-0.005504
Relative Brier Score
0
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| Definitions | |||||
Why do you think you're right?
Keeping the probability of this event quite low. Not necessarily because I don't think China is interested in expanding their influence in Africa, but because US trade wars are giving China an alternative avenue of further entrenching their footprint in the African continent without needing to establish military installments. China recently announced plans to establish tariff free trade with 53 African nations: https://odi.org/en/insights/china-courts-africa-with-tariff-free-access-a-new-era-of-trade-or-just-the-first-step/
China is pushing a rhetoric of the world choosing between "peace or war" and they definitely want to present themselves as the "peace" option at a time global tensions are high due to the Trump era foreign policies. Chinese state-owned firms already have built, financed or operate more than one-quarter of all African ports. There's already plenty of dual use infrastructure in place, there's no need to ruffle feathers by changing their designation to military installations. https://www.yahoo.com/news/chinas-african-port-interests-expanding-093000083.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMdbk7C1jZLIusvRuByydlGbF6s_YovZTN9gkMHOLlDK0rcTpLCEgwtDmv8AdBv3s09mN389O_0ADpbctpobbbFLSlUlp3MGUcqAWHR_77N8ACDobiB3nLEzkrUg05y_BV9lU9ZodMXFNXyuuSJBQI_YGCV8D2_6EUnNuegKdAT2
And Djibouti still remains an outlier in China's long history. The unique context around Djibouti hosting multiple military bases allows China enough ambiguity and plausible deniability about their military expansion ambitions.
Why might you be wrong?
Equatorial Guinea’s existing Chinese backed infrastructure and economic reliance on China has led to consistent speculation around Equitorial Guinea hosting the next "logistical facility". While there's been outright denial from leaders of Equitorial Guinea about this rumour, PRC also claimed the “idea that the Chinese navy would establish bases overseas was groundless" circa 2010 when first rumours of a base in Djibouti surfaced.
@soup , a deeper into the details of the question....
Your comment "Chinese state-owned firms already have built, financed or operate more than one-quarter of all African ports. There's already plenty of dual use infrastructure in place, there's no need to ruffle feathers by changing their designation to military installations."
How many of these dual use ports were created during the time frame of this question?
If you can narrow it down to that point, then proceed with assessing the probabilities China may use the infrastructure to dock a few naval vessels would provide foresight from a different angle.
Why do you think you're right?
I'm starting with a high probability for this event based on two factors:
- Potential adversaries of the US and allies already have credible ASAT capabilities
- Circumstances leading to the use of ASAT tech seems likely by 2027
Two countries US and allies would deem as "not so friendly" are already equipped with credible ASAT capabilities. China is consistently investing in a wide variety of ASAT tech. If the US Space Force Chief is this concerned, maybe there's a reason for it: https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/04/how-china-expanding-its-anti-satellite-arsenal/404283/
China has already tested kinetic effects of their ASAT tech on their own satellites: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test
and so has Russia: https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/2842957/russian-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-test-creates-significant-long-last/
Now would there be a circumstance where either China or Russia could use this tech against US and allies by 2027? Russia is already at war and increasingly, the war extending beyond Ukraine seems entirely likely given Russia's escalatory behaviour in recent months: https://apnews.com/article/nato-russia-drones-estonia-ed72156951e6ef62f802d9f1f786c8b5
There's certainly enough cause for Russia to potentially use ASAT in this conflict, and there's a lot of buzz around this threat recently in the news: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/world-war-3-orbit-space-warfare-accelerates-russia-china-build-space-weapons-1744440 & https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/09/23/the-new-era-of-space-warfare/
The 2027 timeline for a potential Taiwan conflict could also involve ASAT. Lead up to a conflict between China and Taiwan would likely involve major disruptions to satellite systems operated by US and allies. This would cripple information sharing and early warning systems US and allies would need to respond to an escalation: https://asiatimes.com/2025/07/crystal-clear-china-sharpening-its-anti-satellite-laser-edge/
And in my personal opinion, space warfare has an inherent ambiguity that China likes dabbling in. By nature, most space assets are dual use technology. And given the lack of comprehensive laws around the space domain, it makes it easier to perform greyzone operations and claim plausible deniability. There are currently no binding international agreements on space warfare. Even in the case of Russia's ASAT test, which directly threatened the international space station, had no real consequences: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-21/space-weapons-how-the-world-is-preparing-for-war-in-space/103634106 and https://armorysaga.com/international-laws-on-space-warfare/
So persistent Chinese investment in this domain of warfare makes a lot of sense, and it's certainly feasible that China could use these weapons against US or allies in an escalatory situation.
And while India remains a friendly face to US and allies, this could easily change given the recent thawing of India-China relations: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/09/18/trump-tariffs-prompt-india-to-rethink-china-ties/
Why might you be wrong?
Space domain remains a very difficult arena to achieve consistent results in. Technology is still in infancy (compared to other warfare domains) and there haven't been any attempts to refine their use against an adversary. And the risk of disrupting your own space assets while attempting to hamper an adversary is quite high and will weigh on the mind of anyone attempting to use ASAT technology. But this might be less of a concern if they're already in an active conflict/preparing for one.
Top Forecaster - Sep 2025
Star Commenter - Sep 2025
Why do you think you're right?
Going all in
Why might you be wrong?
Anything goes lately
Why do you think you're right?
A lot has changed since my last forecast... Did not realise the end of season outbreaks this year would be so abnormal, but I suppose anti-vaxx movement has gained significant traction and had led to a far worse health crisis than I initially assumed.
Why might you be wrong?
CDC numbers might fall under 1500 by Oct 1 but then get updated later.
I suppose anti-vaxx movement has gained significant traction
Not everywhere, it would seem; New Mexico measles vaccination rate is up by 62% (~21K doses) compared to this time in 2024: https://www.nmhealth.org/about/erd/ideb/mog/
Why do you think you're right?
Updating again based on CNN tracker, which already has surpassed 1500 by 23rd of Sept: https://www.cnn.com/health/measles-cases-us-dg
Why might you be wrong?
CDC underreports initially