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An agreement matching the resolution criteria appears to be have been signed.
An additional reference discussing nuances of the agreement might be of interest to review: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/natos-new-spending-target-challenges-and-risks-associated-political-signal
A nation decides to withdraw support for the agreement on or before July 31st, 2025.
@starfield1 , I agree with your rationale regarding the general understanding of the question. I don’t want to lead you astray with my rationale however! I have acquiesced to a different probability due to the new clarification provided. So, wanted to alert you to assess it too. In case you wanted to change your forecast based on the new information.
Measles cases in 2025 already exceed those for 2019. At a uniform rate of 200 new cases per month (average of current cases divided by current months), through 9 months suggests 1,800 new cases is possible. (Note, there were also ~200 new cases between May and June, according to the question and the CDC's page https://www.cdc.gov/measles/data-research/index.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_10-measles-cases-in-2025) This threshold seems achievable considering the regional proximity of states with lower vaccination rates to states with higher numbers of reported cases. Considering summer activities and increased travel, the chance of exposure also increases.
The case rate is unlikely to be uniform and will likely decline to a much lower level, as CDC's data suggestions on the measle's cases page. Global/international measle vaccination rates and/or outbreaks may also influence the case rate in the U.S., albeit on a longer timescale.
Thank you for the reply.
the inference you're making (that I'm implying a probable outcome based on a rough numeric forecast) - is not well-founded.
I am not sure I am following here. When we assign a probability of 36% for scenario A, 64% for scenario B, and 0% for a number of other scenarios, then by definition we consider (not just imply) B to be the most probable scenario, right?
if the question is simply asking how many cases will be reported by the CDC through Sept 2025, does it really matter when they are reported?
The point of my delayed reporting remark is that this is crucial for anyone trying to calculate the case rate now (e.g. 200 new cases per month) and possibly extrapolate that for the near future (even with attenuation), not of course that because they are delayed they do not count.
I think the number of acres burned has several key drivers: the soil moisture deficit, surface temperatures, wind patterns, rainfall timing and amounts (climate patterns affect likelihood of occurrence, and relevant climate factors can be non-local), availability of vegetation "fuel", the number of fires, number of regionally-proximal fires, and the capacity of fire teams (regional, national, or international) to suppress/contain all fires through various means.
The current North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook for June - August 2025 indicates above normal fire conditions in areas throughout North America (Canada, US, and Mexico), early snow melts in certain regions, drought conditions, and ongoing and extensive regionally-proximal fires since May, especially near the Canada-US border. The National Interagency Fire Center's National Fire News corroborates these forecasts (and the increasing risk for summer) in its current status report. The National Fire Preparedness Level is currently 3 suggesting national-scale mobilization of resources to address anticipated significant wildfire events. In the US, the current number of fires is also 131% above average this year. While the NCEI's Wildfires Report suggests strong variation over multiple years in the total number of acres burned, a large increase above average appears to occur every few years (with 2025 potentially being one of those years). Taken together, it seems reasonable to expect a greater than average number of acres burned this July.
The precise geographic distribution of fire incidents and their timing/duration can be difficult to surmise. The availability of resources to organize, contain, and suppress fires is also unclear to me, as are methods for accurately assessing the number of acres burned.
If global tensions remain high in August and economic stability is not regained then both nation-state and non-state actors may pursue opportunities to exploit, at an increased pace, organizational vulnerabilities (e.g., in the U.S., where many skilled government employees have departed the prior roles) and/or exert political influence, or simply to attack critical infrastructure for monetary gain and/or political gain. The landscape of tools available for cyber attacks in general has also been maturing, along with the ability of new groups of adversarial actors to form. The current trend (Data Breaches Digest) seems to be pushing the upper-bound on attacks to higher levels.
I am not sure how quickly groups are forming or what motivates them to develop and execute a ransomware attack. Both of these influence the rate at which attacks occur (in addition to the accessibility of exploitable system vulnerabilities).
Given that Iran has stated it is suspending nuclear talks with the U.S., and its focus on responding to attacks on its territory (even with a potentially reduced capability to organize and do so) it seems extremely unlikely for a substantive, comprehensive nuclear deal to be brokered by the U.S. Since the Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the previous deal during Trump's prior term in office, it also seems unlikely that deal can be re-established without a substantive ability to argue in political circles that is "new".
If the U.S. is able to successfully use a surrogate negotiator, a deal might be struck, but given the available time remaining, this also seems unlikely.
@starfield1
- Question: Do you think there is still a 9% probability that these military forces will engage in lethal combat by the end of September?