0.083358
Relative Brier Score
18
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Definitions | |||||
Most Active Topics:
Geopolitical Security,
Russia-Ukraine War,
Emerging Technology
Most Active Topics:
Cybersecurity,
Russian Disinformation,
Mirror Life,
Russia-Europe,
MENA
Why do you think you're right?
Despite modest growth (from 19.4% in 2020 to 21.2% in 2024), structural and political challenges in the WANA region limit the pace of trade integration. No major policy shift suggests a leap to 24% is likely within 2 years.
Why might you be wrong?
Although the EU shows sustained commitment to humanitarian aid, fiscal constraints, donor fatigue, and political fragmentation lower the odds of exceeding €20B. Moderate support (~€10B-€20B) remains the most plausible scenario.
Why do you think you're right?
Since early 2025, U.S. military aid to Ukraine has stagnated under the Trump administration, while Europe has continued its contributions at a relatively steady pace. This divergence has widened the existing gap in total allocations. Europe already surpassed the U.S. in total aid as of early 2025 and is now on track to outpace the U.S. in cumulative military aid by year-end. The consistency of European support-combined with increased domestic resistance to aid in the U.S.- supports a forecast where Europe ends up providing significantly or slightly more than the
U.S. between January 2022 and December 2025.
Why might you be wrong?
There is a possibility that some European countries reduce their military aid due to domestic political shifts, economic strain, or strategic fatigue. Simultaneously, a shift in the U.S. political environment-such as emergency funding or congressional maneuvers-could restart or accelerate aid. Also, discrepancies in the classification or timing of aid packages could narrow the gap, making total contributions more balanced than expected.
Why do you think you're right?
Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to target critical infrastructure through cyber means, especially during periods of heightened geopolitical tension. While most attacks have remained non-kinetic, the complexity of operational technology (OT) systems in energy and transportation sectors increases the chances that a cyberattack could unintentionally result in physical damage or casualties. The longer the Ukraine war drags on and NATO support intensifies, the more likely Russia may seek to escalate or retaliate through asymmetric methods. A 28% probability reflects the possibility of deliberate or accidental escalation in this volatile environment.
Why might you be wrong?
The Russian government has thus far avoided cyberattacks that cross the kinetic threshold, likely due to fears of triggering a NATO Article 5 response. Moscow values ambiguity and plausible deniability, and would risk losing those strategic advantages if it caused casualties or infrastructure damage in a NATO country. Additionally, NATO members have substantially improved their cyber defenses and incident response capabilities. These factors-combined with the Kremlin's historical preference for sub- threshold operations-support the view that such a kinetic-effect attack remains relatively unlikely in the forecast window.