-0.825338
Relative Brier Score
174
Forecasts
20
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 5 | 11 | 174 | 11 | 174 |
| Comments | 1 | 3 | 93 | 3 | 93 |
| Questions Forecasted | 5 | 5 | 23 | 5 | 23 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 20 |
| Definitions | |||||
Most Active Topics:
Geopolitical Security,
Russia-Ukraine War,
Emerging Technology,
Quickfire Forecasts,
Forecaster Submissions
Most Active Topics:
Russia-Europe,
Emerging Tech - AI
Why do you think you're right?
Though Russia previously invaded Georgia, its democratic backsliding and pro-Russian Georgian Dream party appear to have secured it to Moscow’s orbit. Other countries present either very little incentive or opportunity for invasion.
Why might you be wrong?
Many things can change on such a long time horizon. If one of these countries experiences a dramatic internal political shift, Russia may choose to intervene.
Why do you think you're right?
The medical device approval process typically takes 90-180 days, and I can’t find other examples of devices incorporating LLMs in the pipeline.
Additionally, I expect that any devices awaiting approval will take longer due to the novel aspects of vetting an LLM.
Why might you be wrong?
The definition of medical devices is extremely broad, and it’s possible a device has been submitted that avoids the negative clinical implications of hallucinations.
Why do you think you're right?
I found two examples of incursions in:
2024 saw "Joint Sword-2024A" (May 23-24), with violations around Kinmen and Matsu, but no recorded crossings of the contiguous 24-mile boundary.
"Joint Sword-2024B" (Oct. 14-15) does not appear to have any recorded violations, nor does the unnamed exercise conducted in December 2024.
The trend appears to be deeper encroachment into Taiwanese territory since the May 2024 inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te.
China has conducted naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait between February 1st and July 31st every year since 2021. These usually occur in April or May.
Taiwan's ability to respond appears limited. Coupled with its "red-line" policy at the 12-nautical-mile mark, I believe the PRC is highly incentivized to cross this boundary again.
I put the probability of this occurring during 2026 at >99%, with a high probability for this particular question due to previous PRC exercises in the spring.
Why might you be wrong?
The crossings first occurred only last year, and Chinese leadership may choose a less confrontational route in 2026 for geopolitical reasons. Additionally, they may occur outside of the window provided.