Null-Null

The naive death probability for a 71-year-old male in the US is approximately 3%, and there does not seem to be a good reason to believe that Putin is significantly healthier than the average 71-year-old male. Moreover, the base rate of regime change is nonzero, Russia's government is deeply opaque (so we might well not see any sign of impending coup), and the political and economic system continues to be under high stress.

While North Korea is unlikely to take intentional action against a military vessel, either accidental/rogue action (as seems relatively likely in the sinking of the Cheonan) or brief boarding/arresting of a civilian vessel are both plausible. It may also be that if the region destabilizes (e.g. by increased aggression by China), North Korea will take the opportunity to aggress on South Korean islands. In the event of sudden regime change, attacks (intentional or accidental) could also occur.

The fraction of Ukrainians interested in territorial concessions is still a significant minority, and presumably a smaller fraction of those would be willing to accept the current state of controlled territory in a ceasefire. Moreover, Russia has indicated unwillingness to accept even that deal; apart from refusal of proposed ceasefires, Russia continues to call up substantial numbers of troops. Current projections do not seem to suggest that Russia is likely to run out of resources to pursue the war within the next six months, and given that the conflict has largely consisted of grinding infantry skirmishes, it seems unlikely that the state of it will change abruptly. Ukrainian supply is constrained, but Europe has increased its support, so they have the capability to fight on as well. I suspect that Ukraine is unwilling to accept substantial territorial losses without a guarantee of prompt NATO membership (or at the very least a heavy perpetual peacekeeping force), and Russia's territorial ambitions would seem to preclude them accepting any such bargain

The base rate of coups in Africa appears to be approximately one every six months, leading to a relatively high base estimate. Moreover, there appears to be a fairly high chance of global economic recession in the next several months, which often destabilizes governments, leading to an increased chance.

At the moment, I suspect that Wagner will deploy to a new African country only if, and likely if, a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine occurs before the resolution date. Current international reporting agrees that Russia is low on mechanized assets, and moderately low on infantry; a deployment would likely reduce both. 

If the war ends, Wagner deployments are an effective means/aspect of Russia's strategy for increasing influence and obtaining funding from Africa; as both of these are in short supply, I suspect that there would be a prompt deployment in a post-ceasefire world (if any African countries are interested in such a deployment, which seems moderately likely, though not certain).

The chance of a ceasefire in the next eight months seems relatively low. Russia's current lack of resources, as well as Europe's apparently renewed commitment to Ukraine, seem to imply that Ukraine may be in a better long-term position to reclaim its territory; therefore, they are likely to continue fighting. Putin has repeatedly indicated unwillingness to accept a ceasefire, and especially one that cedes any captured land, and it is unclear whether it would even be politically sustainable for him to do so, so a drive towards peace by Russia seems highly unlikely. Neither side seems likely to win the war in any sense in the next several months; unless the nature of the conflict changes, grinding infantry conflicts rarely end quickly. I estimate the chance that the war resolves by the resolution date as quite low.

As the US falters, Europe is growing increasingly conscious of its own security threats, most of the mass of which comes from Russia. Ukraine has, for some years, been a fairly staunch opponent of Russia and has drained substantial aggressive resources of Russia. Europe is likely to move toward a future where military might matters more; as this comes, an appreciation for Ukraine's part in the same is likely to increase.

As of now, Nvidia lags 20% behind Apple's market cap. Current signs suggest a substantial economic downturn, and Nvidia depends for its revenue largely on AI development, which is driven largely by speculative investing (greatly reduced in downturns). The markets have for some time been in a period of extraordinarily cheap investment capital, which has substantially contributed to the high demand for GPUs; a perceived reduction in that flow will likely further decrease the price. Apple, by contrast, sells consumer devices for which demand is less elastic, and is therefore likely to be hit somewhat less hard by the downturn. Much demand for GPUs is currently driven by large companies attempting to build extraordinarily large models; this trend doesn't seem likely to continue, given the apparent diminishing returns from increased size.