ScottEastman

I largely agree with @DimaKlenchin that Putin is indicating that he will not accept the terms of a ceasefire as have been recently discussed. He is continuing to demand control of the four oblasts (regions) "enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation." The ground situation is that only in Luhansk is Russia close to fully controlling the territory:

Donetsk - 70%

Zaporizhzhia - 74%

Kherson - ~75%

Luhansk - 99%

The city of Kherson is currently controlled by Ukraine but has dropped from a pre-invasion population to 280,000 to ~60,000 with frequent shelling and drone attacks. 

The city of Zaporizhzhia is currently under Ukrainian control and has a population of ~700,000. 

So if I understand Putin correctly, he expects Zelensky and Ukraine to give these cities and remaining territory of the listed oblasts, demilitarize, not have a significant contingent of international troops patrolling a deconfliction zone, and hope that Russia lives up to its word and doesn't attack in the future. That would be the same Russia that promised it wasn't going to attack right up to February 24th, 2022. This is a clear non-starter. To capitulate in this manner would not be accepted by the Ukrainian parliament or any likely successor to Zelensky. 

The 1% of Luhansk cold probably be bargained away. The current lines could also probably be accepted for essentially a permanent ceasefire that does not require Ukraine to formalize that the territories have been permanently lost (face saving). I can see this as a possibility if it is accompanied by a credible international force to patrol a DMZ, and if Ukraine is allowed to make alliances and build a robust defensive military. Whether or how much of the ~$300 billion in frozen Russian assets could be negotiated as reparations should be a legitimate topic, but is unlikely to be approved unless Russia was facing an imminent and convincing threat of being militarily routed. That is not the case. It is also not the case that Russia is making quick progress gaining territory in Ukraine. Drone warfare has radically changed the nature of warfare where neither side has conventional air superiority. 

One point that may be changing Trump's thinking is the recent New York Times Siena Poll which showed the approval for how Trump is handling the war between Russia and Ukraine at 35%. This is his second lowest category, with only the case involving Kilmar Diego Garcia scoring lower. It is correct that this is just one poll and one point in time, but it is a signal. Today Trump expressed that Putin may not want peace and has also talked about increasing sanctions on Russia. 

"Myanmar's ruling military has extended a temporary ceasefire in its conflict with rebels to April 30, in a move to expedite relief and rebuilding efforts following a devastating earthquake last month, state media reported on Tuesday." This is a positive sign and gives some breathing room for confidence building towards an eventual peace and return to normalcy. Despite the positive news of the ceasefire extension, the timeline is too short for holding elections and the country needs time to stabilise after last month's devastating 7'7  magnitude earthquake. 

0 (<0.5%). The war is in a near standstill. Oil prices are a bit depressed but LNG prices are still strong enough that the economy is unlikely to crash in the near term. China, NK, and Iran remain allies and Trump is not creating undo problems for Putin. 

I am holding at 1%. In the current instability of the tariff war I don't see Huawei collaborating with O-Ran. Relations are currently acrimonious and not likely to be restored before October. 

Why would Russia agree to a ceasefire when the US is giving in to many of Russia's request direct negotiations with Ukraine even start? Why not see how far Trump, Witkoff, and Rubio will go in demanding concessions from Ukraine and asking nothing from Russia other than a temporary stop? 

Russia  and Ukraine continue to take heavy losses and the frontlines see very little movement from either side. Ukraine has mastered battlefield drone warfare, but is still fighting in a war where neither side has complete air superiority. Russia can hope that the US will stop providing intelligence support to Ukraine and that Congress will reduce or eliminate military and humanitarian aid support. The European coalition of the willing cares enough about the trajectory of the war to continue supporting Ukraine and to possibly increase support where possible. This does not include the ability to replace US satellite and signals intelligence, if withdrawn. 

Russia can hope that fissures in Europe and NATO will be increased the more the support burden is transferred to the coalition of the willing. The countries that historically were part of the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact with the notable exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia see the conflict as a true threat to their long-term sovereignty, but the countries in the west logically have less concern. Russia is willing to continue losing their soldiers. North Korea, Iran, and to a much lesser degree, China, are willing to continue supporting Russia. With the advantage of mass, Russia is unlikely to incur major losses of territory if the US support collapses. In such a scenario, Ukraine is still likely to offer stiff resistance. I don't see Russia taking a major city such as Kharkiv this year, but they can wait and hope for weakening support. I don't see Russia stopping until they are stopped and begin to lose significant ground, or see a total change in US and EU policy toward a winning of major territory as opposed to maintaining the status quo. I can see Ukraine negotiating a peace in exchange for the land they have already lost and true security guarantees, including international boots on the ground. Ukraine is extremely unlikely to give up land that has not already been lost in exchange for peace. 

Russia will have an extremely difficult time getting to Moldova even if the US pulls support for Ukraine. Modern FPV drone warfare in the absence of conventional air superiority has made large mechanised moves extremely difficult. The geography, road system and cities between current Russian areas of control and Moldova would make an assault highly unlikely. For this to happen, Ukraine would need to cede Odessa, a city of nearly 1 million to Russia, and have lost all access to the Black Sea, their primary way of getting grain to international markets. Russia has shown no signs of being to operate their Navy near Ukraine. Romania has a significant French and US contingents on its territory. and would not want to see Russia on its border. Maia Sandu, the president of Moldova, is pro EU and is a dual citizen of Moldova and Romania, and recently won re-election. Her term does not expire until the end of 2028. The upcoming presidential elections on the 4th of May in Romania could put a Euro-NATO skeptic leader in place, but would not be enough to give Russia access to Moldova. 

Georgia is complicated because it shares a direct border with Russia, has two-breakaway regions, and a pro-Russian leadership, despite the recent protests. It makes more sense for Russia to continue to exploit the divisions to gain further influence without the need for war. This is something that he accepted in Ukraine up to the Maidan Revolution. 

If I could use decimals, this would be Estonia 0.7, Latvia 0.7 and Lithuania 1.6. The Suwałki Gap is a natural area for conflict to breakout if there is increased tension with Kaliningrad, or Russia simply wants to make their territory contiguous. Even without US backing, the defense of this region should be much more robust from a multinational perspective than the defense of Ukraine. There are currently Czech, Dutch, German, British and US troops in the area, supplementing the Lithuanian and Polish militaries. 

The Baltic countries don't have fighter jets, but Poland is acquiring F35s  and already has F16s. If the UK and Sweden get involved, Russia would not be able to control the skies. Unlike in Ukraine, there is an alliance, even if the US pulls out of it or sits on the sidelines. I see Poland, the Baltic's, and Finland definitely coming to the direct military aid of any of the three countries. Sweden and the UK are also highly likely to join the fight, regardless of what happens with NATO in the next couple of years. Considering how depleted the Russian military is at this point and that a surprise attack beyond a border skirmish is difficult to carry out without being noticed, I consider the risk extremely low. This is contingent on the regional alliances holding. I don't see the regional alliances deteriorating before April 2027. 

The war in Ukraine is unlikely to reach lasting comprehensive ceasefire this year. Even if it does, I expect Russia would keep a large military contingent in the region for fear that Ukraine would break the ceasefire. 

Holding at 9%. This continues to be based on the lower bar level of  PHEIC for a pandemic and the Trump administration's de-staffing of NIH, CDC, and international public health aid. At least at this moment, HIV and tuberculosis international aid from the US government has not been eliminated. A base rate of