Confirming my original forecast. While Ethiopia is more likely to default than the other countries, they are actively engaging with the creditor community to manage and restructure its current debt. I've not seen any new information that suggests this is not proceeding normally.
No Scores Yet
Relative Brier Score
0
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Definitions | |||||
I agree with @DimaKlenchin 's logic, I'm just not quite as confident.
Perhaps I was a bit too aggressive with my Bolivia forecast.
Generally agree with @alter_hugo and @Rene, although I think Bolivia's more likely to default: https://latinfinance.com/magazine/2024-q3/2024/07/02/bolivia-a-default-foretold/
Why do you think you're right?
I wish there was more specificity in the question, because who holds the sovereign debt makes a difference (i.e. an IFO vs. bilateral vs. private and so on). That being said, both Nigeria and Angola are oil rich and prices are good right now. Economic reports for all 4 countries give no indications that any of them are on the brink of default, and the IFOs (and Paris Club, even China) have proven amenable to debt restructuring in recent years, so even if a crisis arose, I don't think it would result in default.
Recent African debt defaults (Zambia and Ghana) took place under much worse debt to GDP ratios, during the COVID-19 pandemic.
https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Ethiopia-Difficult-compromises-2/13/2024,49351
https://data.one.org/topics/african-debt/
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-5-year-regional-outlooks/sub-saharan-africa
Why might you be wrong?
Drought, war, and radical swings in commodity prices could change the conditions.
I have been swayed by some of the comments, so I've moderated my forecast. However, I think the "crowd" is overlooking the sharp rightward-swing of German politics; AfD's policy position is much more populist/nationalist and far less NATO-oriented.
Adjusting based on @PeterStamp 's comments.
The percentage dropped by 11 between 2023 and 2024, although it rose 25 between 2022 and 2023. This makes it difficult to predict a trendline, so I've made the following assumptions: first, that the war between Russia and Ukraine will continue; second, that there will be no major escalation. Working forward from that assumption, I figure there is an even chance of there being between a 0-11 percentage decline, so gave the 50-59 and 60-69 brackets equal probability. The other brackets seem possible but would require my assumptions be violated. For the "less than 49 bracket" I think there would need to be a ceasefire or peace negotiation, and since I don't think that's going to happen I gave it a 3% chance. For the 70-79 bracket there would need to be some significant escalation (like tactical nuke usage) in the war to bring it back up to the level it reached around the initial invasion, which I think is more likely than peace and so I gave it a 6% chance. Above that I think would require some indication that Germany or NATO itself was going to be directly attacked, which is why I only gave it 1%
Russia has made several escalatory moves, including updating its nuclear doctrine, employing North Korean troops, and launching a ballistic missile.