Tweak.
0.821111
Relative Brier Score
163
Forecasts
18
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 3 | 13 | 176 | 163 | 1342 |
| Comments | 3 | 14 | 186 | 181 | 261 |
| Questions Forecasted | 1 | 10 | 62 | 60 | 153 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 2 | 19 | 18 | 133 |
| Definitions | |||||
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
Tweak.
Why do you think you're right?
Routine update.
Why might you be wrong?
Routine update.
Star Commenter - Nov 2025
Why do you think you're right?
Time update.
Why might you be wrong?
Time update.
Why do you think you're right?
I would adopt the crowd forecast if I were completely sold on the idea that Putin has no appetite whatsoever at peace, which may be his underlying current/motivation, and every meeting and negotiation is a bluff.
Why might you be wrong?
On the other hand, I think there is a sliver of potential openings and opportunities that if aligned correctly in time, will yield to even one ceasefire to being taken into effect.
One important thing to remember is although that Russia is rejecting recent terms and conditions, it is also Russia pushing for ceasefire, and specifically a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donetsk Oblast. This is short of those pesky high-bar conditions like giving up more land.
My view is that the NATO push against Russia is meaningfully strong, which should force Russia to desperately try to possibly gain other territories, but there doesn't seem to be any tangible appetite or plans for that at the moment, as resolving footing in Ukraine has to be priority. This puts Russia in a tight position of bending with negotiations under certain stress.
@probahilliby thanks! I just updated the LinkedIn hyperlink.
Have a good day!
Why do you think you're right?
Adjusting comfortably into lower bins as consistent with trends and my first forecast and rationale.
Why might you be wrong?
N/A
Why do you think you're right?
I think there are certainly shifts but mostly everything may be tentative. Movement and deployment will take more resources and send wrong signals at a time of needed stability for negotiation.
Why might you be wrong?
We can see these plans come into play if leaders of such agendas are on the extreme end of NATO backing and anti-Russia, those who are most pessimistic on Russia and believe in a strong NATO action plan to thwart the odds against Russia into Ukraine and Europe's favor.
In a hundred worlds, I can see this combination of conditions happening maybe 3 out of 100 times.
Why do you think you're right?
Slight updates for passage of time and reducing assuming negotiations will dampen odds a bit.
Why might you be wrong?
Slight updates for passage of time and reducing assuming negotiations will dampen odds a bit.
Why do you think you're right?
Time update.
Why might you be wrong?
Time update.