The Senate Parliamentarian has already struck many provisions from the House-passed bill, making it extremely difficult for the identical version to pass both chambers as required by the resolution criteria. With only 2-3 days remaining and the final bill text still incomplete as of June 28, the procedural mathematics are likely insurmountable. Provided the lack of majority consensus, senators are likely to utilize most or all 20 hours of debate and make other motions on the bill. At least two Republican senators maintain serious opposition, and it is unclear whether the GOP has the votes to pass it. Any Senate modifications would also require the House to re-pass the legislation under rules requiring 72-hour layover periods, likely pushing final action to after the deadline.
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Relative Brier Score
5
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0
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Star Commenter - Jun 2025
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Why might you be wrong?
Senate Republicans could theoretically employ emergency procedures or find creative parliamentary workarounds that bypass standard time requirements, especially given President Trump's intense personal pressure campaign. All opposition senators could suddenly capitulate under extreme political pressure, particularly if Trump offers specific concessions or threats that change their calculations overnight. The resolution criteria could be interpreted more loosely than expected if minor technical changes are deemed not to constitute a "different" bill.
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Putin's regime has shown remarkable adaptability despite mounting pressures, with constitutional mechanisms for removal effectively blocked. The opposition remains severely fragmented and weakened following Navalny's death, with no credible alternative leadership emerging domestically. Despite economic strain, Putin enjoys popular support through state control and propaganda, with approval ratings remaining above 80% (though this number may not fully reflect popular sentiment). Historical precedents suggest that even severe economic and political crises typically require sustained pressure over many years to topple entrenched authoritarian regimes (e.g., Putin, the Cuban regime).
Why might you be wrong?
At age 72, Putin faces increasing health vulnerabilities with no visible succession planning, creating potential for sudden incapacitation that could trigger immediate regime transition. The economic crisis is unprecedented in its scope, with inflation exceeding 9.5%, interest rates surpassing 20%, and military spending consuming the federal budget — pressures that could accelerate beyond typical authoritarian collapse timelines. Elite dissatisfaction has reached historic levels, with multiple reports of disappointment among government officials and hopes that external pressure might force Putin to change course. The convergence of multiple simultaneous crises -- military stalemate, economic overheating, elite purges, and international isolation -- could create a "perfect storm" that overwhelms the regime's resilience mechanisms faster than historical precedents would suggest.
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The military junta extended Myanmar's state of emergency until July 31, 2025, and under Myanmar's 2008 constitution, elections cannot be held during a state of emergency, making elections before July 1 constitutionally illegal. With the junta now controlling less than half of Myanmar's territory nationwide (as of March, 2025) elections may also be logistically difficult, despite its control of key portions. Min Aung Hlaing has officially announced elections for December 2025 or January 2026, indicating that the military itself does not plan to hold elections before the July deadline. Opposition forces have also committed to disrupting any election infrastructure, with the 2024 census having faced deadly resistance attacks. Ultimately, the constitutional barrier alone makes elections before July 1, 2024 virtually impossible, while a combination of territorial losses, active resistance, and the military's own announced timeline creates overwhelming evidence against early elections occurring.
Why might you be wrong?
The military might stage limited elections only in areas under its control to gain some legitimacy, as the junta faces mounting internal pressures that could force desperate actions. The regime has shown willingness to break constitutional norms repeatedly and could theoretically lift the state of emergency early if facing existential threats. Moreover, China's support for Myanmar's political transition timeline could create sufficient external pressure to accelerate the election schedule. Finally, economic collapse and internal military tensions could force the junta into premature electoral legitimization attempts before their announced timeline.
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The mathematical realities of ranked-choice voting with 11 candidates make early victory extremely difficult -- Cuomo polls at only 35-38% first-choice support, well below the 50% +1 threshold needed for victory, and historical precedent from 2021 required eight elimination rounds with similar field dynamics. Strategic cross-endorsements between Mamdani-Lander and other progressive candidates create an organized anti-Cuomo coalition designed specifically to consolidate votes in later rounds, while early voting data showing Mamdani leading suggests the race has fundamentally tightened beyond what traditional polling captures. The unprecedented grassroots mobilization by Mamdani's campaign (more than one million doors knocked) appears to be successfully turning out younger, more progressive voters who strongly favor extending the contest through multiple elimination rounds.
Why might you be wrong?
Cuomo maintains crucial demographic advantages including a lead among voters over 50 and a decisive advantage among Black voters -- both historically reliable blocs that could provide more durable support than polling suggests, potentially allowing faster consolidation as weaker candidates are eliminated. The extreme heat forecast for Election Day could significantly suppress turnout. His massive spending advantage combined with late endorsements from leading political figures could shift momentum in the final hours, while potential backlash over Mamdani's "Globalize the Intifada" controversy might create late-deciding voter hesitation that benefits the former governor.
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This is highly improbable - BEV market share has increased only slightly from Q1 to May 2025, requiring an unprecedented acceleration to reach 20% YTD. Expert forecasts have been revised downward throughout 2025, with S&P cutting their full-year BEV projection from 27% to 21%, suggesting even annual targets are at risk. Market headwinds include significant government incentive reductions in key European markets, and Tesla's decline across EU markets weakens a historically reliable growth driver. Regional bottlenecks also exist, with only three countries hosting 61% of all EU charging points -- limiting market expansion.
Why might you be wrong?
This timing coincides with multiple new affordable BEV model launches, including the Renault R5 and Skoda Elroq, which could catalyze consumer adoption if pricing and availability suddenly align. Pressure from EU CO2 targets may create powerful incentives for manufacturers to dramatically increase BEV sales through any means necessary, potentially including substantial manufacturer subsidies that aren't reflected in current data.