I’m giving only a 10% chance of collapse because, even though Egypt’s economy is under real pressure, it has repeatedly managed to avoid hitting extreme thresholds. Inflation is high but hasn’t approached 50% recently, the EGX 30 hasn’t shown the kind of sudden crashes that fit the criteria, and Egypt has consistently received support from the IMF and Gulf countries to avoid default. With that pattern in mind, I think the country is likely to muddle through the next year without crossing any of the specific triggers.
0.002103
Relative Brier Score
5
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Definitions | |||||
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
10%
Yes
90%
No
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
could be wrong if a major shock hits Egypt at the wrong time. A sharp currency drop, a spike in global rates, or regional instability could quickly push inflation higher or trigger a fast stock-market fall. There’s also the risk that external lenders delay or reduce support, which could make a debt-payment issue more likely. In short, an unexpected shock could push Egypt past one of the collapse thresholds sooner than expected.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
6%
(0%)
Estonia
5%
(0%)
Latvia
7%
(0%)
Lithuania
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
5%
Less than 250
20%
Between 250 and 349, inclusive
35%
Between 350 and 449, inclusive
25%
Between 450 and 549, inclusive
15%
More than or equal to 550
Why do you think you're right?
The numbers we’ve seen this year set a pretty strong baseline: 965 victims in March 2025 and 528 in April. Even if activity slows a bit in the summer, the longer-term trend is still moving upward—last August there were 449 victims, the year before 398, and only 198 back in 2022. On top of that, ransomware groups are leaning harder on public data leaks when payments aren’t made, which pushes the totals higher. Taking all of this together, it seems reasonable to expect August 2025 to end up well above past years, most likely in the mid-hundreds.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Ransomware doesn’t always follow a straight line. Big police operations or international crackdowns can suddenly disrupt gangs, as we saw with LockBit in 2024. Some groups may also switch strategies—choosing private extortion instead of posting leaks—which would make the numbers look smaller. There’s also the chance of simple seasonality or gaps in reporting. And of course, if one or two major groups ramp up activity, the victim count could easily spike higher than expected.
Files
Hey @evyon_2019 !
We are at 528 already. So it's either one of the last two buckets!
Files
New Badge
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
6%
Estonia
5%
Latvia
7%
Lithuania
Why do you think you're right?
Because although Russia maintains geopolitical ambitions and increasingly confrontational rhetoric, its military remains heavily strained by the war in Ukraine. At the same time, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not alone: NATO’s reinforced presence, the deployment of permanent brigades, and the accession of Finland and Sweden make any aggression extraordinarily costly for Moscow. Politically, an attack on the Baltics would not just be a local offensive—it would be a direct declaration of war against the entire alliance. That is why it is more reasonable to expect that, before 2027, Russia will continue to rely on threats, intimidation, and propaganda rather than risk an open clash that could leave it completely isolated.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Because politics is not always rational. If Russia perceives an opening—a distracted NATO divided internally, U.S. elections that weaken commitment to Europe, or a ceasefire in Ukraine that frees up troops—it might choose to test the alliance’s resolve in the Baltic region. It is also possible that internal pressure or the need to project strength could push the Kremlin into risks that today seem unthinkable. In this sense, miscalculation, rather than strategic logic, could be what drives an invasion scenario.
Files
Why do you think you're right?
Because the RSF still has manpower, foreign backing, and control over Darfur. A shock, SAF collapse, or sudden shift in external support could open a narrow path for an RSF comeback
Why might you be wrong?
Because the SAF now holds Khartoum, has stronger state backing, better international legitimacy, and the RSF is increasingly isolated in Darfur. Retaking a capital the RSF already lost would require a far stronger military position than they currently have.