Tarfi

As of 16 September, CDC reports 1,491 confirmed cases (https://www.cdc.gov/measles/data-research/index.html). Almost half of those are from the Texas outbreak still (https://www.dshs.texas.gov/news-alerts/measles-outbreak-2025) but that and other outbreaks don't seem to be increasing at this point. I think there is still a chance of reporting increasing with any small outbreaks with school starting but it does not seem like it will be a significant increase. So, I am lowering the bands and increasing likeliness of ending somewhere in the high 1500s with some small chance of being larger. There is also a very small chance that no more than 8 more cases will be reported over the next two weeks.

Pakistan and India participated in the SCO meeting (https://eng.sectsco.org/20250901/1963431.html). This does not suggest any formal conciliation, but the SCO's anti-west messaging may present informal pressure to maintain relations in the near term. So, I am decreasing the likeliness that a major incident will occur the next couple of weeks.

Hurricane Erin failed to make landfall, and no major hurricanes have hit the U.S. so far this summer. With two weeks left in the period, it seems very unlikely more than one would occur. There does seem to be precedence for that occurring (in 2004 and 1954) but it so rare that I am moving my predictions to more closely align with the crowd at this point.

As of 17 Sep, the site reports 71 incidents. That is around six cases per month over the last year suggesting another three might be expected over the next two weeks. However, the Russian drone incursion into NATO territory has increased tensions even more which could include additional disinformation from Russia. So, I am leaning heavily towards the middle band but giving some chance for a quick increase in propaganda efforts in the next couple weeks.

With only two weeks left in the question period, there are fewer opportunities left to make such an announcement. Exercise Freedom Edge, involving USA, ROK, and JPN, is still ongoing and a positive sign of the relationship. The incident involving ICE detentions of South Korean workers in the U.S., however, has likely strained political relations, although I have no insight into what ROK may do in response and what reaction that may generate from U.S. leaders. The current administration has been comfortable making big pronouncements of this kind without traditional staffing or logical arguments so an announcement could still be made with little warning. So, I am reducing the likeliness significantly but not as much as the average.

Polling conducted in October and November of 2025 will follow a summer of attempted negotiations and European leaders recognizing serious threats arising from U.S. waffling. It is unclear how this will affect German views of Ukraine, but it is possible to the following reinforcing trends continue: Germans decrease trust in U.S. and its seeming partnership with Moscow, Germans recognize Russia as greater threat to Ukraine and by extension themselves, and thus increased German sense that Ukraine is in a similar geopolitical position and an ally now, more so than it was at the beginning of the war. Refugees are reportedly integrating well (https://doku.iab.de/forschungsbericht/2025/fb0525en.pdf). Polling in February 2025 showed 49% of Germans supported backing a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/thin-majority-germans-back-role-possible-ukraine-peacekeeping-mission-2025-02-18/). This may have been an early sign of the effect of President Trump's accommodations for Putin and objection to Ukraine as perceived in Germany. If this dynamic is exacerbated during the polling period (which I believe is possible given current state of Ukraine discussions), then we should expect to see much greater support for Ukraine in Germany.