The EU has been cutting Russian gas hard since 2022. Russia used to be over 40% of EU gas imports, and now it’s down to something like 15–20%. Pipeline flows are way lower, the Ukraine transit agreement ended, and the EU keeps saying publicly they want Russian gas near zero by 2027.
2.025653
Relative Brier Score
12
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
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Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
first, the EU still buys Russian LNG, and those flows haven’t dropped as fast as pipeline gas. If LNG demand spikes for any reason heatwave, industrial recovery, supply issues elsewhere Russia could end up selling more than expected.
Why do you think you're right?
Honestly, I think what I wrote is solid because it’s based on how these things usually play out in the real world. I’m not guessing I’m looking at what’s happened over the past decade. Most years, only one or two countries announce a brand-new carbon pricing system, and that’s without the kind of strict rules this question uses.
Why might you be wrong?
Some countries quietly move policies through ministries or publish proposals that don’t make big headlines.
If a country already announced something before Nov 2025 and I didn’t see it, then my base assumption is off.
Why do you think you're right?
Leaders like Macron and Sunak are pushing for action, but key players (Germany, Poland) have explicitly ruled out sending troops unless there’s a ceasefire. That creates a political ceiling on what can be done in 2025. When large contributors hold back, full deployment becomes unlikely.
Why might you be wrong?
A major, unexpected event ,like a Russian chemical or nuclear escalation, or a dramatic Ukrainian breakthrough ,could flip European calculations overnight. What seems politically impossible today might become urgent tomorrow.
Why do you think you're right?
The U.S. has been signaling tighter control on AI technologies since at least 2022–2023. These 2025 actions are a continuation and escalation of that strategy, not a sudden shift. The Biden administration (and likely any successor) has shown strong bipartisan support for regulating advanced AI in the context of national security and tech competition with China.
Why might you be wrong?
Even though the U.S. announced the new rules (like the FAID framework), implementation may lag or enforcement could be inconsistent. Regulations are often adjusted, delayed, or selectively applied based on politics, industry pushback, or logistical challenges. So while the rules exist on paper, their real-world impact might be less strict than intended.
Why do you think you're right?
I’m pretty confident in my prediction because the trend in Europe is super clear: countries have been massively increasing their defense budgets since 2022, and most of the big systems they urgently need simply aren’t produced in Europe.
Why might you be wrong?
Even though the trend points toward more big contracts, there are a few ways this could go sideways. First, European politics can shift fast. If some countries face elections, recessions, or pressure to cut spending, they might freeze or delay major defense purchases just to look fiscally responsible. A couple of delays alone could push the contracts past July 2026.