Updating because time window for event to occur is narrowing.
0.757326
Relative Brier Score
35
Forecasts
2
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 37 | 37 | 37 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Definitions | |||||
New Badge
Power Forecaster - Sep 2025
Earned for making 20+ forecasts in a month.
New Badge
Star Commenter - Sep 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
5%
(-5%)
Yes
95%
(+5%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
If the reasoning for my initial forecast was incorrect, it would still have a residual effect on my updated forecast.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
15%
Yes
85%
No
Why do you think you're right?
China has only established one military base in Africa so far, and this occurred 8 years ago. This low frequency suggests that caution is order about the probability of a new one being established in the next 16 months. Moreover, there appears to be less news reporting about China's intention to establish a new base in Africa this year, in comparison to last year.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The fact that China has only established one military base thus far in Africa may be a poor guide post, if this reality is actually increasing the motivation for additional military bases on the continent among Chinese national security decision-makers.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
20%
Togo
Why do you think you're right?
The baseline rate of deployment to Africa is a little more than 1 deployment a year, or 0.33 deployments every four months (the time frame for this question), since it appears that Wagner Group and/or the Africa Corps have deployed to ten countries in the last approximately 9 years. However, this rate appears not just to Togo, but to any African country, and the forecast should be revised downward as a result, I believe.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I may be underestimating the likelihood of deployment to Togo because I'm not sufficiently considering how recent political or military developments in Togo may might deployment more likely.
Files
New Prediction
This forecast expired on Oct 9, 2025 09:24PM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
5%
Yes
Sep 9, 2025 to Mar 9, 2026
95%
No
Sep 9, 2025 to Mar 9, 2026
Why do you think you're right?
North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear tests from 2006-2025, a time period of approximately 20 years. If the timing of these tests was random, I calculate that there would be a 15% chance that another test would occur in the next 6 months. Since no tests have occurred in the past 8 years, it seems highly likely that the timing is not random and various factors are reducing the likelihood of a North Korean test in recent years. Therefore, I am reducing my forecast likelihood from the overall baseline.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
My forecast is based on a basic quantitative/temporal analysis, rather than detailed analysis of current political and security conditions in North Korea and regionally.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(-10%)
Less than or equal to 59
5%
(-24%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
74%
(+41%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
20%
(-6%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
1%
(-1%)
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
There are already 69 cases identified, with only less than a month to go to add to the tally. It seems unlikely that there will be 11 more cases in that time frame.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
If the identified cases tend to cluster in certain months, there might be a greater probability that a large number of cases could be identified in the remainder of September.
Files
New Prediction
This forecast expired on Oct 5, 2025 08:28PM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
60%
Yes
Sep 5, 2025 to Mar 5, 2026
40%
No
Sep 5, 2025 to Mar 5, 2026
Why do you think you're right?
Recent experience suggests that the frequency of coups in Africa is fairly high, and it reasonable to expect that another may occur in the next 6 months, though far from certain.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Recent historical experience may not be a good guide, if recent coups were driven by one-off aggregating factors (such as a once-in-a-generation economic recession).
Files
You are very welcome, and thank you for elaborating.
My 2 cents: the article was not wrong; but when it was written back in April 2024, with 2 recent successful coups (July & August 2023), the situation looked arguably different than in September 2025.
According to the VoA data (which are considered something of a "gold standard"), we did indeed have 9 successful coups in Africa, from 2020 to 2023 (and none since): https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
10%
Less than or equal to 59
29%
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
33%
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
26%
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
2%
More than or equal to 90
Why do you think you're right?
There is a lot of volatility in detected cases over the past few years, and I think it's reasonable that my prediction reflects that for 2024-2025.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The federal elections in Germany earlier in 2025 may have caused disinformation cases to spike, meaning that the probability of an outcome in these higher ranges should have been increased.
Files
Thanks for catching this; I will adjust my predictions.
Files
Why do you think you're right?
There is little time left in this forecast window for more than one major hurricane to make landfall.
Why might you be wrong?
If hurricane landfall probability is not independent, this might increase probability of more than 1 making landfall somewhat.