fishhunter6

I originally thought it was about a 50/50 chance with a slight lean toward no. When I stop for a few more minutes, I have to think that the first thing I should really ask isn't if "they would do it," but if the conditions will be right for them to do it." Seeing as the thing was conceived pending a peace process, that makes it much, much, less likely. Would Europe send forces into the war? (that's what they would essentially be doing), that would be unrealistic

My gut inclination is to argue that Europe will deploy forces to Ukraine, as I believe that this would be a credible deterrent. As we talked about in the training, it is easy to focus in on topics that you have followed closely or follow a narrative as to how something could play out, versus what is likely to happen. So, taking a step back. This is a large group of countries with their own interests. Leaders like Macron, Merz, and von der Leyen certainly want to make this happen, but they are going to be constrained by their domestic politics. We are currently seeing churn in Polish and Dutch politics, for example, with far-right factions growing in clout. These politicians are more skeptical of a larger commitment to Ukraine, although they tend to favor some type of engagement. As hard  it is will be to get this coalition on the same page, each country will be having its own internal fight as to if and how it should do this. The question is if this becomes harder or easier to do this if there is progress toward peace talks. These deployments could be part of implementing a ceasefire, but I do not think a durable ceasefire is likely. The U.S. administration vacilates between pushing for a ceasefire, to a strong stance against Russia, and sometimes even seeming to favor the aggressor. At the moment, the administration appears to be backing off, while the legislature is even advancing strong economic measures against Russia. It seems that the U.S. could help bring convening power and tip the scales one way or the other, but it appears that the U.S. is most likely to "muddle through" with some form of support to Ukraine continuing, and likely some form opposition to Europe's plan. Europe tend toward escalating their level of assistance to fill U.S. gaps, while not trying to make a dramatic change given their international and intranational disagreements.

My forecast during the workshop was around 6%. When I consider the fact that actual clashes between the two countries are rare, but that tensions are high, that was probably an ok number. As some time passes, this is about three months away.  When I consider how likely it will really be for these two countries to have a lethal fight in the next three months, that is a very low chance. 

I feel like I am cheating here, because there is only one month remaining. My gut reaction said "yes, it will be higher" as President Trump's approval has been around that number (45%), and he came into office with a flurry of activity that appealed to his voters. Given that he is controversial with his non-voters and those who did not vote, I usually think of his popularity being around 50%. I looked at his current approval rating and found it at 43%, this is honestly lower than I thought it currently was. So, if I go in thinking it is 43%, what might change it? He could deliver something his voters find popular (or be perceived as delivering it- as many of his promises cannot be unilaterally accomplished by the president) or there could be a big event that is popular with a majority of Americans (breakthrough in Ukraine peace, passage of his hallmark bill).  I believe that a break though in Ukraine peace is highly unlikely. I can wonder if walking back tariffs (especially with the off ramp that some of these actions are illegal) and cutting bilateral deals with countries that perhaps lower unfair trade barriers to U.S. goods. This is far more likely to me, but fewer Americans are following it, and we are seeing higher prices in stores like WalMart already and uncertianity regarding the U.S.'s bond market, credit, and employment. It is most likely that things don't get majorly better or worse than they are today by mid-July, but still with plenty of consternation regarding the economy. Trump's "crackdown" on immigration has included actions that many feel are immoral (revoking statuses of immigrants here legally) and on their face are illegal (ignoring due process for individuals). These actions aren't popular with most Americans, including some of his voters, although they are highly popular with a significant potion of his voters. Overall, most of President Trump's activities that are garnering the most attention are the least popular. If anything, his approval rate will stay where it is or decrease.

I read too fast, and did not account for the types of MLRS that had already been provided. I started thinking of HIMARS and 2 equivalent systems, thinking that European countries had not yet provided these. I wrote that if more countries were not trying to figure out how to procure them and integrate the systems themselves, I would guess 80/20. The European countries have shown a willingness in recent months to take more risk, and going forward, their incentive will be to continue on this path. Germany, for example, just stated that it would remove range restrictions from its weapons, and Ukraine has crossed even more supposed Russian red lines by hitting Russia as deep as Russia can be hit, and destroying nuclear-capable systems.

I started by checking how many measles cases there have been so far this year. I then looked back at previous years. Unfortunately, there is not much of a pattern, given that measles was so rare in the past compared to this rise in cases. I looked at the cases per week in past months. I noticed that the worst out breaks were at the end of the winter. March might have been skewed by a particularly bad outbreak, because diseases don't really work in a linnear way- transmission follow human interactions and pops up in clusters and spikes. I figured it was best to look at summer months as being different than winter months for disease transmission. I started in April, and looked at the average number of cases a week until now. I then looked at how many weeks were left through the end of September, and di that basic math, thinking I would get closer to the range of cases doing that than another way.  It puts me right in the 1500 to 1649 range. the other two ranges on the left and right of that are also quite likely, I gave it 70/30 that I would fall within the range I estimated, and figured it was about as likely that I was overshooting as undershooting.

Ukraine and Russia both have incentives to continue fighting. While Ukraine may struggle to take and hold ground, as their early efforts have proved- maneuver warfare could lead to operational success. Russia is also in a very bad position. A peace deal imposed on Ukraine without strong security guarantees or a path to NATO may not be worth taking, given the egregious wrongs inflicted upon the country by Putin's invasion. Give that the stakes are national survival, the Ukrainians may rightly continue fighting. Putin may seek an out- but his goals of destabilizing Ukraine and NATO probably remain. Putin intends to reconstitute his vision of a Russian empire, and has designs against Ukraine with military, economic, political, and even ethno-nationalist aspects. They could rightly be characterized as genocidal, given his effort to undermine the idea of Ukrainian nationhood (and behaviors such as indiscriminate killing, rape, and the kidnapping/brainwashing of children). If Putin believes he can make battlefield gains, he may try. Trump is another factor, here. If he should abandon his current stance, he may stop pursuing a "deal" and instead choose to confront Russia. This appears unlikely at the moment, although long-term U.S. security interests would be well served by thwarting Russia's invasion, supporting peace on Ukraine's terms, and deterring future aggression.

There is a high likelihood Ukraine and Russia chooses not to pursue a ceasefire, which is why I think a ceasefire by this fall is only slightly more likely than not. There is a strong moral and strategic rationale for Ukraine to continue fighting, and for the international community to back Ukraine indefinitely.

Update: since my last forecast, President Trump resumed U.S. support to Ukraine, lessening the incentive for Ukraine to accept an unjust deal. At the same time, terms have been offered for a 30-day ceasefire that provides some positive outcomes for Ukraine, and does not have many upsides for Russia. In some ways, Ukraine becomes more likely to accept this temporary ceasefire, and Russia becomes less likely. Russia does have incentive to take it, and might intend to given their rush to change the facts of the ground in Kursk and improve their bargaining position by retaking the only territory that was actually there's at any point prior to or during the war. Unfortunately, it looks like Ukraine is not holding onto that piece of ground. President Trump has signaled a willingness to increase financial pressure on Russia, which might encourage Russia to take the deal, or greatly improve Ukraine's position to resist. At the same time, some reports that Russia may be getting somewhere in talks (such as rejecting the positions of the U.S. or people at the table) reminds us of how fluid the Trump administration's position may be, as U.S. objectives to this point in the conflict would not at all be served by considering any Russian demands at this point (given the positions and leverage of the U.S. and Ukraine. Because of all this, I am slightly reducing the likelihood of a ceasefire deal