150th
Accuracy Rank

geoffodlum

Geoff Odlum
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0.337793

Relative Brier Score

216

Forecasts

105

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Forecasting Activity
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Past Week Past Month Past Year This Season All Time
Forecasts 6 13 231 216 877
Comments 5 9 200 194 518
Questions Forecasted 6 11 31 26 107
Upvotes on Comments By This User 3 7 107 105 448
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Plataea479
made a comment:

Unfortunately, attribution and resolution in cyber attacks may come years after the event. Or maybe never. @geoffodlum makes a great point. When the Trump administration hardly spares a day without belittling our allies, the Article V commitments mean nothing

However in this year's National Defense Authorization Act, Congress prohibited the withdrawal of US troops from Europe without Congressional authorization. And Ukraine and The Baltic Security Initiative were funded albeit at reduced levels.

While these attacks are ongoing, wouldn't one expect such an attack to occur in conjunction with a major military operation. Isn't the declared willingness of NATO to retaliate a deterrent? 

These attacks increase in frequency and intensity and I am going to re evaluate my forecast.

Exclusive: US suspends some efforts to counter Russian sabotage as Trump moves closer to Putin - https://www.reuters.com/world/us-suspends-some-efforts-counter-russian-sabotage-trump-moves-closer-putin-2025-03-19/

The attack did not involve transportation or energy infrastructure. Little solace.  otherwise it qualifies. so far they have not taken down a power plant, since Ukraine in 2015. so far ....


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https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=886221420594696

I found this to be an insightful perspective from Gordon Corera, that the West largely views the Russia vs NATO dynamic as binary -- either war or peace, with "war" meaning all-out, potentially nuclear war.  This perspective made more sense during cold-war, when every country on the Eastern Flank was a member either of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and both sides believed that direct conflict might too easily escalate into mutually assured destruction.  

But since Putin ascended to power, he has shown again and again that he subscribes to the view that grey war / hybrid conflict, even directly with the West, is a legitimate and useful tool of power projection and statecraft.

Translating this into advice for fellow forecasters who believe there is only a 0-10% chance that Russia would launch an offensive cyber-attack against NATO member state infrastructure that causes kinetic damage: 

  • Its important to listen carefully to experts like Gordon Corera, and even more so to political leaders from Eastern Flank countries like Donald Tusk, Petr Pavel, Alexander Stubb, Kaja Kallas, etc, who all see the threat of Russian cyberattacks against their infrastructure as serious, credible, and in many cases ongoing.  I just don't see how their reality translates into the range of extremely low forecasts I'm seeing from expert forecasters here.  Clearly Russia has no problem conducting physical sabotage, and clearly Russia has significant offensive cyber capabilities, so what's the logic behind the conclusion that Russia would never use its cyber capabilities to cause kinetic damage? 
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grainmummy
made a comment:

The low probability figures may not negate these two facts (these restrained projections) may not negate these two facts. On the contrary, they assume that despite the existence of these capabilities and willingness, the escalation barrier (Article 5) is considered a very dangerous threshold for Russia to cross.

Regarding the threat versus the actual occurrence, Eastern European leaders are already saying that the threat is serious and credible because Russia has demonstrated its capabilities and intentions. Expert forecasters may also have considered the probability of this threat actually occurring to be low, as it is contrary to Russia's primary strategic interests.

Even the low predictive percentages mean that the risk of this event occurring is not zero, and its impact would be devastating, so I completely agree with you on the seriousness of the matter.

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

Dropping to 8% in light of today's news that Trump is allowing Nvidia to sell its more advanced H200 AI chips to "approved customers" China. That’s a pretty clear policy-loosening signal, not a move toward new frontier-explicit controls.

Also, the U.S. posture since October has emphasized export promotion (American AI Exports Program; EO to promote full-stack AI exports) rather than resurrecting the rescinded Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule’s frontier model-weight or cloud training controls. There’s been no new Commerce/BIS rulemaking re-targeting frontier model development in the past month as far as I can tell.  https://www.trade.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-american-ai-exports-program-implementation

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Why might you be wrong?

I can envision a credible threat to US AI model leadership (e.g., evidence of PRC frontier-class training jumping dramatically ahead of US models) triggering a narrow, frontier-explicit cloud/end-use rule.

