johnnycaffeine

31 July is not a lot of time for something that isn't on the horizon right now. The base rate is very low these days, with the last deployment being in 2017. So that's maybe 5%. 

There is scholarship that there has been a general decline of peacekeeping, due to the great powers no longer agreeing on where peacekeepers should be sent, the withdrawal of US funding, and countries no longer being as willing to host them. So I take the initial 5% and adjust downward based on these factors.

Starting with the base rate (majority of the time China is greater than or equal to 5.0% annualized in Q2, plus the majority of the time it hits its targets). But then adjusting downwards for the fact that expert forecasts have 2026 as a whole at maybe 4 and a half percent (example).

Reducing the probability on the passage of time. The U.S. Department of Defense (still the official name, apparently) has issued a report here in which it assesses on page 55 a lot of the same ideas that we have expressed in this forecasting question. 

From the report:

China seeks to establish sites as part of a global logistics and basing network to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. China’s leaders probably accept varied levels of access to meet the PLA’s overseas military logistics needs– including bases with garrisoned forces, host-nation shared facilities, exclusive PLA logistics facilities collocated with commercial infrastructure, or ad-hoc access to commercial infrastructure abroad. The purpose and operations performed at each facility are likely to be determined based on host-nation agreements and each location’s utility rather than the actual title of the facility.
The PLA is actively considering and planning for additional military facilities to support naval and air projection with associated ground security forces. In March 2025, Gabonese President Brice Oligui Nguema confirmed China’s interest in a base in the Gulf of Guinea, alleging PLA basing in Gabon was discussed with President Xi in 2024.
China has likely also considered basing in Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu. The PLA is probably most interested in military access along the sea lines of communication in the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and other areas in Africa and the Middle East. 

That's a good summary of the situation in my view. I am thinking this is 1% a month or so.