Vladimir Putin was just re-elected in March 2024 for another six-year term, which officially runs until 2030. This was made possible by changes to the Russian constitution a few years ago, which reset his term limits and allow him to stay in power much longer if he chooses.
Right now, I don’t see any credible signs—at least according to reliable news sources—that Putin plans to step down or that he’s under serious threat of being removed before July 1, 2025. In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction:
Putin has a tight grip on power. He’s managed to sideline or suppress most political opposition, and he controls the main institutions of government and the military.
The 2024 election gave him over 87% of the vote, though it’s important to note that the process was widely criticized for a lack of real competition and for cracking down on dissent.
Despite Russia’s economic problems and the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s power structure looks very stable, with no obvious cracks or threats to Putin’s leadership.
Legally and constitutionally, he’s allowed to stay in office, and there are no moves underway to remove him.
Given all this, I think it’s extremely unlikely that Putin will leave the presidency before July 1, 2025.
Why do you think you're right?
I believe I am right in forecasting that a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, if it goes into effect in 2025, will likely be short-lived—lasting fewer than 91 days, and most plausibly less than 30 to 60 days. This forecast is grounded in a combination of historical precedent, current geopolitical dynamics, and the fragile nature of recent negotiations.
Historically, all attempts at ceasefires in the Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2022 have failed quickly due to deep-rooted mistrust, incompatible strategic goals, and continuous military escalation. For example, previous humanitarian corridors and temporary truces collapsed within days or were violated almost immediately. This suggests that a sustained ceasefire requires a fundamental shift in both parties’ incentives—something not yet clearly visible.
Additionally, the current negotiations, such as the March 2025 talks in Saudi Arabia, show some willingness from both sides, but remain conditional and vague. Putin’s statement that there are still “pending questions” is an indicator of hesitation. Without firm, verifiable commitments from both governments, any ceasefire is vulnerable to being derailed by minor violations or shifts in the political-military balance.
Furthermore, external mediation efforts—although symbolically important—have not yet demonstrated the leverage necessary to impose or guarantee long-term compliance. The international community is divided in its interests, and any solution lacking enforcement mechanisms is unlikely to last.
For these reasons, I assign low probabilities to a long-term ceasefire and believe a short duration is the most likely outcome.
Why might you be wrong?
I might be wrong because forecasting the duration of a ceasefire in a high-stakes, dynamic conflict like this one is inherently uncertain. Multiple factors could contribute to a different outcome than the one I anticipate:
Underestimating international diplomatic pressure: If powerful third-party actors such as the U.S., China, or EU nations decide to strongly intervene—either with incentives or punitive measures—they could force a more serious, durable commitment from both sides.
Unexpected political shifts: A leadership change in Russia or Ukraine, or even within their advisory circles, could introduce a new willingness to negotiate and compromise in ways that current leadership has resisted.
War fatigue and economic collapse: Both countries are suffering tremendous human and economic losses. A point may come when continuing the war becomes unsustainable, prompting a genuine desire for a long-term cessation of hostilities.
Successful establishment of monitoring mechanisms: If a ceasefire is backed by credible verification—such as a U.N.-supervised mission or multilateral enforcement group—then adherence may significantly increase, extending the ceasefire far beyond initial expectations.
In essence, I may be wrong because I am placing too much weight on past patterns of failure and not enough on the possibility that a tipping point—political, economic, or diplomatic—could drastically alter the trajectory of the conflict.