Allied pressure for harmonized guardrails or a high-profile misuse incident might also give Commerce cover to act despite industry pushback...though given Trump's trashing of Europe in his new NSS, this seems unlikely.

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

BLUF:  I’m dropping to 8% given the passage of time and no significant new movement.

Having said that, there are several developments and updates worth noting since my last forecast:

Egypt–Jordan–Iraq (“trilateral mechanism”): Ministerial engagements and communiqués reaffirming cooperation have continued, but no movement towards a signed security MOU (defense/intel/joint ops) yet

Algeria and Tunisia signed a new bilateral defense cooperation agreement in October expanding training, information sharing, and border security coordination. This is a useful signal of momentum in the Maghreb, but bilateral ≠ multilateral under this question. (https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Top-News-EN/19306320-tunisia-and-algeria)

Arab League/GCC statements: Regional statements and Gaza-related frameworks continue, but these are political declarations, not new multilateral security instruments among ≥3 of the specified MENA states. (https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-12-3-3.aspx)

Revisiting my base rate: New, formal multilateral (≥3 states) security agreements among the listed MENA countries (excluding Iran/Saudi/Turkey/Israel as the core signers) are extremely rare in the past decade; most cooperation remains bilateral or broad Arab League/GCC communiqués without binding security clauses.  I should have started a bit lower, at 3-5%.

Revising my Drivers and signals: (1) Algeria–Tunisia tightening defense ties could be a step toward a Maghreb trilateral with Libya, but it’s not there yet; (2) Egypt–Jordan–Iraq remains the most plausible near-term candidate, yet their 2025 activity skewed economic/energy; (3) Gaza/Red Sea spillovers could pull the regional focus toward ad hoc coalitions or external-led formats rather than a new intra-Arab security pact. 

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Why might you be wrong?

A Gaza ceasefire stabilization package could catalyze an Arab security support arrangement (e.g., Egypt–Jordan + one or more North African states) with formal security language.

Border security pressures (Tunisia–Libya–Algeria) could harden into a trilateral security MOU if cross-border militancy or migration shocks surge



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Confirmed previous forecast
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geoffodlum
made their 22nd forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
3% (0%)
Estonia
4% (0%)
Latvia
3% (0%)
Lithuania
Confirmed previous forecast
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Confirmed previous forecast
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Why do you think you're right?

Dropping due to passage of time and absence of incident reporting that triggers this threshold.

However, several recent incidents have come close, and the cyber threat from Russia against NATO is rising not diminishing: 

--Russian cyberattacks on a Norwegian dam in August (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/14/russian-hackers-control-norwegian-dam-norway)

-- Russia GPS signal jamming of European aircraft over the Baltic Sea in September  (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyx3ly54veo)

-- the Polish government estimate of up to 1,000 serious Russian cyberattack attempts every day against Polish targets (https://www.reuters.com/technology/poland-says-cyberattacks-critical-infrastructure-rising-blames-russia-2025-10-10/

-- British FS Coooper warning today (December 9) that https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/putin-cyber-army-ukraine-russia-yvette-cooper-b2880355.html) Europe is seeing "an escalation in hybrid threats – from physical through to cyber – designed to weaken critical national infrastructure, undermine our interests and interfere in our democracies all for the advantage of malign foreign states."

I'm 95% confident that we will see evidence of a Russian cyber attacks against NATO member state energy or transport  infrastructure in the next 3-5 years that causes kinetic damage, but the timeline for such an incident occurring during this timeline is fast closing.  

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Why might you be wrong?

Russia's cyber forces and proxies may be far more careful than I give them credit for, in calibrating their frequent cyberattacks carefully enough to avoid causing kinetic damage. Or NATO's cyber defenses on critical infrastructure may be successfully blocking the most serious Russian cyberattacks.

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New Prediction
geoffodlum
made their 28th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
0% (0%)
Yes
Dec 4, 2025 to Jun 4, 2026
100% (0%)
No
Dec 4, 2025 to Jun 4, 2026
Confirmed previous forecast
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geoffodlum
made their 16th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
5% (0%)
Moldova
3% (0%)
Armenia
3% (0%)
Georgia
1% (0%)
Kazakhstan
Confirmed previous forecast
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