raframrod1410

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New Prediction
Confirmed previous forecast
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raframrod1410
made their 3rd forecast (view all):
This forecast expired on Nov 30, 2025 08:09PM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
15% (0%)
Yes
Oct 31, 2025 to Apr 30, 2026
85% (0%)
No
Oct 31, 2025 to Apr 30, 2026
Confirmed previous forecast
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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

Despite modest growth (from 19.4% in 2020 to 21.2% in 2024), structural and political challenges in the WANA region limit the pace of trade integration. No major policy shift suggests a leap to 24% is likely within 2 years.

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Why might you be wrong?

Although the EU shows sustained commitment to humanitarian aid, fiscal constraints, donor fatigue, and political fragmentation lower the odds of exceeding €20B. Moderate support (~€10B-€20B) remains the most plausible scenario.

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New Prediction
raframrod1410
made their 1st forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
5%
Europe allocates the same amount or less than the U.S.
15%
More than €0 but less than €10 billion
40%
At least €10 billion but less than €20 billion
25%
At least €20 billion but less than €30 billion
15%
€30 billion or more
Why do you think you're right?

Since early 2025, U.S. military aid to Ukraine has stagnated under the Trump administration, while Europe has continued its contributions at a relatively steady pace. This divergence has widened the existing gap in total allocations. Europe already surpassed the U.S. in total aid as of early 2025 and is now on track to outpace the U.S. in cumulative military aid by year-end. The consistency of European support-combined with increased domestic resistance to aid in the U.S.- supports a forecast where Europe ends up providing significantly or slightly more than the


U.S. between January 2022 and December 2025.

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Why might you be wrong?

There is a possibility that some European countries reduce their military aid due to domestic political shifts, economic strain, or strategic fatigue. Simultaneously, a shift in the U.S. political environment-such as emergency funding or congressional maneuvers-could restart or accelerate aid. Also, discrepancies in the classification or timing of aid packages could narrow the gap, making total contributions more balanced than expected.

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New Prediction
raframrod1410
made their 4th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
5% (0%)
Less than or equal to 59
10% (0%)
Between 60 and 69, inclusive
25% (0%)
Between 70 and 79, inclusive
35% (0%)
Between 80 and 89, inclusive
25% (0%)
More than or equal to 90
Confirmed previous forecast
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PeterStamp
made a comment:
We are already at 67.
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New Prediction
New Prediction
raframrod1410
made their 5th forecast (view all):
This forecast expired on Oct 31, 2025 05:43AM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
28% (-10%)
Yes
Jul 31, 2025 to Jan 31, 2027
72% (+10%)
No
Jul 31, 2025 to Jan 31, 2027
Why do you think you're right?

Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to target critical infrastructure through cyber means, especially during periods of heightened geopolitical tension. While most attacks have remained non-kinetic, the complexity of operational technology (OT) systems in energy and transportation sectors increases the chances that a cyberattack could unintentionally result in physical damage or casualties. The longer the Ukraine war drags on and NATO support intensifies, the more likely Russia may seek to escalate or retaliate through asymmetric methods. A 28% probability reflects the possibility of deliberate or accidental escalation in this volatile environment.

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Why might you be wrong?

The Russian government has thus far avoided cyberattacks that cross the kinetic threshold, likely due to fears of triggering a NATO Article 5 response. Moscow values ambiguity and plausible deniability, and would risk losing those strategic advantages if it caused casualties or infrastructure damage in a NATO country. Additionally, NATO members have substantially improved their cyber defenses and incident response capabilities. These factors-combined with the Kremlin's historical preference for sub- threshold operations-support the view that such a kinetic-effect attack remains relatively unlikely in the forecast window.

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