Ana-Santana

Ana Santana
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Most Active Topics:
Biotech, Russia-Europe, MENA

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@1earphone  Recent data shows a continued decline in Russian natural gas exports to Europe, with quarterly volumes falling steadily due to the shutdown of pipeline flows through Ukraine in January 2025, reduced reliance on Russian energy under the REPowerEU plan, and an increasing share of EU gas coming from LNG and non-Russian suppliers.


The chart indicates that Russian gas imports in Q3 2025 are around 14–15 billion cubic meters. For the criterion to resolve “Yes,” total imports in Q3 + Q4 2025 must reach at least 19 billion cubic meters. This would require a significant rebound in Q4 2025—despite clear structural, political, and logistical trends pushing imports downward.

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@40_Mahid-Mustafiz Unexpected geopolitical or market shifts could cause a temporary increase in Russian gas imports. For example, an especially cold winter in Europe, disruptions in LNG supply chains, or domestic political pressures within certain EU member states (e.g., Hungary or Slovakia) could lead to short-term increases in demand for cheaper Russian gas.


Additionally, if the EU were to delay or relax planned restrictions on Russian LNG imports further, Q4 2025 volumes could exceed expectations. A major change in the Ukraine transit situation or an unexpected increase in Turkish or Balkan transit capacity could also raise import levels.

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@4cast4life  Europe is under growing pressure to compensate for the potential reduction of U.S. military support to Ukraine.

Several European countries, such as Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom, already operate M270 systems or have invested in producing HIMARS-compatible ammunition. In addition, the EU has announced plans to boost ammunition production and proposed a €40 billion fund for military assistance to Ukraine.

There is also active interest in alternative systems like South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo (already procured by Poland) and Israel’s PULS (being evaluated by Germany and the Netherlands).

Given the current political and military dynamics, it seems likely that at least one European government will formally commit before the end of 2025 to providing Ukraine with one of these rocket artillery systems.

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@aakashsudhakar Europe still faces major constraints: ammunition production remains insufficient, and many countries are prioritizing their own defense needs amid fears of a prolonged conflict.

There are also political and logistical barriers—some European governments are reluctant to transfer advanced systems without coordination with the U.S., and export license negotiations (particularly with South Korea and Israel) could delay or block formal commitments.

It’s also possible that Europe will choose to increase financial aid or training support rather than deliver new rocket artillery systems directly.


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Ana-Santana
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Probability
Answer
8%
Less than $350 million
29%
More than or equal to $350 million but less than $500 million
30%
More than or equal to $500 million but less than $650 million
17%
More than or equal to $650 million but less than $800 million
16%
More than or equal to $800 million
Why do you think you're right?

@aQxjdIBdOKqjPSsiwzQMFrDB The biotech sector remains one of the strongest areas for early-stage investment in Europe, with continued demand for innovation in drug discovery, gene therapy, and AI-driven biotechnology. Despite some macroeconomic uncertainty, investor appetite for health tech and biotech remains high due to long-term growth prospects and pandemic preparedness goals.

2024’s total of roughly $380 million in seed rounds demonstrates a resilient funding base, and the 2025 figures—though lower so far—suggest room for acceleration as venture markets stabilize and new EU-level funding programs (such as Horizon Europe and the European Innovation Council) continue to support biotech startups.

Given these factors, I expect seed funding in 2025–2026 to either match or exceed 2024 levels as the investment climate improves.

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@Aayush A sustained slowdown in venture capital or higher interest rates could continue to suppress early-stage funding. Investors may prioritize later-stage companies with lower risk profiles, especially if biotech IPO and acquisition activity remains weak.

Regulatory uncertainty in the EU and UK, combined with competition for capital from AI and climate tech, might divert funding away from early-stage biotech. If global economic conditions worsen or major funds reduce exposure to healthcare startups, total seed round funding could remain well below 2024 levels.


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@Ana-Santana Both the U.S. and the UK are moving toward stronger AI governance, with clear interest in linking cybersecurity practices to financial incentives. The UK’s Code of Practice for AI cybersecurity and its roadmap for third-party assurance suggest a growing infrastructure for independent audits. In the U.S., bipartisan interest in cybersecurity tax credits shows political appetite for using tax incentives to promote security.

Given this momentum and international coordination on AI safety standards, it is plausible that at least one of these governments will formalize a law tying tax incentives to independent AI security audits before 2029

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@Ana-Santana Legislative inertia and competing priorities could delay or block formal legislation. In both countries, most current efforts remain voluntary or in early policy stages. The complexity of defining “AI security audits” and verifying compliance may make governments prefer non-binding frameworks or certifications instead of tax-based incentives.

Additionally, political shifts or economic constraints could deprioritize AI-specific legislation in favor of broader cybersecurity or innovation-focused incentives that do not meet the specific resolution criteria.

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Ana-Santana
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Probability
Answer
10%
1 January 2025 - 31 March 2025
20%
1 April 2025 - 30 June 2025
25%
1 July 2025 - 30 September 2025
25%
1 October 2025 - 31 December 2025
20%
Not before 2026
Why do you think you're right?

There are signs of partial progress in negotiations, such as Ukraine’s support for a 30-day proposal, even if Russia has not yet agreed. International pressure (from the U.S., EU, and Saudi Arabia) combined with military and economic exhaustion increases the likelihood of a bilateral ceasefire later in 2025. Historical precedents show that ceasefires in protracted conflicts often occur after several years of high costs on both sides.

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The conflict may last longer because Russia and Ukraine still have fundamental disagreements over territory and security guarantees. Even if a ceasefire is announced, it may not meet the criteria (bilateral, official forces, prohibition of offensive operations). Unexpected factors such as a shift in U.S. policy, renewed escalation on the battlefield, or internal crises in either country could delay any agreement until 2026 or beyond.
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I believe there is a relatively high probability of a new multilateral security agreement because several MENA countries are currently facing common security threats such as terrorism, regional instability, and maritime security challenges. There is also increasing international pressure, especially from the U.S. and European Union, to encourage regional cooperation. Historical precedents, such as the Abraham Accords and the Arab League/Syria reinstatement, show that when common interests align, agreements can materialize relatively quickly.

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Why might you be wrong?

My forecast could be wrong if regional rivalries prevent cooperation, especially between states with conflicting political agendas. Domestic instability in countries like Libya, Syria, or Lebanon could also reduce the likelihood of reaching formal agreements. Additionally, if external actors such as the U.S. or Russia shift their priorities, regional governments may have fewer incentives to pursue multilateral security frameworks. Another possibility is that cooperation continues informally or bilaterally, without being formalized in a public, multilateral agreement.

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