This is only a slight nod in favor of the 5% spending target already under an agreement with Spain appearing to be the lone NATO member voicing clear disapproval. Left in a vacuum, I believe this can be negotiated into a stronger consensus provided the provision to revisit the spending target in 2029, after just 4 yrs.
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Star Commenter - Jul 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
60%
Yes
40%
No
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
The US-Russia relations under the Trump administration may erode the consensus if Ukraine appears to be abandoned by the US...Although, I would think that Ukraine would still want the NATO consensus to carry on with this spending target under any scenario other than full control by Russia.
Files
Hi @CastforeX, thanks for the reply. Great websites too. Yes, you assessed correctly - by the end of the July 31, if there is no news from a major international news site, or other verified accurate source (NATO) that Spain has outrightly stated they agree to the 5% spending target, the question will resolve as “No.”
As far as this statement of yours "I think that my consideration is more along the lines that everybody can agree and then walk it back by 2029....and the appearance of holdout from Spain creates time for the Trump Administration to trip over itself with regards to negotiations or talks with other NATO members....and create an erosion of the projected consensus. This is what I planned to watch for in order for my forecast to flip to a No."
This is good reasoning. I had initially thought that Spain had agreed with NATO on the 5% spending target and then Sánchez flipped at the summit. And that would have fallen under the question criteria that a member could agree and then revert. There were news reports stating “All 32 members have agreed…” along with Rutte stating Spain did not have an exemption. But due to the recent RFI clarification - the question judges stated this was not the case and the question would resolve as “No” (if it were to resolve today) because there is no indication Spain has agreed.
Spain may be in negotiations with NATO, or the USA, etc.. but we have no way of knowing this. Thus, Occam’s razor - the easiest and most straightforward forecast is “No.” Unless you are very clairvoyant and have other information. (Which could be the case, so we are not overlooking that)!
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
15%
Less than or equal to 1349
75%
Between 1350 and 1499, inclusive
10%
Between 1500 and 1649, inclusive
0%
Between 1650 and 1799, inclusive
0%
More than or equal to 1800
Why do you think you're right?
I am looking at the base rate of cases from last year to extrapolate the confirmed cases as of today's date (1,288) and that puts me in the second bucket with no further outbreaks https://www.cdc.gov/measles/data-research/index.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_10-measles-cases-in-2025
Files
Why might you be wrong?
IF the prevailing vaccination rate does not provide a sufficient moat around Texas and any activity kicks off in Washington, California, Arizona, Georgia, Florida, or New York.....this could balloon quite a bit more.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
1%
Yes
99%
No
Why do you think you're right?
I think a 2024 deal overtakes a trend of troop and equipment growth since 2020. I need to see where that issue (Sino-Indian border dispute in the Western Himalayas) becomes a top priority for action at this time in history.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Until I learn more about the significance of the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Western Himalayas and any correlations to present day priorities...I'm fully exposed to be wrong on this one.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
70%
Yes
30%
No
Why do you think you're right?
I am going to go out on a limb and say that the announcement of troop removal may formally come out with hasty plans for pull out, but it won't entice any action from N. Korea considering the often reversal of plans under the Trump Administration. The defense cost burden has been stated as a topic worth discussing and renegotiating, so the troop removal may appear to be a bartering chip for increased spending by S. Korea. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/south-koreas-defence-ministry-says-no-talks-held-with-us-troop-withdrawal-2025-05-23/
Along these lines, I predict that the troop removal will be reversed and an agreement will be secured with the newly elected president as of June. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-south-koreas-presidential-election-means-for-the-us-korea-alliance/
Files
Why might you be wrong?
If a deal is struck before a fully crafted "stick" from the Trump Administration (i.e., troop removal size, timeline, and pull-out plans) ...then the existing chatter regarding 4,500 troops will have run its course and I am wrong.
Also, I need to further assess the definition of "intent" ....is this a stronger level of commitment that tariffs against countries with a stated start date ahead of scheduled talks, meetings, and negotiations, to pre-emptively shape the willingness to engage in negotiations?
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
2%
Less than or equal to 1
51%
Between 2 and 3, inclusive
45%
Between 4 and 5, inclusive
2%
More than or equal to 6
Why do you think you're right?
