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Why do you think you're right?
Assuming this is exclusively about federal laws, I think it is highly unlikely to resolve affirmatively.
In the U.S.:
- No current bills introduced promoting an tax incentive for AI companies - Doesn't mean much given resolution date in 2029
- There is historically a single digit enactment rate for legislation from congress - trending downward since the 115th congress
- Increasing polarization makes it less likely that non-urgent / non-essential legislation gets passed - Tax incentives for AI safety audits wouldn't fall under this category
- The resolution will resolve prior to the inauguration of the next president, and the current administration's stance supports less regulation to preserve U.S. competitiveness with China, and , if they chose to enforce AI safety audits, would likely pass an executive order rather than wait for congress
In the UK:
- The UK has historically been inclined to tax tech companies
- The U.K. is more favorable toward AI regulations, but would more likely pass regulatory requirements without a tax incentive
Why might you be wrong?
It's possible that lobbying and / or a greater need for auditing pushes legislation to the finish line in a way that is favorable to tech companies. Arguably, tax incentives would be a way of encouraging audits without as much harm to international AI competition.
Why do you think you're right?
Since there are not clear counts of all types of cyberattacks, I use a mix of sources to come to a base estimate of state-sponsored infrastructure cyberattacks on G20 countries:
- KELA reported that 4,701 ransomware incidents were recorded globally between January and September 2025. IBM's X-Force 2025 Threat Intelligence Index notes that ransomeware accounted for 28% of total malware cases in 2024. Working backwards from the 4,701 ransomeware count, this would mean that we should expect ~11,185 cyberattacks from January to the end of June.
- The X-Force 2025 report also notes that 70% of cyberattacks targeted critical infrastructure. This lowers our expected count to ~7,829.
- Cognyte's 2025 report cites that in 2024 36% of identified cyberattacks were from state sponsored actors. Assuming this percentage holds true into 2026, this lowers our estimate to ~2,818.
- DeepStrike's 10 most targeted countries for cyberattacks in 2025 included 7 G20 countries (U.S., Japan, UK, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India, Germany). As a very rough estimate, we could say that 70% of attacks target G20 countries. This brings us to ~1,972 infrastructure attacks on G20 countries from Jan-end of June.
- SQ Magazine's 2025 cybersecurity overview cites that ~22% of attacks are identified as using AI, bringing our estimated count to 434 relevant attacks. If 10% of these substantially use AI, that brings us to ~43 cases.
Since the resolution includes "data theft affecting operations or services" and "financial losses exceeding $1 million USD" as examples, if we ascribe a 5% chance that an attack meets this threshold, then we should expect ~2 attacks to meet our resolution criteria.
Why might you be wrong?
The greatest barrier to this resolution resolving affirmatively would be the reporting afterward. The reporting would need to confirm that the attack used AI and met the stated threshold for disruption. This could take time that exceeds the resolution timeline. Additionally, since it would likely be a sophisticated cyberattack to cause infrastructure disruption, it may be harder to confirm details of how it was executed after the fact.
In my forecast I accounted for state sponsored actors through Cognyte's 2025 report
You are right, I somehow missed this; thank you for the clarification and apologies for the mistake
Why do you think you're right?
The bar for authorizing a UN peacekeeping mission is very high given that it has to be passed without a P5 veto in the Security Council. Conflict zones directly involving P5 member interests are almost guaranteed to be vetoed, leaving only conflict zones with no clear incentive for a P5 member to veto. I reason that if the UN SC hasn’t approved a mission for this remaining category of conflicts yet then it’s unlikely to do so at this point unless a drastic development were to occur, which is unlikely because if being a conflict zone is insufficient for them to approve a mission, it would need a very severe development for this to happen. Additionally, there are operational challenges to missions, such as the October announcement of reductions to peacekeeping personnel from budget constraints. This paired with the trend of mission wind downs makes it unlikely this resolution will pass.
Why might you be wrong?
There are 7 months until the resolution date. It’s possible that a new conflict emerges in this time that is severe and doesn’t invite P5 vetos. However, it would likely need to be very severe to mobilize the SC in a short time frame. A less probable alternative is that P5 members are able to overcome gridlock and pass a resolution on an existing conflict zone, but even if this does happen, this assumes the resolution would initiate a peacekeeping mission right off the bat when it would realistically issue sanctions first
Why do you think you're right?
Updating for the passage of time. I believe my rationale from before still holds.
Why might you be wrong?
Same as original rationale.
Why do you think you're right?
March 31st is ~4 months from now. Based on this overview (table 1), new medical devices are automatically evaluated as class III devices and would typically undergo the pre-market approval (PMA) or, if it has a predicate technology (the FDA has approved several devices for detecting contrast agents in CT scans) the device can go through the pre-market notification (PMN) process. If LLM-medical devices go through the PMA process, I think it is very unlikely to be approved by March 31st since it would need to obtain an IDE (which alone can take 3-6 months) and IRB approval, and then go through the review process which can take 180 days. If it goes through the PMN process, it could be within the ~4 month timeline (especially if it has already been filed at the time of writing).
Additionally, in April there were mass layoffs at the FDA that are expected to impact devices in development. I anticipate the combination of reduced FDA capacity, and the potential for LLM hallucination will result in a PMN process and approval timelines beyond March 2026.
Why might you be wrong?
It's very possible that there are devices being reviewed currently that are close to approval already. The FDA doesn't have public data on the current devices they are reviewing, so it's possible the event could happen at any given point over the course of the time frame.