Continued focus on INDOPACOM and need to counter balance increasingly threatening alliance in region.
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Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
I overpriced the time to change in the next 25+ days for the administration.
Star Commenter - Aug 2025
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
There is unexpected violence or operation to take back hostages or target Hamas leadership in the end of August or the operation/mobilization efforts are earlier.
Why do you think you're right?
Mexican northern border being tightly monitored and militarized means that less instances of border town cartel violence. It will then be contained to the more and Mexico has taken steps to increasingly police this region.
Why might you be wrong?
Heavy summer fighting season, uptick in demand for drugs, feuds amongst cartel, government corruption schedule or altercation with cartels.
Why do you think you're right?
I believe that there are several factors that would be used for evaluating the probability of a Taiwan contingency:
1. Politics and Economy are biased towards status quo; step changes are relatively hard to come by in the efficient and modern world.
2. Domestic Incentives Matter: This question partially rests on whether the Chinese public believes the credibility of Xi, the CCP, and the countries political self-understanding depends on re-unification. I don't think this is the case when preferences are actually revealed in the short-run.
3. China benefits by waiting: China has more time to conduct grey zone operations and wait for a more favorable leadership class in Taiwan over next decade.
4. China will sustain massive damage to its international reputation if it conducts an all-out assault on Taiwan and will be further isolated from world economy. This will likely hurt them in this current environment.
Why might you be wrong?
The domestic political conditions are worse and the intraparty dynamics between CCP hawks vis a vie Xi loyalists are more influential than previously considered. Intelligence and reliable reporting on CCP dynamics and conditions about the Chinese economy are notoriously hard to come by and a tail risk that the military and senior leaderships perceive the current moment as their best chance is relatively hard to price in relative to incumbent forces I laid out.
Why do you think you're right?
Updating priors from 98 --> 99
Why might you be wrong?
Failing to account for exogeneous risk
Why do you think you're right?
These trends are very hard to build supply. I think we are still likely on a real estate bubble but I don't think it will have popped by then.
Why might you be wrong?
I may be wrong because I am understimating the interest rate effect on home prices or that there is a asset bubble pop.
Why do you think you're right?
I think global oil supply is already constrained to the EU. Russia has relatively little incentive to sanction the three countries further and China has increasingly partnered with the UAE in attempts to make in-roads in the ME. The sanctioning would likely be a U.S. lead coalition.
Why might you be wrong?
Tail-end risk, major escalations in the Middle East. Egypt and UAE are found to be sponsoring terrorism is one potential downside or exogeneous events.