geoffodlum

I'm dropping to 8% from 10% because I don't think either Putin or Xi is willing to take such an escalatory step against a US or Allied (or MNNA) satellite under current geopolitical circumstances.  But we shouldn't rule out Iran using Russia's Kalinka anti-satellite capabilities against US and Allied satellites, as Iran may have done in January against Starlink (see https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/did-iran-just-use-russias-kalinka-jamming-system-starlink-bw-012026 and https://english.almayadeen.net/news/technology/kalinka--the-new-russian-archenemy-of-starlink--starshield)

I also wanted to flag this article in the National Interest on January 29 that highlights Russia's Tobol system in Kaliningrad, which uses EW to jam regional signals, though that's not (yet) permanent kill-chain behavior. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/tobol-understanding-russias-great-baltic-satellite-jammer-bw-012926

Also, see this January 21 Atlantic Council policy study on Countering Russian Escalation in Space, which flags Russia's escalation pathways in space. It frames the problem set and points to countermeasures rather than documenting any recent ASAT attacks, suggesting deterrence dynamics still favor reversible effects. But I also see it as confirmation that Russia is escalating in space and considers ASAT capabilities to be a core strategic asset. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/countering-russian-escalation-in-space/

Also, U.S. Space Force is doubling down on Dynamic Space Operations (things like distributed constellations, rapid reconstitution, active protection), which also highlights how vulnerable US satellites are to adversary attack: "The criticality of today’s U.S. space operations cannot be overstated. Current systems have fundamentally changed the way the United States operates its military and conducts operations in all domains. The space architecture the United States operates today, however, is tied to an assumption that space is a sanctuary, not a warfighting domain..." The next superpower conflict will almost certainly involve extensive space and satellite warfare.  https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/dynamic-space-operations/

These analyses explain why I am somewhat higher than the crowd wisdom of 5%.

Confirmed previous forecast

I just spent a chunk of time diving down Middle East regional media rabbit-holes, plus reviewing credible international media and MENA  oriented think tank analysis from the past several weeks. Although there is always a measure of persistent conflict risks and fragmentation in the region, I didn’t see any signals pointing towards a new multilateral security compact that would involve 3+ MENA states not including Saudi Arabia.

GCC capitals seem primarily focused on incremental coordination and internal resilience (economy, sovereign tech, maritime/security exercises) rather than treaty-level defense pacts that would bind multiple MENA states in a format separate from the GCC.

The Egypt–Jordan–Iraq trilateral (“New Levant”) continues political and economic coordination, but there’s no sign yet of a signed security MOU that meets the resolution bar (explicit defense/intel/joint ops language).

Maghreb tensions (notably Algeria–Morocco) still undercut prospects for broader Arab security integration that would rope in ≥3 non-excluded states.

Other major fora (e.g., the Arab League) are prioritizing crisis management and de-escalation over new defense treaties, and recent 2026 outlooks stress “downside security risks,” not integrative breakthroughs by mid-year. (source: https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/01/key-themes-shaping-middle-east-north-africa-2026)

https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/bis-revises-license-review-policy-for-advanced-computing-commodities-ai-semiconductors-to-china-and-macau-when-exported-from-the-united-states/

On Jan 15, the Commerce department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) shifted to a case-by-case license policy that allows exports of Nvidia H200-class GPUs (and equivalents) to China and Macau under strict conditions. This is a relaxation from the earlier “presumption of denial,” not a move toward sweeping new frontier-AI controls.

The rule’s guardrails, including third-party chip testing, supply-prioritization for U.S. demand, commitments not to transfer model weights, etc, are embedded in China/Macau licensing, so this is not a global, model-centric control that the question requires.

The broader Trump Administration posture including Commerce's “American AI Exports Program”, signals preference for enabling allied sales of the U.S. AI stack rather than reviving the Biden-era model-weight controls.

Congress is considering other chip-tightening bills (e.g., the “AI Overwatch Act” and the "Remote Access Security Act"), but these focus on oversight of AI-chip exports to China. Even if one is adopted, signed by the President, and implemented before July 31, I dont think these would create the kind of frontier-model/weights/cloud control that would trigger a “Yes.” But I'm always open to colleagues correcting me, as I get a bit confused reading the texts of these bills.

Bottom line:  BIS’s new rule is a China-specific licensing carve-out with safeguards, not the global, frontier-model/weights rule the question needs. I think this new rule lowers the chances that Congress will pass and Trump will sign new or expanded global export controls or restrictions explicitly targeting frontier AI model development by 31 July 2026.