Spain's clear refusal to commit means the requirement for unanimous agreement among all 32 members cannot be met.
Spain's explicit rejection of the 5% target, combined with the requirement for unanimous agreement from all 32 members, makes it impossible for this question to resolve "Yes."
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Spain could reverse its position under intense pressure - if President Trump follows through on threats to impose punitive trade measures ("make them pay twice as much" in trade negotiations) or if other NATO allies threaten to exclude Spain from key alliance benefits, Madrid might capitulate and formally agree to the 5% target to avoid economic and diplomatic isolation, even if they don't intend to actually reach that spending level immediately
Files
Why do you think you're right?
Given the established downward trend (-5 points in 2024), continued political polarization with AfD gains, economic pressures, and approaching 4-year war duration, a further decline of 2-7 points seems likely, putting Germany's net perception of Ukraine in the 20-25 range for the 2026 report (based on October-November 2025 polling).
The exact number will depend heavily on battlefield developments, economic conditions, and whether the new government can maintain public support for Ukraine aid despite growing domestic pressures.
Why might you be wrong?
Factors That Could Lead to a SMALLER Decline (25-30+ range)
Successful CDU-SPD Coalition Messaging:
If the new Merz government effectively frames Ukraine support as essential for German security, it could halt the decline
A strong communication strategy emphasizing that "if Ukraine loses, Russia will threaten NATO countries next" could resonate
Major Escalatory Events:
Russian attacks on NATO territory or German infrastructure could dramatically spike support
Use of nuclear weapons or major war crimes could galvanize German opinion
Direct threats to Germany (cyber attacks, sabotage) would likely increase Ukraine solidarity
Economic Recovery:
If Germany's economic situation improves significantly by late 2025, public willingness to support Ukraine financially could increase
Reduced domestic budget pressures would make foreign aid less contentious
Trump Effect Backlash:
Risk perceptions of the US increased sharply in Germany following Trump's election
If Trump pressures Germany to reduce Ukraine support or threatens trade wars, Germans might rally around Ukraine as resistance to American pressure
Factors That Could Lead to a LARGER Decline (15-20 range):
Accelerated War Fatigue:
By October 2025, the war will be approaching 4 years - unprecedented duration for sustained public support
Continued energy costs and inflation could erode patience
AfD Normalization:
The CDU already worked with AfD in parliament to pass migration policy, breaking the "firewall" Munich Security Index 2024
If anti-Ukraine messaging becomes more mainstream through AfD influence, it could shift broader public opinion
Ukrainian Military Setbacks:
Major territorial losses or collapse of Ukrainian resistance could make continued support seem futile
Public support often correlates with perceived likelihood of success
German Economic Crisis:
Prolonged recession or major industrial closures could prioritize domestic spending
Re-prioritization of budget allocations toward domestic concerns ahead of international commitments
Migration Crisis Integration:
If Ukrainian refugee integration becomes politically problematic, it could affect broader Ukraine support