Bringing this down to zero, given that we're only a few hrs away from the deadline and there is no news about Spain reconsidering its position.
0.454897
Relative Brier Score
16
Forecasts
3
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Definitions | |||||
New Prediction
New Badge
Star Commenter - Jul 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(-1%)
Yes
100%
(+1%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Of course, some surprise might still happen, but again, given the proximity of the deadline, it's hard for me to believe that Spain could still change its mind.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
1%
(+1%)
Yes
99%
(-1%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
Not sure why it recorded "0%", so I'm just updating that now. My rationale why it's so low remains the same as my previous entry.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Same as before, I'm just updating from "0%" to "1%", bc that was my original intention.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
Yes
100%
No
Why do you think you're right?
Given that the question specifically asks about reaching an agreement by AUG 1, and given that the E3 have set an informal deadline at the end of August 2025 to reach a comprehensive agreement, it seems extremely unlikely that it will get signed by EOD TOM.
Meanwhile, Iran has conditioned any renewed direct talks with the United States on Washington’s acknowledgment of damage from mid-June strikes and a binding guarantee against future attacks—a stance that complicates immediate resumption of negotiations.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I'm keeping the 1% just because, one never knows what might be going on behind the scenes that might surprise us all.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
5%
(-10%)
Yes
95%
(+10%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
The UK, France and Ukraine agreed on mature operational plans and a UK/French-led headquarters to support force generation once a ceasefire or peace deal is in place.
At the Rome meeting the same day, UK Defence Secretary John Healey confirmed Britain stands ready to send troops to reinforce a potential ceasefire, but stressed that any deployment remains conditional on a comprehensive ceasefire agreement and Ukraine’s formal invitation. So, I do think there's still a chance...
Files
Why might you be wrong?
...but it seems less likely that an actual formal ceasefire will happen bef EOY now.
MAX Intelligence assigns a roughly 60% probability to a successful ceasefire negotiation in 2025, driven by U.S. pressure and battlefield exhaustion on both sides.
ISW analysts consider a full ceasefire by December 2025 unlikely, highlighting Russia’s continued offensive in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions and minimal incentives for Moscow to pause fighting.
GLOBSEC projects the “prolonged war of attrition” scenario as the leading path for 2024–2025, with a 31% probability, underscoring the war’s persistence beyond the end of 2025 and limited room for comprehensive ceasefire efforts.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
95%
Yes
5%
No
Why do you think you're right?
- I calculated 3 estimates: 1,485,917, 1,328,271, and 1,826,630.24
- Looked at US average temperatures; while 2025 is not expected to be as warm as 2024, it seems that wildfire burned acreage seems to follow temperatures by one year, so, just based on this, this year can be expected to be as bad in terms of wildfires as 2024
- Now, 2024 was crazy in terms of burned acreage (8.9M), and while since the year 2000, 14 years have seen 7.5M or more, and 7 of those 14 have seen close 9M or more acreage burnt, including 2024 (2023 was an anomaly with only 2.7M acres burnt), it's not likely that two years in a row see close to 9M or more burnt, so I got two different estimates using prior JUL data and JUL-SEP data
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Say the estimate of 1.33M is the most reasonable based on the method I used. Then, given some margin of error, it's possible that that number could be as low as 1.28M, so just below the question's figure of 1,283,147 acres
Files
Such "macro" forecasts are certainly game before the music starts, but we are no more viewing the situation from afar - we are already on July 23, with new data coming on a daily basis; did you take into account that, as of July 1-22, we had 1,090,063 acres burnt? https://www.randforecastinginitiative.org/comments/187879
this year can be expected to be as bad in terms of wildfires as 2024
- 2025 YTD: 38,928 fires, 2,879,645 acres burnt
- 2024 YTD: 19,834 fires, 3,618,741 acres burnt
Source: https://www.nifc.gov/fire-information/nfn (as of July 22)
So, although the number of fires is almost double this year, the acreage burnt is significantly lower
Files
Why do you think you're right?
The deployment of forces, being contingent on a ceasefire, is more unlikely, because the ceasefire itself is farther from realization. Since Putin's visit to Alaska, Russia has intensified the fight, the US is really not pushing Russia, and Ukraine is also more determined not to cede its territory.
Why might you be wrong?
Depending on the domestic political situation, Trump might still use this conflict as a distraction from any uncomfortable topic (like the Epstein files story was earlier this summer).