Given the ease of access to underlying lab materials and the expected scaling potential of AI, the capacity for a highly motivated individual or group to successfully do this are only growing, and the determination/capacity of governments to prevent it are not likely to keep up.
0.010419
Relative Brier Score
7
Forecasts
1
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
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| Definitions | |||||
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
More dramatic government policy intervention takes place than can be currently contemplated. Luck!
Why do you think you're right?
With U.S. attention focused elsewhere, DPRK is not likely to want to generate undue attention. It is benefitting from its growing relations with Moscow, hedging effectively its relations with Beijing, and reaping the dividends of allied divisions. The technical need for a test is not urgent. If DPRK decides to stick its chin out, it is more likely to do so by making a territorial claim or move in the Northern Line Limit, as hinted to by changes to its constitution in September 2024.
Why might you be wrong?
In the absence of affirmative engagement with the new U.S. administration, DPRK may seek to remind the world of its relevance by conducting a test prior to the 2026 UN General Assembly. It may also judge that it can do so with little consequence, given division between U.S. and its allies and willingness for Moscow (and likely Beijing) to protect it.
Why do you think you're right?
With U.S. attention focused elsewhere, DPRK is not likely to want to generate undue attention. It is benefitting from its growing relations with Moscow, hedging effectively its relations with Beijing, and reaping the dividends of allied divisions. The technical need for a test is not urgent. If DPRK decides to stick its chin out, it is more likely to do so by making a territorial claim or move in the Northern Line Limit, as hinted to by changes to its constitution in September 2024.
Why might you be wrong?
In the absence of affirmative engagement with the new U.S. administration, DPRK may seek to remind the world of its relevance by conducting a test prior to the 2026 UN General Assembly. It may also judge that it can do so with little consequence, given division between U.S. and its allies and willingness for Moscow (and likely Beijing) to protect it.
Why do you think you're right?
The average lifespan of an Iranian male is 75.7 years. The SL is 85 with known health issues. I think it extremely unlikely he flees or is overthrown over the coming year; I simply think he's run into some actuarial deadlines.
Why might you be wrong?
It's possible that his impending demise and contestation about successorship leads to a political crisis/forced leadership change.
Why do you think you're right?
Hard to imagine level/intensity of fighting would reduce to such an extent so as to give confidence to such a Coalition. Also risk US admin would oppose, seeing it as a trap to compel U.S. forces.
Why might you be wrong?
Low odds but non-zero chance of some sort of de minimus political framework may create political and operational window for such a deployment.