NOAA appears to have completed this forecast for us with a prediction of 3-5 major hurricanes https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/noaa-predicts-above-normal-2025-atlantic-hurricane-season
...of these, which how many will make landfall at that level of strength...? search results say that on average 3 major hurricanes will reach their strength before landfall. https://www.belfor.com/us/en/resources/hurricane-categories/
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I left a 2% chance at each end of the distribution tales...but the major likelihood is 2 and 3 or 4 and 5.
I need to look for weather patterns that are associated with greater likelihood of building energy over land and coming in without full strength.
A recent report from CSU is saying that the season will be slightly less severe than originally forecasted. The major hurricane count is still 3, but this could easily update to being 2 or 1. At 1, I will have very slim predictive value in my forecast. https://www.providencejournal.com/story/weather/hurricane/2025/07/11/hurricane-season-2025-forecast/84530155007/
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
20%
Yes
80%
No
Why do you think you're right?
The motivation for fighting can be simplified to control of Kashmir according to this article. https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-india-military-explainer-0708bbf29ea81126aeae0d141f5a4026 Which presents numerous reasons why the two nations are less inclined to formally escalate into full scale war.
The situation appears to be new regarding the depths of attacks, but it appears that India did not encroach upon demarcated boundaries of dispute when conducting attacks. So, the escalation was more symbolic than aggressive and unruly. https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-may-2025-india-pakistan-conflict-neither-quite-the-same-nor-quite-another/
I predict that any continuity of a skirmish arising out of the ceasefire will have the damaging effects of casualties to uniformed fighters within bases and military support facilities with advanced capabilities or great significance. This would most likely include a fatality at the very least.
So, the final version of the question is whether or not ceasefire will erode and a new skirmish will erupt during the timeline of now until Sept. 30th. The suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (and Simla Agreement?) appears significant enough of an issue to maintain tensions. However, the timing of the April 22 attack on tourists in India-Administered Kashmir, with apparent coinciding timeline with a visit by US VP JD Vance, seems to have run its course by disrupting the purpose of that visit and establishing a two-sided seat at the table for discourse on US-India relations. I see Pakistan making some concessions to restore the treaty and agreement. Whatever objectives were in place for April must be out of the picture at this point. So, India is exerting more force to shape Pakistan's posture for the near term.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I think it just takes a week of skirmishing to make me wrong. SO, I need to watch this daily so I can flip the answer !
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
Less than or equal to 500
8%
Between 501 and 750, inclusive
66%
Between 751 and 1000, inclusive
19%
Between 1001 and 1250, inclusive
7%
More than or equal to 1251
Why do you think you're right?
totals for violence within a single month appear to be centered around 110-120 per day with a min of near zero during ceasefire and a peak of just under 200. https://acleddata.com/2025/05/29/qa-what-do-israels-shifting-tactics-in-gaza-tell-us-about-whats-ahead/
except I am not yet clear if that is for a subset of types of violence or the full total. https://acleddata.com/gaza-monitor/#data
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I think my primary potential for error is still with internalizing the metrics and verify what is being reported in my sources.
I maintain slim likelihoods at the tails but the surefire cause for me to be wrong would be a ceasefire for more than half of the month of August. Meanwhile, there are plans for a 60 day ceasefire....so any degree of success with that effort will lead to a significant change in my forecasted distribution. https://apnews.com/article/gaza-hamas-israel-ceasefire-f98461150ec7572beb8432325cbfd299
Files
Why do you think you're right?
The threat of tariffs to be imposed upon Spain has not appeared to make a difference in Spain's stance on what defense spending target it is willing to surge towards. The timeline of July 31, 2025 is now too close to expect any other action to salvage negotiations.
Why might you be wrong?
I would now seek some form of significant gift to Spain that would literally offset the defense spending increase for the projected impact to be nullified and the agreement to be secured by consensus. I have no idea what that would look like or who would be on standby to put forth such a gift.
Apart from that, some form of or set of politically damning information being held over the heads of Spain's delegates to NATO would hypothetically move the needle.
I simply do not see either of the two levels of effort being secured before the deadline of July 31.