cadams

First of all, the Munich Security Index reports German attitudes on Ukraine by differencing the percent that views Ukraine as a threat from the percent that views Ukraine as an ally. We have 2 data points from prior to the Ukraine war, when that number was 8 percentage points (2021, 2022) and 3 data points from after the war, when that number was ~30 percentage points (32 in 2023, 27 in 2024, 28 in 2025). Assuming the baseline Ukraine war experience continues, we are likely to see ~30 percentage points in 2026.

Annoyingly, there is a cutoff in this question right at 30 percentage points, so we need to look for more data. No other entity seems to specifically ask the questions the same way as Munich, so we're comparing apples to, well, not oranges, but maybe pears. YouGov shows high levels of support for Ukraine but diminishing over time from 2022 through 2024.  German pollster Koerber-Stiftung also shows high support but diminishing in 2024. This suggests to me that the blip downward that Munich saw in 2024 was not a measurement error but potentially captured a real phenomenon. 

https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/48720-ukraine-war-two-years-on-the-view-from-western-europe-and-the-us

https://koerber-stiftung.de/en/projects/democracy-in-crisis/survey-2024/

As such, my baseline assumption is that support for Ukraine will mirror the 2024 and 2025 results and be in the high 20's, with an outside chance of being in the low 30's.

What could affect that baseline assumption for the worse?

One, as the war continues and no resolution occurs, the German public could become more frustrated with Ukraine. We saw in the YouGov polling that the Germans are the least receptive to Ukraine of the major NATO allies currently and the most receptive to Russia. This suggests there could be further softening of Ukraine's popularity in Germany. I give this a medium-high likelihood and low effect.

Two, there could be a worsening of Ukraine's relationship with NATO. For instance, a Ukrainian drone could inadvertently fly into NATO airspace (similar to the Russian incursion earlier this year) or Ukrainian intelligence could be found responsible for a cyberattack on NATO soil. This would obviously increase the perception that Ukraine is an unfriendly country. I give this a low probability but a large effect.

Three, paradoxically, a peace resolution, especially one in which Ukraine becomes a puppet state to Russia, could also decrease the number here by decreasing the salience of Ukraine. Notice, in 2021, the number was 8 percentage points, because people were mildly supportive of Ukraine during the long proxy war. Peace could return trends towards that equilibrium. And if Ukraine is seen as an extension of Russia or not fully supportive of NATO, that decrease could be worse. I give this a low probability and low effect.

Four, Ukraine's position visa vie Russia could worsen. Russians could have a breakthrough along the frontlines (as opposed to the current, slow, grinding progress) and put themselves in a position to win outright. I give this a low probability but a high effect.

What could increase the baseline?

The only thing that comes to mind would be a dramatic change for the better in Ukraine's battlefield position. The YouGov polling suggests that a lot of the dimming opinion of Ukraine stems from the perception that it's a losing war. If that perception shifts, so too might support for Ukraine. I give this a medium-low probability but medium-large effect.

In total, I would say that I am not convinced to move strongly from my baseline, other than to nudge it down slightly toward the 20's from the 30's.

Trump is going to APEC in South Korea this year and recently had the South Korean President Lee Jae Myung over for a cordial visit. No indications of a change in status in US military forces in the ROK, especially one so soon.

At this late hour, there does not seem to be any real movement in this direction, as near as I can tell.

Time keeps on ticking, ticking, ticking, into the future

We're about halfway through the period for assessment and signs of conflict are not there yet. Also, the base rate here is ~0% for the past ten years and I do not see a reason to deviate from that.